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Abstract 
The well-known global crisis of 2007-2008 occurred after an economic boom made 
possible by U.S deregulation, which massively transformed the financial system in the early 
2000s. The boom was characterized by accelerating housing market prices and financial 
innovation in the form of asset securitization, including the development of a complex 
derivative instruments market. These factors, together with a scarce supervision, fueled an 
asset price bubble, with the boost of the subprime mortgage market. What began on a local 
level in the US with failing institutions like Bear Stearns quickly spread globally due to the 
high interconnectivity of the financial sector. 
As the crisis advanced, its effects passed from banks to the real economy, showing its 
severe spillovers especially in Europe. The European sovereign debt crisis made evident the 
fragility of monetary union under turmoil and the lack of macroeconomic tools for effective 
intervention. The cross-border exposure of some big European Union banks to sovereign debt 
in weaker (peripherical) European economies was quite significant in some countries. Cyprus, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain were unable to repay or refinance their government 
debt and/or to bail out their “national” banks without assistance from the European Central 
Bank (ECB), or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) was created as a special vehicle to provide direct financial assistance, forbidden under 
the EU functioning treaty. The crisis showed that the EU had to improve the European-wide 
system for coordination and cooperation in the management of cross-border banks. A system 
based on ad hoc coordination was insufficient in an integrated market and even more within a 
common currency.  
All these considerations posed the basis for the drafting of the BRRD (2014/59/EU) 
whose aim is to create a common framework for bank resolution across all EU Member 
States, changing the focus of intervention from public bail-outs to bail-ins. Actually, the 
Directive gives authorities and central banks further tools before the liquidation of a failing 
institution. However, the real question, besides the technical aspects involved in its 
implementation, is whether and when a full bail-in will be put in action. 
From a first analysis it seems that market isn’t capable to insert the bail-in risk, letting 
CDS prices and rating evaluations be free from resolution considerations. The management of 
recent bank crises raised questions about the EU credibility to impose private losses without 
demanding a sacrifice to the public. 
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The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 is intended to give a clue on the 
idiosyncrasies of the bail-in approach compared to the bail-out procedure in preventing and 
tackling banking crises; Chapter 2 analyses the main features of the European Bank 
Resolution and Recovery Directive, including an overview on the most famous cases of 
resolution intervention within the bail-in framework; Chapter 3 explains the methodology 
adopted in the assessment of the coherence among bail-in and risk indicators under a three 
dimensions framework; Chapter 4 summarizes the results obtained; Chapter 5, the last one, 
picks up the conclusions.  
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1. Financial crisis: from Bail-out to Bail-in 
1.1 Bail-outs should be no more the proper solution 
A common policy response undertaken by several countries after the 2007-2008 crisis 
was the bail-out of national banks, justified with the priority to avoid the systemic threat that 
the failure of any bank beyond a certain size carries with it, in a sort of too big to fail 
perspective. Furthermore, the unforeseen dimension of the post-Lehman panic and the 
unprecedented level of money market disruption of that crisis discouraged many economists 
and politicians to talk of bail-in as a tool for managing such crises.  
Bail-outs take various forms, each subtly different in their benefit to different 
stakeholders and their likely impact on the government’s finances and therefore on taxpayers 
tout court. The main tool is the recapitalization of the struggling bank. The central bank 
allows for the injection of funds (cash or other instruments) in return for an equity stake or 
subordinated debt, which tends to dilute existing shareholders in favour of senior creditors; 
the degree to which dilution occurs depends on the price of the equity. The higher the stock 
price, the fewer shares must be sold to raise the same amount of capital. An alternative 
approach is to provide a government guarantee instead of cash. Guarantees typically require 
an insurance premium payment by the covered bank. For instance, the UK put up 40 percent 
of GDP in guarantees at the disposal of its banks; many other countries provided a multiple of 
that through assurances for the entire deposit base. It is true that the back-stops broadly 
worked, the guarantees were often not used, and bank capital injections by the state in some 
cases even turned out to be profitable for the state (as occurred in Italy, see Figure 1). 
However, even if the guarantee shows a profit in the end, it may benefit both the creditors and 
the shareholders ex ante and therefore bail-outs are hugely unpopular. Sometimes it may be 
the case that the ongoing business is performing poorly and a third way to bail out creditors is 
the acquisition of troubled assets (e.g. NPLs) at an above-market price. This method was 
supposed to be implemented in the U.S under the name of troubled asset relief program 
(TARP). By doing so banks are still able to pursue their core activities without damaging the 
whole financial industry. 
In November 2011, the U.S Congress forced a one-time audit of the Federal Reserve 
to disclose the amount of emergency lending, kept idle until then. After the audit, the public 
found out the bail-out was in trillions not billions1, as originally stated, and that there were no 
requirements attached to the bail-out money, that is: the banks could use it for any purpose. 
                                                 
1 Collins M. (2015). 
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The total bill reached $7.7 trillion2, 600 billion of them were used only to save Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac. In Europe the biggest bail-out cases concerned Dexia and Fortis and the bill 
rose to €800 billion. The subsequent sovereign debt and banking crises within the eurozone 
led national governments to underpin the balance sheets of several banks through extensive 
bail-outs at the expense of taxpayers3.  
As shown in Figure 1, in 11 European member states the fiscal impact of the bail-out 
measures undertaken between 2008 and 2014 exceeded 3% of the 2014 GDP; in Ireland, it 
reached 31.1%; and in Greece, Cyprus and Slovenia, more than 18%. 
 
One may ask: isn’t capitalism designed to get rid of the weak and the failed? Why 
didn’t regulators just let them fail? The answer was that they were, as stated before, too big to 
fail and allowing them to fail could have created greater losses leading a worldwide 
depression. However, using central banks as lenders of last resort made the big even bigger, 
causing a vicious circle. 
Clearly, bail-outs are a potential source of moral hazard and can undermine market 
discipline, given that the use of public money is a market-distortive action. For these reasons, 
regulatory authorities throughout the world are trying to introduce resolution regimes that 
allow, in principle, banks to fail without resorting to public funding. These bundle of reforms 
aims at internalizing the costs of bank failure of which the foremost is the drawing up of bank 
creditor bail-ins. Essentially, bail-in constitutes a radical rethinking of who bears the ultimate 
                                                 
2 Ivry, Keoun & Kuntz (2011). 
3 Micossi, Bruzzone & Cassella (2016). 
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costs of rescuing a distressed bank. The bail-in approach is intended to counter the dual threat 
of systemic disruption and sovereign over-indebtedness. It is based on the penalty principle, 
namely, that the costs of bank failures are shifted to where they best belong: bank 
shareholders and creditors. Namely, bail-in replaces the public subsidy with private penalty 
(Huertas, 2013) or with private insurance (KPMG, 2012; Gordon, Ringe, 2014) forcing banks 
to internalize the cost of risks which they assume. 
This is an important development, since in the past banks’ subordinated debt did not 
provide any cover when bank liquidation was not an option, which meant that subordinated 
creditors were bailed out alongside senior creditors by taxpayers (Gleeson, 2012). This led to 
a sticky situation of creditor inertia because creditors, bearing almost no risk, had no incentive 
to watch over the manager’s actions. Shareholders, instead, have every incentive to monitor 
the management’s behaviour since it affects their return on equity. 
Turning unsecured debt into bail-in-able debt should incentivize creditors to resume a 
monitoring function, thereby helping to restore market discipline. For example, as the 
potential costs of bank failure would fall on creditors, in addition to shareholders, such 
creditors should become more alert about the levels of leverage the bank carries (Coffee, 
2011), limiting one of the most likely causes of bank failures and the governance costs 
associated with excessive leverage (Admati et al. 2013; Avgouleas and Cullen, 2014b).  
Such monitoring might, in turn, reduce the scale of loss in the event of a bank failure: 
creditors could force the bank to behave more cautiously, especially where the bail-in regime 
allows for earlier intervention and closure than a bail-out mechanism. It should also, in 
principle, eliminate the too-big-to-fail subsidy enjoyed by bigger banks. 
Essentially, bail-in means that, to a certain extent, a pre-planned contract replaces the 
bankruptcy process giving greater certainty (Coffee, 2011) about the sufficiency of funds to 
cover bank losses and facilitating early recapitalization. Moreover, the bail-in tool can be used 
to keep the bank as a going concern and avoid disruptive liquidation of the financial 
institution in distress. 
In these new schemes, apart from the shareholders, the losses of bank failure are to be 
borne by ex-ante funded resolution funds, financed by industry levies, and certain classes of 
bank creditors whose fixed debt claims on the bank will be converted to equity, thereby 
restoring the equity buffer needed for on-going bank operation. At the same time, sometimes 
cautiously sometimes audaciously, policy makers have already embarked on the route towards 
bailing in. Certainly, the most famous and controversial experience was the bail-in of bank 
creditors of Laiki Bank. Before and after the Cyprian bank there had been a few other cases in 
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Denmark (Amagerbanken), Spain (Bankia), Netherlands (Dutch bank SNS Reaal) and 
Portugal (Novo Banco), all with their idiosyncrasies.  
Public outrage for the enormous losses placed on taxpayers convinced policy-makers 
and legislators across the Atlantic, under the auspices of the G-20 and the Financial Stability 
Board, that the traditional system of underpinning fractional reserve banking with an implicit 
public guarantee had to be discontinued, and that bank shareholders and creditors should be 
called in to take losses and suffer the full consequences of reckless management through bail-
in, before any public back-stop could come into play4. 
When in 2012 the European Council acknowledged the need to break the vicious 
circle between sovereign and bank debt in the eurozone, the overhaul of the regulatory 
framework was sped up. By mid-2014, the Single Rulebook for all member states and the 
Banking Union legislation, establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the 
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for the eurozone, were legally in place. 
The new regulatory system involves higher capital requirements as well as new rules 
on bank resolution establishing the credible promise that shareholders and creditors would 
carry the full burden of bank losses, mainly through the new bail-in instrument, with three 
main goals. The first one is to eradicate moral hazard within the banking system by 
eliminating the implicit subsidy of the banking charter that had encouraged bankers to over-
borrow and take excessive risks. The second goal is to make it possible for even a large bank 
to fail without systemic repercussions on aggregate financial stability, minimizing reliance on 
public support. The third goal is to make sure that different national approaches to bank 
rescues will not undermine the internal market by resulting in different costs of funding for 
banks with similar creditworthiness5. 
During the transition to the new system, the European Commission used the control of 
state aid as an instrument to coordinate the response of the member states wishing to support 
distressed banks either by providing liquidity aid or helping them restructure and return to 
viability. The legal basis to assess the compatibility of state aid with the Treaty was found in 
Article 107, paragraph 3, letter b, TFEU, which allows the Commission to declare state aid 
compatible with the Treaty if it is necessary to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy 
of a member state. 
One of the key principles of a free market economy is that owners and creditors are 
supposed to bear the losses of a failed venture. But the idea that the penalty for failure can be 
                                                 
4 Ibidem. 
5 Ibidem. 
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shifted onto an institution, such as a bank, is incorrect. Ultimately all penalties, and similarly 
benefits, should be absorbed by individuals, not inanimate institutions. When it is said that the 
bank will pay the penalty of failure, this essentially means that the penalty is paid, in the guise 
of worsened terms, by bank managers, bank staff, bank creditors, borrowers and so on and so 
forth. The real question is which individuals will be asked to absorb the cost6. 
Figure 2 briefly shows how a round of bail-in works. In this example, in the first 
step, a bank experiences a loss of nine units on its assets side and, therefore, breaches the 
threshold required by the supervisory authority, thus triggering a bail-in. In a second step, 
its liabilities side is therefore written down to absorb the losses. In this example, the entire 
equity and part of the subordinated debt is lost. In a third step, the bank will be recapitalized 
to 10.5% CET1. The recapitalization requires new equity of roughly nine units: the entire 
subordinated debt and a fraction of the senior unsecured debt need to be bailed in. The final 
step illustrates the balance sheet of the bank after the bail-in. 
Figure 2. Stylised example of loss absorption and recapitalization after a bail-in
Source: Financial Stability Review, May 2016 - Special features  
 
In 2014, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the SRM 
Regulation, which are now in force since the 1st of January 2016, established the conditions 
under which the assets of shareholders and creditors of distressed banks are bailed-in, either 
on a stand-alone basis or as part of the resolution procedure. 
                                                 
6 Avgouleas & Goodhart (2014). 
8 
 
Expectations on the use of burden-sharing and of the bail-in tool by competition and 
resolution authorities directly affect the risk of capital instruments in the banking sector and, 
if not properly governed, may in turn become a source of instability, rather than firming up 
the system. 
 
1.2 Bail-in challenges 
There is a long list of actual or hypothetical advantages attached to bail-in 
recapitalizations. Most importantly the bail-in tool involves replacing the implicit public 
guarantee, on which fractional reserve banking has operated, with a system of private 
penalties. The bail-in tool may, theoretically, be much superior in the case of idiosyncratic 
failure (e.g. a fraud). Nonetheless, there is need for a closer examination of the bail-in process 
and its potential shortcomings, whether it can be a successful substitute to the unpopular bail-
out approach.  
The desire to find an effective way to replace the public subsidy behind the bail-out 
process is entirely understandable but, at the same, time, there is a danger of over-reliance on 
bail-ins, in part owing to the growing momentum for its introduction. In placing bail-in at the 
heart of bank resolution regimes, legislators and regulatory authorities ought not to overlook 
some important shortcomings attached to this approach. In a discussion paper of 2014, E. 
Avgouleas and C. A. Goodhart, have tried to discuss the potential shortcomings and explain 
why, arguably, bail-in regimes will not remove, in the case of resolution of a large complex 
cross-border bank, (unless the risk is idiosyncratic), or in the event of a systemic crisis, the 
need for public injection of funds. 
Bail-in is a pre-condition for bank resolution in the EU and for ESM implemented 
bank recapitalization within the Eurozone. It is clear that the European Union holds high 
hopes about the effectiveness of this mechanism, an approximation to which has already been 
tried in Cyprus in March 2013 and for the restructuring of the Spanish banking sector. It is 
also hoped that bail-in will nullify the need for state aid for the banking sector across the EU 
and not just within the confines of the Eurozone (Angeloni, Lennihan, 2014). 
Yet the legal entity by legal entity approach raises its own set of difficult issues. In the 
case of non-EBU groups, resolution colleges might smooth coordination issues but, a bail-in 
decision has distributional consequences, potentially with clear losers. Hence in some cases it 
might even create a crisis of confidence in a member state’s banking system, and strong 
disagreements are bound to arise as to which subsidiary is bailed-in and which is not. Where 
there are subsidiaries in non-EBU European countries such disagreements could even go as 
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far as creating serious problems in the relationship of the EBU with non-EBU European 
countries, especially where losses are bound to fall unevenly. One possible solution may be to 
adopt a US-like approach, aggregating all the losses to the group entity. However, this would 
reinforce subsidiarization, which goes against the leading principles of the single European 
market, based on the free economy spirit. 
Another significant challenge that the EU approach to bail-in raises is the issue of 
liquidity support from resolution funds and central banks. This could be provided either to 
each legal entity, against the collateral available to that entity, or sent through a parent 
company. In either case, if that happens within the Eurozone, all liquidity funding from the 
central banks would eventually have to be booked on the ECB’s balance sheet, at least until 
the bank is successfully restructured. 
The EU has an “open” bank resolution process (going concern principle) that is reliant 
on the successful bail-in of the struggling bank. The bail-in process is seen as a substitute to 
liquidation of either the entire group or of parts of the group, combined with the use of other 
resolution tools. This is not an unreasonable approach, especially in the case of a largely 
idiosyncratic cause of failure. But there are four essential conditions that have to be met when 
using the bail-in process as a resolution substitute: timing, market confidence, the extent of 
restructuring required and accurate determination of losses. 
First, the issue of when to trigger the bail-in process, taking also into account the 
requirements of early intervention regimes is matter of cardinal importance. Identification of 
the right time and conditions to trigger the bail-in tool in a process that extends conversion 
beyond specially designed bail-able debt will be one of the most important for any bank 
supervisor. If the supervisor triggers bail-in early, then the full measure of losses may not 
have been fully revealed, risking further rounds of bail-in. But if the supervisor determines to 
use the bail-in tool at a later stage, when the full scale of losses to be imposed on creditors is 
revealed, they risk a flight of bank creditors who do not hold bail-able debt. 
Moreover, speed of resolution (at the expense of flexibility) is one of the reasons for 
the popularity of bail-in among regulators (Sommer, 2014). Yet, there is still doubt whether 
the adoption of bail-in regimes would lead to earlier regulatory intervention than under the 
bail-out regimes. There may be legal concerns about imposing potentially large losses on 
private creditors and this could unduly delay resolution, until the last possible minute. By then 
the liabilities needed to be written down could extend beyond specially designated bail-able 
debt. Bail-out, being undertaken by the authority of the government, is, one could argue, 
somewhat less liable to legal suit than bail-in. Indeed, before any country, within the EU 
boundaries, is able to rescue a national bank the approval of the European Commission is 
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required. This approval, even if the bail-out is nested on public interest motivations, can prove 
difficult to receive. On the other hand, bail-in of bank liabilities that extends beyond bail-able 
debt affects a wider range of creditors; there are more parties to the negotiation, and hence a 
greater effort is needed to tackle the problem. The more delayed will be the action of 
resolution, the more essential it will be to put huge emphasis on an earlier recovery scheme. 
There are also other concerns. In the absence of a fiscal backstop for other parts of the 
financial system, if bail-in is triggered before measures have been taken to assist the rest of 
the financial system a creditor flight from other banks will be certain, spreading the tremors 
throughout the financial system, even if those banks retain sufficient amounts of bail-able 
debt.  
Secondly, market confidence in the bailed-in institution would have to be quickly 
restored in order to preserve franchise value and repay official liquidity support (Sommer, 
2014). Reversing the trend would doubtlessly prove a challenging task if the institution has 
entered a vicious spiral with customers, creditors and depositors. A bank run will be as more 
likely as the rumours on a possible bail-in get insistent, making the going concern value hard 
to handle and maintain. 
Thirdly, triggering the bail-in process will prove unsuccessful if bank losses are not 
properly identified in some finite form. The determination of bank losses including unrealized 
future losses must be accurately determined in order to avoid successive rounds of bail-in 
losses accruing to bank creditors. For instance, bank losses in the recent crisis have 
consistently been underestimated. 
Normally bank failures occur when macro-economic conditions have worsened, and 
asset values are falling. Bank failures during boom conditions are easier to handle with less 
danger of contagion. In the uncertain conditions of generalized asset value declines, the new 
(incoming) accountants, employed by the resolution agency, are likely to take a bad scenario 
(or even a worst case) as their base case for identifying losses, to be borne by the bailed-in 
creditors, partly also to minimize the above-mentioned danger of underestimation leading to 
further calls on creditors. Previously the accountants of the failing bank itself will have been 
encouraged (by management) to take a more positive view of its (going concern) value. Thus, 
the transition to bail-in is likely to lead to a huge discontinuity, a massive drop, in published 
accounting valuations. This could put into question amongst the public the existing valuations 
of other banks, and lead to a contagious crisis7. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Ibidem. 
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2. The bail-in and its legal framework 
2.1 The European approach: the BRRD 
A precondition for a functioning market economy is that when a company turns 
insolvent, it exits the market in an organized manner, without damaging (strongly) other 
market participants. This principle, although simple, is difficult to apply to failing financial 
institutions. The financial turmoil post 2007-2008 crisis demonstrated that, when it comes to 
let financial firms fail, banks are different. Lehman Brothers default has showed that the 
insolvency of a large or interconnected financial institution can result in a tragic meltdown of 
the entire industry. The lack of appropriate tools for the resolution of banks generated the 
necessity to resort to public funds to maintain financial stability (see Chapter 1 for further 
details on the cost of the crisis). 
The European Union showed its determination to remedy this unsatisfactory situation. 
The clear goal is that taxpayers should no longer be liable to bail-out troubled institutions. 
Therefore, the European legislator established a toolkit that allows the orderly resolution of 
banks without compromising financial stability and resorting to public funds. This toolkit 
goes under the name of Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (2014/59/EU), also known 
as BRRD, which came into force on the January 1st, 2016. However, as it will be showed in 
section 2.4.1, its procedures and principles had been exploited to face banking crises all over 
Europe even before that date8. 
The broad scope of the Directive is explained in one of its first whereas. The BRRD 
has been created to provide authorities with a credible set of tools to intervene sufficiently 
early and quickly in an unsound or failing institution so as to ensure the continuity of the 
institution’s critical economic functions. The Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive has 
thus become one of the most important building blocks of the Banking Union together with 
the rules on capital and liquidity requirements (CRD IV and CRR), which form the single 
supervision mechanism (SSM), and on the European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS)9.  
From a pure theoretical point of view the main scope of the BRRD is to prevent the 
moral hazard effect by making the bail-out of banks virtually impossible given that any 
extraordinary public financial support will normally entail at least some bail-in of 
shareholders and creditors, in accordance with the order of their priority claims under normal 
                                                 
8 The Directive explicitly states: “In order to allow for effective resolution outcomes, it should be possible to 
apply the bail-in tool before 1 January 2016”. 
9 Unlike the first two pillars of Banking Union, the third pillar is (so far) not based on a centralized system 
shifting competencies and powers to the European level but relies on the traditional concept of rule 
harmonization to ensure a common scope and level of deposit insurance (deposits up to € 100.000 are insured 
per person per bank). 
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insolvency proceedings. The hope is that what is often referred to as “too-big-to-fail situation” 
will no longer occur. 
 
Figure 3. The three pillars on which rests the Single Rulebook
Source: Oesterreichische Nationalbank  
 
The BRRD is the outcome of a long negotiation process10. The new bank recovery and 
resolution framework has wide reaching implications, both within the EU but also for 
countries with banking relationships with the EU. The Directive will additionally have 
indirect effects on many more EU entities and group members, including branches outside the 
EU, even though they may not fall directly within the scope of the legislation. 
Together with higher capital and liquidity requirements, the enhancement of resolution 
regimes is a central element of the international regulatory response to increase banks’ 
resilience. The Financial Stability Board’s Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes 
for Financial Institutions (KA), endorsed by the G20 in 2011, provided the new harmonized 
international standard for resolution regimes for financial institutions. The KA, although 
focused on global systemically important banks (G-SIBs or, alternatively, SIFIs), serve as 
guidance to jurisdictions that are adopting or amending national resolution regimes. The 
BRRD considers the recommendations of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and is aligned 
with the regulatory framework of the EU for financial institutions. The BRRD’s scope 
includes those institutions that are subject to the prudential supervision and regulatory capital 
requirements provisions in the EU Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV); that is, credit 
institutions and big investment firms with an initial capital above 730,000€ and financial 
                                                 
10 After formal consensus was reached in 2014 political reluctance and technical uncertainties prevailed in 
several Member States. This delayed the implementation and triggered the referral of six Member States to the 
European Court of Justice for failing to transpose the BRRD into national law within the established timeframe.  
Source: Financial Sector Advisory Center of the World Bank (2017). 
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holding companies established in the EU. Moreover, the Directive lays down rules for the 
following entities: parent financial holding companies in a Member State, Union parent 
financial holding companies, parent mixed financial holding companies in a Member State, 
Union parent mixed financial holding companies and branches of institutions that are 
established outside the Union11. 
Notably the BRRD resolution toolkit is applied only if justified by public interest. This 
means that this bundle of laws is intended to be applied to G-SIBs in order to ensure the 
continuation of their critical functions, i.e. the going concern.  
Finally, it is important to stress that the BRRD is a Directive of minimum 
harmonization. Consequently, Member States must implement the minimum harmonized set 
of resolution tools and powers of the BRRD into national law, but may choose to go beyond 
these. In doing so, Member States are free to introduce additional tools at national level to 
deal with crises, as long as they are compatible with the resolution objectives and principles 
set out in the BRRD, other EU legislation, and the EU state aid rules. 
 
2.2 The key points of the Directive 
Before explaining the function and the issues related to the bail-in tool, it is useful to 
highlight that the Directive 2014/59/EU introduced other resolution solutions, namely: the 
sale of business, the asset separation and the creation of a bridge bank. As the name of the 
tool indicates, the bridge bank institution tool is an interim solution. Article 41(2) of the 
BRRD provides that a bridge bank must be built with a view to maintaining access to critical 
functions and its sale to one or more private sector purchasers when conditions are 
appropriate. The assets and liabilities which are not transferred to it remain in the failing or 
bad bank which has to be wound up in a conventional insolvency proceeding. Recent 
examples of the application of the bridge bank tool have included, inter alia, the Italians 
Banca Marche, Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara, Banca Etruria and CariChieti12.  
Besides contemplating the possibility of precautionary recapitalizations not preceded 
by the write-down or conversion of subordinated debt, the BRRD, also provides some 
principles and criteria for the application of bail-in and, more generally, the write-down and 
conversion of capital instruments, as follows. 
 The main rule regards the imposition of a hierarchy. For loss absorption or 
recapitalization in resolution procedures, the shareholders will bear the first losses and the 
                                                 
11 As stated in points d) and e) of the Art. 1 of Directive 2014/59/EU, freely available on EUR-Lex (web source). 
12 White & Case (2017) web source. 
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creditors of the institution will bear losses after the shareholders in accordance with the order 
of priority claims under normal insolvency proceedings (bail-in tout court), while covered 
deposits are fully protected (Art. 34(1) (a, b, h)).  
The authorities shall follow the priority of claims under national insolvency 
proceedings also for write-down and conversion of capital instruments outside resolution 
proceedings (Art. 60). 
Figure 4. Source: Van Malleghem & Colla (2015)  
As highlighted in Figure 4, the contribution of each creditor or shareholder will depend upon 
the nature of the liability. 
The second rule contemplates the adoption of no creditor worse off principle, which 
means that it should be impossible, for any creditor, to bear losses higher than what would 
have been occurred if the institution had been wound up under the normal insolvency 
procedures (Article 34(1)(g)).   
Pursuant to Article 37, another general principle of resolution procedures is that the 
resolution authority may seek funding from alternative financing sources with government 
stabilization tools provided in Articles 56 up to 58 only in the very extraordinary situation of a 
systemic crisis and only after a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalization of bail-in 
able assets equal to an amount not less than 8% of total liabilities.  
In a nutshell, before a Member State is allowed to use external (i.e. public) resources 
for direct recapitalization of a failing bank, a round of bail-in contributions must have taken 
place. National regulators must first impose initial losses representing at least 8% of the 
bank’s liabilities on shareholders and creditors before they can use the national resolution 
fund to absorb losses or to inject fresh capital into an institution, and then only up to 5% of 
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the bank’s liabilities. In the event that bank losses exceed 13% of its liabilities, a further bail-
in round may take place in order for the residual losses to be absorbed by creditors. These 
conditions make public assistance an absolute last resort in order both to counter moral 
hazard and to reduce the risk of mutualization of liability for bank rescues in the Eurozone. 
Moreover, the adoption of a resolution scheme entailing state aid or resort to resolution funds 
is made conditional on the approval by the Commission under state aid rules ex art 107 
TFEU. 
The fourth general rule goes under the name of depositor preference, which consists in 
the exclusion to the losses contributions of all the deposits up to 100.000€ of natural persons 
and SMEs. The article 44 point 3 provides the possibility of totally or partially excluding, in 
exceptional circumstances, other liabilities from the application of the write-down or 
conversion powers when certain conditions are met.  
Finally, some ancillary provisions to the bail-in tool include provisions on public 
back-stops (e.g. government financial stabilization tools, consisting either of a public equity 
support tool or temporary public ownership), which can be used as a last resort, having 
assessed and experimented with the other resolution tools to the maximum extent practicable 
whilst maintaining financial stability. 
The write-down and conversion of capital instruments may be exercised either 
independently of a resolution action or in combination with it when the conditions for 
resolution are met. Article 59 requires the write-down or conversion of capital instruments 
when one of the following circumstances is verified: 
▪ when the conditions of resolution are met, before any resolution action is taken; 
▪ when the appropriate authority determines that the write-down or conversion action is 
necessary to avoid the institution becoming no longer viable;  
▪ more generally, even when those two conditions do not apply, prior to any measure 
entailing an ‘extraordinary public financial support’. 
Related to this article, any public financial support can be injected only when the 
institution concerned is solvent, and the injection of funds or purchase of capital instruments 
takes place at prices and on terms that do not confer an advantage upon the institution, that is 
at market prices. 
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2.3 MREL and TLAC 
In the wake of the financial crisis policy makers have shifted their focus to bank 
resolution by the introduction of the total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC) which apply to all 
bank subject to Basel Committee standards, including not G-SIBs.  
At the EU level, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive also sets out a 
framework for all European banks and investment firms (not just G-SIBs) to satisfy a 
minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (named MREL). Although the 
parameters, scope and requirements of TLAC and MREL differ in several ways, both aim to 
ensure that banks have in place sufficient resources to cover losses and meet recapitalisation 
needs in a resolution. National resolution authorities or (in relation to certain eurozone banks) 
the Single Resolution Board will set the levels of MREL for individual banks and investment 
firms based on assessment criteria set out in regulatory technical standards (RTS) adopted 
under the BRRD. 
In November 2016 the European Commission proposed revisions to the EU Capital 
Requirements Regulation (CRR) with the objective of establishing harmonized TLAC 
requirements for EU G-SIBs. Simultaneously, the Commission proposed amendments to the 
BRRD and the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation to align MREL requirements with 
the TLAC standard, including proposals for revised insolvency rankings to help banks satisfy 
subordination requirements for TLAC eligibility13. 
 
2.3.1 The MREL concept 
The minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities should ensure there is 
sufficient loss-absorption capacity by shareholders and creditors to enable an effective bail-in 
and an orderly resolution without creating further contagion and without recourse to public 
funds. The BRRD introduces the MREL as a highly loss absorbing buffer like the TLAC 
concept of the Financial Stability Board. The MREL is expressed as a percentage of the total 
liabilities and own funds of the institution, where the numerator is composed of own funds 
and a specific type of liabilities (the MREL-eligible liabilities). The BRRD does not provide 
for a harmonized minimum level but MREL is meant to be set by the resolution authority for 
each individual bank on a case-by-case basis as part of the resolution strategy. 
It is important to stress that not all bail-in able liabilities are eligible for MREL. Those 
requirements should consist of liabilities that can be bailed-in with minimum legal and 
operational risk and without endangering financial stability or creating contagion.  
                                                 
13 Financial Sector Advisory Center of the World Bank (2017). 
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In Table 1 it is possible to have an overview of the deposits eligible for MREL 
depending on the amount, the maturity and the kind of the client (whether natural person, 
corporate or institution). 
AMOUNT MATURITY
DEPOSITS OF NATURAL
PERSONS AND SMES
DEPOSITS OF
CORPORATES
DEPOSITS OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
< = 100
thousands €
< = 1 year
> 1 year
No bail-in and not 
MREL eligible
(Covered by DGS)
No bail-in and not 
MREL eligible
(Covered by DGS)
Bail-in able but not MREL eligible
Bail-in able and MREL eligible
> 100
thousands €
< = 1 year
> 1 year
Bail-in able but
not MREL eligible
Bail-in able but not MREL eligible
Bail-in able and MREL eligible
Bail-in able but not MREL eligible
Bail-in able and MREL eligible
Table 1. Overview of deposits eligible for MREL and bail-in
 
 
The MREL is based on the resolution strategy and the resolvability assessment and is a 
key element of the resolution plan. Although there is no common or minimum MREL, the 
prior 8% bail-in requirement that applies before the use of the resolution fund or public 
support is to be considered for banks that will be resolved. The other features of MREL are 
stated in the following lines. 
The first element of MREL, the loss-absorption amount, is based on the definition of 
the prudential capital requirement. There is no binding minimum level for loss-absorbing 
capital foreseen but the MREL level set by the resolution authority is binding for the 
respective bank. The loss-absorption amount set by the national resolution authority should, 
as a baseline default, be equal to the prudential capital requirements (including Pillar II and 
the combined buffers) as determined by the supervisory authority.  
The second element of MREL, the recapitalization amount, should ensure that the 
institution meets the conditions for authorization (licensing requirements) after resolution (at 
a minimum 8% of total risk exposure amount) and that the capital level is high enough to 
ensure market confidence following resolution. The appropriate level could be determined in 
comparison with peer groups. The recapitalization amount will regularly be zero for 
institutions that are expected to come under liquidation. Though unlikely, resolution 
authorities may require a recapitalization amount even for those banks that are expected to be 
liquidated, to ensure that liquidation achieves the resolution objectives. 
  MREL may be further increased if this is viewed necessary to support market 
confidence following resolution. It may also be necessary to increase the MREL following 
consideration of the potential adverse impact of an institution’s failure on financial stability, 
or to allow for the exclusion of certain liabilities (under the no creditor worst off test). Though 
in principle applicable to all institutions, adverse effects on financial stability may especially 
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be assumed for Global Systemically Important Institutions (G-SIIs) and Other Systemically 
Important Institutions (O-SIIs) as determined by competent authorities. 
   
2.3.2 MREL compared to TLAC 
  Both TLAC and MREL are defined as minimum amounts of own funds and specific 
debt obligations required for banks to ensure that they can be restructured or wound down in 
orderly ways. Despite having the same purpose, i.e. to facilitate private sector loss 
absorbency, they have significant divergences. 
  In terms of the scope of application, MREL is addressed to all credit institutions while 
the TLAC covers only global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). At the European level, 
MREL has been in force since the beginning of 2015. Initial MREL target levels are expected 
in 2016 (with interim targets during a transitional period). The Single Resolution Board has 
announced a MREL target of not less than 8 % of total assets for all banks under its control. 
MREL is set on a case-by-case basis with no differentiation between pillar 1 and pillar 2 
requirements. 
  TLAC is (formally) based on RWA instead of total assets and defines a mandatory 
minimum pillar 1 requirement equivalent to 16 % of risk-weigh-ted assets (18 % from 2022) 
and at least 6 % of the leverage ratio denominator from 1 January 2019 (6.75 % from 2022), 
with scope for resolution authorities to set additional firm-specific requirements on top of this 
(as per pillar 2 requirements). Contrary to MREL, capital buffers (typically ranging from 2.5 
to 6 % of risk-weighted assets) are not included in TLAC so that Common Equity Tier 1 
(CET1) capital cannot count simultaneously towards both TLAC and regulatory capital 
buffers14. 
  MREL and TLAC share the same purpose but are quite different in terms of scope, 
eligibility of instruments, subordination, and implementation (see Figure 5). 
Regarding the eligibility criteria, the FSB TLAC term sheet requires sub-ordination of TLAC 
eligible instruments, excluding operational liabilities (e.g. such as short-term debt) thereby 
ensuring that liabilities within the same rank are treated equally and minimizing legal risks 
(esp. the risks of breach of the no-creditor-worse-off principle). According to the BRRD 
framework, mandatory subordination of MREL liabilities is not required and pari passu 
liabilities can be excluded on an ad hoc basis from bail-in or simply not qualify for bail-in 
(e.g. due to maturity reasons). Resolution authorities may, however, require that MREL 
eligible liabilities should be subordinated on a case-by-case basis, depending on the resolution 
strategy and the structure of a bank’s liabilities. 
                                                 
14 Ibidem. 
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Figure 5. TLAC compared to MREL
Scope G-SIBs EU banks and investment firms
Minimum level Pillar 1 Pillar 2
Denominator RWAs and leverage ratio denominator Own funds + total liabilities
Eligible liabilities Narrow category Broad category
Subordination Mandatory Not mandatory
Implementation
Phase in from 1 Jan 2019 to 1 January 2022
(or 2025-2028 for emerging market G-SIBs)
1 Jan 2016
Disclosures Specified Not covered
Source: Clifford Chance website
TLAC MREL
 
 
2.4 Bail-in episodes 
2.4.1 Before the BRRD: five cases under the spotlight 
One of the earliest cases of bail-in is the one occurred to the creditors of the Danish 
bank Amagerbanken. The small retail bank (the country's eleventh largest), with total assets of 
only 4.5 billion euros, was wound up under the Danish national resolution procedure, named 
Bank Package III. On February 2011, the bank announced the transfer of its assets to a state-
owned bank, called Financial Stability Company, established by the government in the wake 
of the 2008 financial crisis. Under Bank Package III, a two-year blanket state guarantee of 
bank deposits and senior debt terminated at the end of September 2010 was replaced by a 
more limited guarantee for deposits of €100,000. Amagerbanken’s small depositors were 
protected, but instead equity, subordinated capital and creditor claims were written down in 
line with the value of the assets. Given that Amagerbanken's assets were worth around 60% of 
its senior unsecured liabilities, the bank's creditors faced a haircut of 40%, a rare event in 
European banking15. The same result has been estimated by CreditSights which calculated 
that holders of senior debt and unsecured deposits faced a haircut of 41%. Notably, the 
authorities in Denmark, which is not part of the eurozone, decided to bail in bank creditors 
long before the decision of the European banking union and the creation of the SRM and the 
adoption of bail-in. It is a case of interest because involved senior unsecured debt as well as 
large deposits. 
The second resolution situation occurred in Spain. The Spanish government applied 
for ESM assistance in bank restructuring and recapitalization in June 2012. The restructuring 
plans were submitted for Commission approval as foreseen by the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) agreed between Spain and the Eurogroup one month later, in July 
                                                 
15 The Economist Intelligence Unit (2011). 
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2012. Initially the recapitalization concerned four banks: FA/Bankia, NCG Banco, Catalunya 
Banc and Banco de Valencia, but this last one was sold, through a competitive tender 
process, to Caixa Bank because Spanish authorities and the Commission agreed that the 
bank's viability could not be restored on a stand-alone basis16. In the case of BFA/Bankia, 
NCG Banco and Catalunya Banc, the Commission found that the proposed restructuring 
measures will ensure that the three banks return to long term viability as sound credit 
institutions in Spain. The balance sheet of each bank should be reduced by more than 60% 
compared to 2010. Those banks had to refocus their business model on retail and SMEs 
lending in their historical core regions. This should contribute to reinforcing their capital and 
liquidity positions and reduce their reliance on wholesale and central bank funding. 
Moreover, the absorption of losses borne by the banks and their stakeholders will ensure, 
together with the restructuring measures, a satisfactory burden-sharing and an adequate own 
contribution to the financing of the significant restructuring costs. This reduced the state aid 
needed to restructure the banks by about €10 bn. 
The third case regarded the creditor bail-in of the Dutch bank SNS Reaal, which had 
total assets of about 80 billion euros. After the bank had suffered from substantial write-
downs on its real estate portfolio during the year 2012, which led its core tier 1 down to 8.8% 
(triggering the 9% imposed by EBA17), the Dutch government nationalized SNS Reaal on 1 
February 2013. In the context of nationalization, the state injected 3.7 billion euros, 
shareholders and junior creditors were both wiped out. One billion of subordinated debt was 
expropriated with zero compensation under a new Dutch law. This trouble happened during 
the negotiation of the SRM. Its political spillover effect was probably further magnified for an 
additional reason: the Dutch Finance minister in charge had just been appointed as the 
president of the Eurogroup. Hence, his involvement in the decision to bail in creditors in the 
Netherlands was a strong indication for the future stance of the Eurogroup18, including in their 
negotiations with the next case, Cyprus. 
Cyprus is the main bail-in event because it clearly gave the signal that the euro area 
was going for a bail-in of creditors in bank restructurings and moreover that the bail-in basis 
could be very wide, including senior unsecured debt and even large deposits. Indeed, apart 
from the Danish case, retail investors had not yet faced haircuts. It all started in 2006 when 
Marfin Investment Group purchases shares in Laiki Bank, and rebrands it as Marfin Popular 
                                                 
16 Press Release of the European Commission, 28th November 2012. 
17 Il sole 24 Ore (2013). 
18 Schäfer, Schnabel & Weder di Mauro (2016). 
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Bank. In October 2011 Europe agrees to restructure Greek sovereign bonds, leading 
ultimately to a loss of 2.3 billion euros for Laiki. In 2012 Laiki first receives a 1.8 bn euro 
bail-out from the Cypriot government but at the end of the year depositors started a bank run 
after reports of a possible levy on accounts became public. In February 2013 Laiki’s assets 
were sold at a 15% discount to raise funds19. On 18 March 2013, the government of Cyprus 
and the eurozone Finance Ministers announced that all deposits, including those below 
€100.000 (the legal deposit guarantee limit in the EU), would be facing losses. Following a 
week of further frenetic negotiations, the deal was finally announced on 25 March 2013: 
senior unsecured debt and large deposits were bailed in but not retail deposits below 
€100.000. The bank's debts and all savings over €100,000 were vehicled into a bad bank, 
while savings under €100,000 and most of the bank's assets transferred to the Bank of Cyprus. 
The last case involved the bail-in of the Portuguese Banco Espírito Santo, which had 
total assets of about 85 billion euros. On 10 July 2014, fears over this bank briefly triggered a 
stock sell-off across European financial markets. Portugal’s PSI 20 share index dropped by 
4.3%, the biggest drop in more than a year20. The epilogue resembled the Cypriot case. On 4 
August 2014, the bank was split up into a good bank and a bad bank after a frenetic weekend 
of negotiations between Portuguese and European Union officials. The good bank, Novo 
Banco, received all sound assets, deposits and senior debt plus a capital injection of 4.9 billion 
euros. The bad assets were transferred to the bad bank and its losses had to be borne by junior 
creditors. The Bank of Portugal said that the rescue of Banco Espírito Santo had been 
designed so that no creditor would face a greater loss now than they would have if the bank 
had been liquidated21. Here authorities applied the same principle of ‘no creditor worse off’ 
currently in the Directive. 
 
Figure 6. Timeline of bail-in events before the entrance into force of the BRRD
Source: Sch äfer A., Schnabel I. & Weder di Mauro B. (2016)  
                                                 
19 Kremer (2013) web source. 
20 Financial Times (July 2014) web source. 
21 Reuters (August 2014) web source. 
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2.4.2 After the BRRD: first tests 
As stated in chapter 1, the Directive entered into force only on the 1st of January 2016 
but few cases have already showed how its full implementation is hard to put in action.  
The most famous and recent resolution case involved Banco Popular, occurred on the 
7th June 2017 due to a sudden liquidity crisis, so severe that the bank may have not opened the 
following day. This is a resolution of cardinal importance because it resulted in the first write-
down of an Additional Tier 1 layer of equity. 
 
Figure 7. Market's reaction to the resolution decision
Source: I. Zubo, D. Kini, "European banks credit", HSBC global research, July 2017  
 
The European Central Bank and the Single Resolution Board were quick to orchestrate 
an overnight rescue, which did not involve taxpayers’ money but wiped out shareholders and 
junior bondholders. When European markets opened in the morning, they were largely 
unperturbed22. The day before, the ECB decided that the bank was failing or likely to fail and 
notified the SRB accordingly. What is very surprising is that the Spanish bank reacted quite 
well at the 2016 stress tests conducted by the European Banking authority. The stress test 
projected that Popular would have a capital ratio of 13.5% of assets in 2018 under the normal 
scenario. This was only slightly lower than the sample average of 13.8%, meaning Popular 
should have been able to carry on just fine in the absence of shocks23.  
In the 2016 EBA report, the common equity Tier 1 stood at 10.2% of assets, which 
was below the 12.6% average among 51 big European banks, but not the worst on the list. 
Even in a so-called adverse scenario, the 2016 test said, Banco Popular would have excess 
                                                 
22 Bloomberg view (June 2017). 
23 Ibid. 
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capital of 6.6%. During the spring, in the middle of an adverse situation, this supposed capital 
cushion vanished almost overnight. After top Banco Popular managers said they needed to 
raise capital in April, the institution began to experience a run. Then, in early June the bank 
received $4 billion in emergency assistance from the Spanish central bank; it was consumed 
in two days. The Santander deal quickly followed24. 
Table 2. 2016 EU-wide Stress Test: Main results for Banco Popular
Source: European Banking Authority  
 
Banco Popular was officially put into a resolution scheme and simultaneously bought 
out by Santander for a token price of €1. Santander raised €7 bn of new capital to protect its 
own capital ratios in the process. The managers of Santander said the impact on CET 1 has 
been neutral, while the consequences for Popular have been dramatic25. Popular’s AT1 bonds 
have been cancelled, while the illiquid Tier 2 subordinated bonds have also been wiped out 
through the conversion into new shares.  
The second case of an intervention of the ECB on troubled banks regarded two 
institutions in the Veneto region, Banca Popolare di Vicenza (also referred to as BPVI) and 
the smaller Veneto Banca, which suffered deeply from bad loans and weak capital. In June 
2017, both banks were classified as ‘failing or likely to fail’ by the ECB based on their lack of 
capital26. Both were effectively bailed out by the state, after they were taken over by Intesa, 
which agreed to acquire only certain assets and liabilities of the two ailing banks for a token 
                                                 
24 Morgenson (2017) web source. 
25 Raymond J., Karia P. & Knepper L. (2017). 
26 European Central Bank (June 2017). 
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price of €1. Intesa rose 4.4 percent at 12:58 p.m. in Milan trading, rushing a 1.4 percent 
advance in the Bloomberg Europe Banks and Financial Services Index27. 
The default of BPVI and Veneto Banca were caused by poor management. Both banks 
had accumulated too many bad loans, the worst of them being non-performing loans, NPLs. 
Fundamentally, this was because loans were frequently made on the basis of personal 
relationships and trust between officials at the bank and borrowers, instead of objective 
financial assessments28. Both Veneto Banca and BPVI were closely attached to the local 
community within Veneto, since they were unlisted and mutual banks. Local shareholders had 
a strong influence over the operations of the banks. The shares of both banks were sold in 
private markets, where share prices were determined by the bank’s management according to 
auditors, and approved by shareholder’s annually. In April 2015, the Board of Directors of 
Popolare di Vicenza decided to cut shares by 23%, passing from 62.55 to 48€. Two months 
later, under the reform of cooperative banks29, shareholders were forced to keep their stocks30. 
Once supervision of BPVI was taken over by the ECB under the rules of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism, European regulators quickly identified irregularities and concerning 
business practices. However, those multiple inspections and investigations that did not lead to 
any concrete corrective action. A 2014 stress test of European significant banks by the ECB 
found that BPVI needed to raise capital. In 2015, the ECB identified a ‘loan-sharing’ scheme, 
which occurred at least in two occasions in 2013 and 2014 at BPVI. Between 2012-2014, the 
unlisted bank granted financing to clients for around 1 billion euros so they would purchase 
its shares, artificially boosting the lender’s capital strength, the prosecutors said in the 
warrant, dated Sept. 21 and seen by Reuters. The fact that the ECB rapidly identified 
irregularities at BPVI within months of beginning to supervise the bank suggests that Italian 
regulators, which seem to have failed to identify the problems, were far too lax in their 
supervision31. 
Before the ECB pronouncement over the likelihood to fail of the two venetian banks, 
the state of Italy tried to respond differently with the respect of the Spanish authorities, opted 
to extend a public guarantee on the bank’s bonds. This would have turned these securities 
into de facto sovereign debt, which could have been posted at the ECB in exchange for 
                                                 
27 Bloomberg news (June 2017) web source. 
28 FT (November 2016) web source. 
29 The Law Decree 3/2015, named “Investment Compact”, established that popular banks that overcame €8 bn of 
total assets must transform in limited banks (e.g. SpA) within 18 months, that is July 2016. 
30 Veneto Economia (March 2016) web source. 
31 Kanaris Miyashiro (2017). 
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liquidity. Both banks needed assistance and the government responded with an emergency 
decree on 23 December 2016. This addressed bankruptcy laws and introduced a government 
guarantee mechanism for senior tranches of securitized nonperforming loans. One of the 
primary aims is to increase the recovery rate on non-performing loans and make them easier 
to sell. Recalling that nonperforming loans of banks in Italy were about 21% of GDP in 2016, 
among the highest in the EU, this should be a primary objective. When no private bank nor 
fund showed its interest in saving those banks (neither Atlante32, a fund set up in April 2016 
to ensure the success of capital raising requested by the supervisory authority from banks that 
face market difficulties acting as a shareholder of last resort33), the government liquidated the 
two venetian banks with a loan up to 17 billion of euros (5 of them in cash and the remaining 
12 in public guarantees). The solution invalidate the EU policy aimed at ending the taxpayer-
financed rescue operations and removing the problem of failed big banks34 
After Banca Intesa stepped forward to confirm market rumours that it would be open 
to acquire “certain assets and liabilities” and “certain legal relationships” of both banks (but 
only if it had a neutral effect on its Common Equity Tier 1 ratio) the ECB declared that both 
banks were “failing or likely to fail”, the wording used as a precursor to put them into 
resolution under the BRRD. However, the Single Resolution Board determined that resolution 
was not warranted in the public interest in this case, allowing the Italian authorities to wind 
down the banks under national insolvency law and avoid bailing in senior bondholders. The 
European Commission said the Italian government would provide a cash injection of €4.8 bn 
and up to €12 bn in state guarantees to facilitate the orderly wind-down and support Intesa’s 
acquisition. By using state aid, the Italian authorities could protect deposits and senior bonds 
(many of which are retail-owned), a key political aim. Shareholders and subordinated debt 
holders will, however, be written down as part of state aid “burden sharing” rules, although 
reports suggest that retail holders that were mis-sold €200 mn of subordinated debt (out of the 
total €1.2 bn) will be compensated35.  
These divergent outcomes, the Spanish and the Italian ones, revealed the big shortcoming in 
Europe’s resolution framework, which is an unwillingness to impose losses on senior 
creditors, who rank above shareholders and junior bondholders in banks’ capital structures. 
There is no reason why such investors should be free from risk, unless those bonds, when 
placed into the market, explicitly entail some retroactive mechanism. For example, the so 
                                                 
32 Il Sole 24 Ore (May 2017) web source. 
33 Lintner & Lincoln (2017). 
34 Uymaz (2017). 
35 Sackey-Addo et alia (2017). 
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called CoCos (Contingent Convertibles) are bonds that, whenever a pre-specified trigger is 
reached, convert into equity. Another hybrid form of capital are the Equity Recourse Notes 
(ERNs) which start their life as debt but convert into equity payment-at-a-time when the 
issuer suffers large losses in market value subsequent to the original issue date36. 
Furthermore, the almost inconsistent interventions in the cases of Popular, Popolare di 
Vicenza and Veneto Banca put into question the future of the BRRD. This is not the end of 
Directive, but political considerations will continue to be an important input and this seems 
very clear in the situation with Vicenza and Veneto. There was a great contradiction between 
the SRB statement noting that the banks are not systemic enough to justify its involvement, 
and the Italian government and the EC signing off on a rescue package that may ultimately 
cost the Italian taxpayer up to €17 bn37. Spain opted for a quicker route than Italy. 
Shareholders and junior bondholders have paid a hefty price, but the overall cost was almost 
certainly lower than it would have been had if the crisis had continued. It must be clear that, 
when it comes to decide upon the destiny of a troubled bank, the two main options, resolution 
and liquidation, differ substantially. The former is governed by the Directive (2014/59/EU), 
while the latter is regulated by national insolvency laws. 
Optimists see the fruits of reform in both episodes while pessimists argue that all the 
promises made to protect taxpayers are broken after the Italian deal, and that hopes of moving 
towards a true banking union are dead. The reality perhaps lies somewhere in the middle. 
Europe’s post-crisis reforms have brought some progresses. First, the ECB’s supervisory 
powers over eurozone banks are welcome. Second, junior bondholders can now be certain that 
they will be wiped out when banks get into deep trouble. The third reason regards the Italian 
position on non-performing loans (NPLs), historically bad managed. Its passive view on the 
non-performing assets worked as an obstacle for its banks, estimated at €349bn (gross) by the 
Bank of Italy (as of 2016). One reason for the delay has been a political issue: the fact that 
retail investors are big owners of Italian bank debt. Imposing losses on creditors is less 
attractive when the effect is to wipe out the savings of ordinary citizens. The liquidations have 
avoided this outcome38.  
To conclude, managing losses from a bank failure is an inherently political judgment. 
That is why ordinary depositors are protected. The reluctance to hit senior investors reflects 
the fear of sparking wider contagion, and panic too. Financial regulators tried to be pragmatic 
in their response. From now on they should make sure that banks issue equity and layers of 
                                                 
36 For a detailed description of ERNs structure and functioning see Bulow & Klemperer (2014). 
37 HSBC report on European Banks Credit, (July 2017) web source. 
38 The Economist (July 2017) web source. 
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explicitly at-risk debt to institutional investors in large enough quantities to minimize the 
chances of having to bail-in anyone else.  
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3. The relationship between bail-in, CDS and rating 
3.1 The three dimensions framework 
As previously discussed, the relevant introduction of the European BRRD is that, from 
now on, the contribution to the losses of a failing bank will be borne primarily by its 
shareholders and other creditors, according to a pre-planned ranking. From a situation of 
systemic bank bail-outs we have turned into a bail-in principle. However, as the cases 
demonstrated in Chapter 2.4, the full bail-in implementation is far from being adopted.  
My research focused on a comparison among bail-in simulations over the resilience of 
an institution, CDS spreads and ratings. The main scope, at least from an ex-ante perspective, 
was to find out the presence of coherence among these three dimensions, that should be 
correlated. Since the rating of whatever institution is mainly affected by its soundness I 
should expect that banks more resilient to bail-in get better ratings. Vice versa CDS, by 
indicating the perceived likelihood of the default, should be lower for resilient banks. 
The following example should make things clearer. Let’s consider two banks, namely 
Alpha and Beta, with the same amount of liabilities (which represents the basis to calculate 
the minimum share of losses, 8%, borne by bailed-in parties). Let’s say they have different 
capital structures and that, after a potential bail-in on creditors, they result in different levels 
of resilience39. Alpha has a stronger bail-in resilience indicator than Beta, that means Alpha’s 
shareholders and creditors will bear an inferior amount of losses. Supposedly, I would expect 
Alpha to have both a lower CDS spread and a better rating than Beta. 
Figure 8. Different capital structures can lead to different indicators
CDS spread
Rating
+ -
Bank Alpha Bank Beta
= =Liabilities
Bail-in resilience
 
 
 
                                                 
39 I will explain later in this Chapter the definition of bail-in resilience within the framework of my research. 
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3.2 The sample 
For the purpose at hand I decided to focus on the main European banks since the 
BRRD is set at a European level. In this way, the most capitalized banks in the world are out 
of my concern because they are headquartered mainly in the U.S or China40. In order to find 
the leading EU banks, I targeted the Euro STOXX index. This index is a capitalization 
weighted one and includes only institution whose core activities are headquartered in Europe. 
STOXX Ltd. is an established global provider of innovative index concepts with a European 
heritage. The Euro STOXX index has a fixed number of constituents (26 for the year 2016) 
and is weighted according to free-float market capitalization, with base value 100€ on 
December 31, 199141. The index includes banks from eight different countries, namely 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Spain42.   
 
3.2.1 Bloomberg balance sheets 
Once I have detected the institutions to which focus on, I chose to rely on the software 
Bloomberg as the provider for the balance sheets of such institutions. The analysis is 
conducted on the balance sheets from 2012 until 2016, euro currency. 
The accounting data of Bloomberg, being a U.S. based provider, are collected 
according to the Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which are a common set 
of accounting principles, standards and procedures that companies must follow when they 
compile their financial statements. GAAP improves the clarity of the communication of 
financial information and facilitates the cross comparison of financial information across 
different companies43. 
The U.S-centered GAAP differentiate in some ways from the International Financial 
Reporting Standard (IFRS), which is taken worldwide as the main guideline in financial 
statement compiling. The key divergent features concern the treatment of intangibles, of 
inventory costs, of write-downs and of discontinued operations. Hence, these singularities 
should not cause huge bias in the final results of the research. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Data on the biggest banks by market cap, as of April 2017, are taken from Statista (web source).  
41 STOXX index methodology guide of Dec 2017. 
42 Except for Finland which has no representative bank in the index, these are also the top EU countries for GDP 
in 2016, according to the data of the World Bank. 
43 Investopedia (web source). 
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Table 3. List of the 26 banks composing the Euro STOXX index and their status in 2016 
 
Bank G-SIB O-SIB
BNP Paribas
Deutsche Bank
Crédit Agricole
Societé Générale
Banco Santander
UniCredit
ING Group
Banco Bilbao Vyzcaya Argentaria
Intesa Sanpaolo
Natixis
Commerzbank
ABN Amro Group
Caixa Bank
KBC Group
Banco Sabadell
Erste Group Bank
Bankia
Bank of Ireland Group
Unione di banche italiane
Raiffeisen
Allied Irish Banks
Mediobanca
Bankinter
BPER
BPM
Fineco Bank  
The list is ranked by the values of balance sheet total assets as of 30 December 2016, from the 
highest to the lowest. 
 
 
3.2.2 Building the simulation on the first scenario of bail-in 
In the following, I outline the methodology employed to investigate the degree of bail-
in resilience of the institutions in the sample.  
Basically, the aim is to find the amount of losses that shareholders and other creditors 
would have borne if a bail-in had occurred. 
In order to cope with this task only few items are necessary: the total amount of 
liabilities, the total amount of risk weighted assets (aka RWA), the value of the equity 
including minorities, of Tier 1 (preferably explicitly divided between Core Equity and 
Additional) and of Tier 2. These data are not hard to find and handle if the company is listed. 
For the sake of clarity, it should be stated that this is an ex-post analysis about the past trend 
of soundness of the banks not a stress test with a forecast purpose. It is not a precise measure 
As seen in Chapter 2, the status of Globally 
Systemically Important Bank or Other 
Systemically Important Bank is important 
for the TLAC requirements. 
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of soundness but it could give a first estimate of the degree of soundness of the institutions. 
The analysis may lack of accuracy, apart from the accounting principles employed, also 
because it comprises the term 2012-2016 where capital structures and buffers were (and still 
are) facing continuous changes since the requirements of Basel III are under the phase-in.  
 
Table 4. Waterfall approach to calculate the extent of losses on 8% of TL
2016 DBK GY
Base case Deutsche bank AG
A) Total assets 1.590.546
B) Total liabilities 1.525.727
C) Risk weighted assets 356.235
D) 8% of liabilities 122.058
E) Equity + minorities 64.819
F) E-D -57.239
Equity cutting down % 100%
G) Core equity tier 1 47.782
H) Additional tier 1 7.704
I) Total Tier 1 55.486
L) F+I -1.753
Tier 1 cutting down % 100%
M) Tier 2 6.672
Tier 2 cutting down % 26,28%  
 
What I am going to explain applies to each bank of the sample and for each year 
considered. The table above (Table 2) refers to a bail-in simulation computed on Deutsche 
Bank for the year 2016. The denomination DBK GY refers to the ticker used by the software 
Bloomberg to uniquely identify the German bank. For the complete excel tables with the 
entire set of computations, please see the Annex.  
Recall that the objective here is to find out the amount of losses that the bank would 
have borne if a bail-in procedure had been implemented. In order to gauge this, I divided the 
total bank losses into three levels of loss: one for shareholders and the remaining two for the 
main tranches of creditors. These levels are expressed via the percentage of equity cut down, 
Tier 1 cut down and Tier 2 cut down. The procedure adopted starts from the total liabilities 
(B) and calculates the corresponding 8% (D), which is the minimum share of losses that bank 
must bear before any other possible aid (in the form or cash injection or guarantees) might 
come from the government or other funds. This amount has to be subtracted from the value of 
equity including minorities (E) and constitutes the record F.  
The equity cut down is computed according to this formula: In other 
words, if the value of equity is insufficient to cover the loss, then a 100% cut down of the 
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equity is reported, as happened for Deutsche Bank in 2016. Otherwise, the percentage of loss 
will be proportionate to the extent of loss over the initial value of equity.  
In the case of a 100% cut down of equity, the next step is to add the total Tier 1 to F (L). If 
this last value is negative it means that neither the first cushion of protection is sufficient to 
cover a loss. The Tier 1 cut down was calculated in the following way: . 
Hence, a 100% Tier 1 cut down will be reported. When L is positive it means that Tier 1 was 
enough to deal with losses.  
In the case of a 100% Tier 1 cut down, the last step is to calculate the extent of loss on the 
Tier 2. The Tier 2 cut down comes out from a longer equation: . 
As a matter of fact, if none of the cushions were sufficient, the bank will end up with 
100% losses on all the three tranches. In this case Deutsche Bank would have been able to 
absorb the imposition of losses at 8% of the total liabilities with all its equity, its Tier 1 and a 
portion on Tier 2. 
 
3.2.3 Building the simulation on the second scenario of bail-in 
Table 5. Waterfall approach to calculate the extent of losses on 20% of RWA
DBK GY
Deutsche bank AG
A) Total assets 1.590.546
B) Total liabilities 1.525.727
C) Risk weighted assets 356.235
D) 20% of RWA 71.247
E) Equity + minorities 64.819
F) E-D -6.428
Equity cutting down % 100%
G) Core equity tier 1 47.782
H) Additional tier 1 7.704
I) Total Tier 1 55.486
L) F+I 49.058
Tier 1 cutting down % 11,58%
M) Tier 2 6.672
Tier 2 cutting down %
2016
Exceptional case
 
 
What I am going to explain applies to each bank of the sample and for each year 
considered. The second bail-in simulation works similarly to the first one. I inserted this 
second scenario because in a provision of the BRRD it is stated that, under exceptional 
33 
 
circumstances, on the discretionary will of the European Commission, the first losses may be 
imposed based on the 20% or risk weighted assets. 
For consistency, the table above (Table 3) refers to the simulation applied to Deutsche 
Bank in 2016. Again, the procedure follows a waterfall approach. The starting point in this 
case are the risk weighted assets (C), from which it has to be calculated the relative 20% (D). 
Then the computations continue straightforward as in the other simulation, thus computing 
the three levels of losses with the same formulas, for the equity (100%), for Tier 1 creditors 
(11,58%) and Tier 2 creditors (null). 
Notably the losses here had smaller impact in magnitude with the respect to the 8% case. The 
possible reasons will be analyzed in the next chapter. 
 
3.3 Overlook on CDS 
The credit default swaps, or CDS, are the most famous kind of credit derivative 
contracts traded over-the-counter. They act as an insurance against the risk of a default by a 
certain company (a firm as well as a bank) on its debt or other instruments, which are often 
referred to as reference entities. The total face value of the saleable bond is usually called the 
CDS notional. As a normal insurance contract, the buyer of the CDS makes periodic 
payments to the seller until the end of the life of the contract or whenever a credit event 
occurs. We can have credit default swaps on the senior bond, on junior bond, on a special loan 
(a.k.a. LCDS) and so on and so forth. Because these kinds of debt securities will often have 
lengthy terms to maturity, also more than ten years, it will often be difficult for the buyer to 
know with certainty whether the issuer will be in a sound financial position after that time 
span.  
Moreover, if the security in question is not well-rated, a default on the part of the 
issuer may be more likely. Roughly speaking, the risk against which the buyer wants to hedge 
is the risk of non-payment. Through a CDS, the buyer can mitigate the risk of its investment 
in the company by shifting all or a portion of that risk into an insurance company or other 
CDS seller. The buyer of the insurance obtains the right to sell the reference entity issued by 
the company for its face value when (or better, if) a credit event occurs. As a matter of fact, if 
the debt issuer does not default and if all goes well the CDS buyer will end up losing some 
money, but this is the traditional concept of hedging. In this way the buyer avoids losing a 
much greater proportion of its investment if the issuer defaults. 
The key aspect inside a CDS contract is the definition of credit event (i.e. a default). 
Usually a credit event is defined as a failure to make a payment as it becomes due, a 
restructuring of debt, or a bankruptcy. 
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Figure 9. Source: International Swaps and Derivatives Association  
It must be stressed that, unlike the traditional insurance case, who buys the protection 
does not necessarily own the asset to be protected (thus constituting the so called CDS naked). 
The advantage over other credit derivatives is that the way they work is straightforward. 
There is one important difference between credit default swaps and the other over-the-counter 
derivatives (i.e. interest rate swaps, total return equity swaps, asset back securities and others). 
These other OTC instruments depend on interest rates, exchange rates, equity indices, 
commodity prices and so on. There is no reason to assume that any market participant has 
better information that any other about these variables. Credit default swap premia, instead, 
depend on the probability that a company will default during a period. Only managers of this 
company may be able to gauge this probability and financial institutions that work closely 
with the company are likely to have more information about the creditworthiness of the 
company with the respect to another financial institution that has no dealings with the 
company44. Hence the CDS trading is very complex, risk-oriented and its market is prone to a 
high degree of speculation. The more the holder of a security thinks its issuer is likely to 
default, the more desirable a CDS is and the more the premium is worth it. For these reasons, 
CDS prices should move together with the ratings made by the credit agencies.  
 
3.3.1 The CDS on unsecured debt and the choice of the maturity 
For my research I looked for the CDS prices of senior unsecured debt and junior 
unsecured debt of all the 26 banks included in the sample. The former, being on a higher level 
of seniority, usually shows cheaper premia since its likelihood of default is lower. I based the 
analysis on the unsecured debt because it is a good proxy for the perceived risk of the default 
                                                 
44 Hull (2015), page 573. 
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of the issuer, banks in this case. Once again, I chose to rely on Bloomberg software as the 
provider of data. I picked the average value of monthly CDS prices at one, two and five years 
for the term 2012-2016, euro currency. However, it was not possible to retrieve all the data for 
all the years considered, with a ratio of missed data of nearly 5% over the whole data needed. 
For some institutions I had no data available at all, forcing me to discard them. These are 
three Italian banks, namely Banco Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna (a.k.a. BPER), Banco 
Popolare di Milano and Fineco Bank. This should not invalidate the final results as the fact 
that those banks have the lowest level of total assets, representing just 1% of the entire 
sample45. 
In the following figure (Figure 10) it is possible to observe the pattern that CDS prices, 
on senior and junior unsecured debt, had over the period considered (from 2012 to 2016) at 
three levels of maturity (one year, two years and five years). 
Both charts show the same decreasing trend, reflecting a better market confidence in 
the financial soundness of the European banks. This may be due either to the implementation 
of Basel III (entered into force in 2014), which aims at enhancing banks solvability through a 
greater retention of liquidity, either to the quantitative easing adopted by the ECB, which 
contributed to alleviate the credit crunch consequent to the crisis of 2007-2008. 
Figure 10.
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Since the evolution of the CDS prices, both senior and junior, shows the same trend 
across the three maturities analyzed, I decided to focus the attention exclusively on the credit 
default swap on unsecured debt with five years of maturity because it incorporates the 
medium-term expectations and it is the one usually adopted in the business practice to study 
the issuer’s risk of default. 
 
                                                 
45 The entire sample accounts for a level of total assets, based on Bloomberg data, equal to 14.400.000 million €, 
while the three small Italian banks hardly reach 140.000 million €. 
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Figure 11.
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Figure 11 shows the values of CDS prices for the year 2016 across the 23 banks for 
which data on credit default swaps were available. The sample shows a large degree of 
heterogeneity in both type of CDS premia on the unsecured debt, either senior (green line) 
either junior (red line). The minimum prices (around 100.000€) belongs to the Belgian multi-
channel bank KBC, while the worst performer (with the junior CDS reaching 600.000€) has 
been the biggest Austrian bank Raiffeisen, perhaps due to the troubles related to a change in 
the Austrian requirements for derivatives, and consequent intervention of the EBA, which led 
to a sensible devaluation of its assets46. 
A certain degree of consistency can be observed through the other years (2012-2015). 
The best and worst performers vary over time but the heterogeneity in CDS premia continues 
to be a constant feature of the sample. 
 
3.3.2 The CDS spread 
In order to target the “pure” bail-in component in the bank’s perceived risk I computed 
the spread between the CDS junior and senior prices. By doing so, I eliminated all the other 
factors that might have affected the price on the unsecured debt, as the sovereign risk. The 
CDS spread could be taken as a measure that expresses how likely is that a bail-in will be 
implemented. Indeed, in such event, junior creditors will be asked to bear losses before the 
senior creditors. Thus, the CDS price on junior unsecured debt will be quite high since it is 
                                                 
46 Franceschi (July 2016), web source. 
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likely that the issuer or the seller of the credit default swap will have to repay the face value of 
the bond. For all these reasons, a low CDS spread means that the market perception on a bail-
in is remote while to a high CDS spread corresponds a higher probability of a bail-in. 
In Figure 12 I plotted the dynamics over time (the period starts the 31/01/2012 and 
ends the 30/12/2016) of both the sample average CDS spread and the STOXX index 
performance in order to compare the two trends on a monthly basis. It is quite evident the 
opposite movements of the variables: when the CDS spread showed upward sloping, the Euro 
STOXX performed poorly. Arguably this negative correlation reflects the fact that, under 
normal circumstances, the positive market confidence in the banking sector, mirrored by the 
increased index price, reduces the likelihood of the default, thus cutting the spread between 
junior and senior unsecured debt.  
The chart confirms the riskier nature of the CDS market, which shows more volatility 
than the equity market. The Euro STOXX price, indeed, is more constant over time with a 
minimum value of 78.30€, registered on May 2012 and a maximum of 157.65€, reached on 
July 2015.  
Figure 12.
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3.4 Ratings 
The third dimension included in my analysis is the degree of creditworthiness of 
banks. For this indicator I chose to rely on the data provided by the rating agency Moody’s, 
one of the top provider of credit evaluations together with Standard & Poor’s and Fitch. It has 
been estimated that they control nearly 95% of the credit ratings market, in large part because 
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their status was protected in the original Securities and Exchange Commission regulations of 
the sector of 197547. 
I decided to base the comparison with the bail-in resilience and the CDS spread on the 
rating given to the unsecured debt. Unsecured debt, being the portion of debt not backed by a 
guarantee or any other type of asset, is clearly riskier than a secured debt. For this reason, the 
rating on the unsecured debt reflects the issuer rating in most cases.  
 
3.4.1 Moody’s methodology 
The Moody’s methodology for a comprehensive rating assignment can be divided in 
three different stages. First, a raw assessment, based on fundamental credit factors, is 
determined by a Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA). Then expectations related to various 
forms of external support are incorporated within a Joint Default Analysis. Finally, the BCA 
is enhanced with other considerations in rating the obligations of related entities such as 
specialized covered bonds issuers and bank holding companies and bank obligations in failure 
or default48. I chose to make exclusively use of the raw BCAs because they reflect Moody’s 
opinion of the bank’s intrinsic, or standalone, strength absent of any extraordinary support 
from affiliates or government. The BCAs are not a rating tout court but a primitive 
assignment of a bank’s probability of requiring support to avoid a default, or defaulting on a 
debt obligation49. 
The BCA scorecard is a simple reference tool to approximate the credit profile of 
financial institutions under the assumption of no external support. It is expressed as a three-
notch range on an alphanumeric scale, which goes from the lowest, C, up to triple Aaa.  
                                                 
47 Council on foreign relations (February 2015), web source. 
48 Moody’s INVESTOR SERVICE (September 2017). 
49 Ibidem. 
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Figure 13. Moody's BCA scale
Source: Moody's Investor Service  
 
Banks are financial institutions specialized in risk and maturity transformation. The 
intrinsic strength of a bank, therefore, depends principally on the extent of the transformation 
undertaken and the resulting risks. Consistent with this, the Moody’s approach in determining 
a bank’s relative financial strength is focused on the view that its strength, and, hence, its 
viability, is largely a function of its solvency and its liquidity, which are the characteristics to 
which are assigned, respectively, 65% and 35% weight (Table 4). Solvency could be defined 
as the combination of asset risk, leverage and earnings, while liquidity is determined by a 
bank’s funding profile together with its ability to access cash. Moreover, these factors are 
related: all other variables being equal, stronger capitalization increases the capacity to absorb 
losses, increasing the confidence of counterparties and reducing the risk of a liquidity 
problem. Greater liquid assets, meanwhile, indirectly enhance solvency because they imply 
that a bank is less likely to need to sell illiquid assets at a loss in the event of a funding 
problem. The reverse is also true, and weak solvency can undermine liquidity. 
Therefore, in order to analyse each bank’s financial profile, Moody’s identifies five 
fundamental credit sub-factors (Table 4): asset risk, capital, profitability, funding structure 
and liquid resources. 
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Figure 14. Overview of weights to address the Financial Profile
 
 
Once explained why Moody’s perspective on rating could be a good proxy for the 
credit quality of the unsecured debt, I collected the data in table 6. 
As occurred with the CDS on unsecured debt, not all ratings were available. Thus, the 
final sample includes 24 of the initial 26 banks composing the Euro STOXX index, with the 
Italian institutions Mediobanca and Fineco Bank out of the list.  
Red cells stand for a downgrade in the credit quality of the senior unsecured debt with the 
respect to the previous year, while green cells stand for the opposite. In few cases the rating 
was withdrawn (yellow cell) by Moody’s. There may be several reasons sometimes unrelated 
to the creditworthiness of the issuer. Should no rating be assigned, the reason may be one of 
the following: 
I. An application was not received or accepted. 
II. The issue or issuer belongs to a group of securities or entities that are not rated as a 
matter of policy. 
III. There is a lack of essential data pertaining to the issue or issuer. 
IV. The issue was privately placed, in which case the rating is not published in Moody's 
publications50. 
In line with the better economic conditions after the turmoil occurred on many sovereign 
debts in 2011 (especially for PIIGS countries), the trend in rating is positive with the number 
of downgrades drastically reduced from year to year. However, the most trusted banks 
                                                 
50 Ibidem. 
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resulted to be the French BNP Paribas and Crédit Agricole, that never experienced a 
downgrade. 
 
Table 6. Moody's ratings of senior unsecured debt
Bank 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Legend
BNP Paribas SA A2 A2 A2 A1 A1 A1
Deutsche bank AG A2 A2 A2 A3 A3 A3 Upgrade
Credit Agricole SA A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A1 Downgrade
Societé Generale SA A1 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 Withdrawn Withdrawn
Banco Santander SA Not found Not found Baa1 Baa2 Baa2
UniCredit SpA A3 Baa2 Baa2 Baa2 Baa1 Baa1
ING Groep NV A1 A3 A3 A3 Baa1 Baa1
B. Bilbao Vyzcaya Argentaria SA Aa3 Baa3 Baa3 Baa2 Withdrawn Baa1
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA A2 Baa2 Baa2 Baa2 Baa1 Baa1
Natixis SA Aa3 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2
Commerzbank AG A2 A3 Baa1 Baa1 Baa1 A2
ABN Amro Group NV Aa3 A2 A2 A2 A2 A1
Caixa Bank SA A3 Baa3 BAa3 BAa3 Baa2 Baa2
KBC Group NV A2 Baa1 Baa1 A3 Withdrawn Baa1
Banco de Sadabell SA Baa1 Ba1 Ba1 Ba2 Ba1 Baa3
Erste Group bank AG A3 A3 A3 Baa2 Baa2 Baa1
Bankia SA BAa3 Ba2 B1 B1 B1 Ba3
Bank of Ireland Group PLC bA2 Ba2 Ba3 Ba1 Ba1 Baa2
Unione di banche italiane SpA A3 Baa2 Baa3 Baa3 Baa2 Baa3
Raiffeisen Bank International AG A1 A2 A2 Baa1 Baa2 Baa2
Allied Irish Banks PLC bA3 Ba3 B1 Ba3 Ba1 Baa3
BankInter SA A2 Ba1 Ba1 Baa3 Baa2 Baa2
BPER Banca Not found Not found Not found Ba2 Ba2
Popolare di Milano BAa3 Baa3 B1 B1 Ba3 Ba2
Source: Moody's site  
 
3.4.2 The numeric equivalent 
The alphanumeric scale can be converted into a pure numeric scale according to a precise 
conversion, proposed by Moody’s itself. The best rating (aaa), coincides with a numeric 
equivalent of 1, while to the worst (caa3) corresponds a numeric equivalent of 19. 
Factor score aaa aa1 aa2 aa3 a1 a2 a3 baa1 baa2 baa3 ba1 ba2 ba3 b1 b2 b3 caa1 caa2 caa3
Numeric equivalent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19  
In this way the baseline credit assignments are made easier to handle so that a comparison 
among companies rating will be more intuitive. 
 
3.5 Grouping 
The initial goal was to discover any empirical trace of coherence among the 
abovementioned indicators behind the three dimensions framework (for a quick review, 
please see figure 1 page 1).  
However, the data didn’t reveal the supposed correspondence with the ex-ante 
expectations. Some banks showed very good bail-in resilience, expressed by the relatively 
small Tier 1 cut down, but high CDS spread and poor rating. On the other hand, some 
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institutions, although presenting huge Tier 1 losses, were given creditworthiness by the rating 
agency and showed limited CDS spread. 
My approach at this point was to divide the sample into two subgroups following a 
country-based criterion. Banks belonging to Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and 
Netherlands were grouped into Pool A, all the others into Pool B. 
The two pools share the same average 
value of market capitalization, even if 
banks inside Pool A have much greater 
assets (100% more on average) in their 
balance sheets.  
Market capitalization can be thought as a rough measure of a company's total value 
and equals the number of outstanding shares, multiplied by the share price. In theory, this is 
the amount of money you would need if you were to buy all outstanding shares and fully own 
the company. Actually, the market cap does not reflect the cost for which the company could 
be purchased under a merger transaction because considerations about debt and synergies 
must be taken into account. To estimate what it would cost for an investor to buy a company 
outright, the enterprise value calculation should be more appropriate. Total assets amount, 
instead, shows how big the company is in the marketplace. Especially during economic 
downturns, these asset-rich companies tend to walk away with the least damage as they often 
dominate their respective markets51. 
For these reasons market capitalization is more a measure of size while total assets a 
measure of strength. 
 
3.6 The benefit score 
As explained in the sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, I realized two types of past simulations on 
balance sheet values in order to assess the bail-in resilience: one at 8% of total liabilities and 
one at 20% of the risk-weighted assets. The reason lies in the possibility that, under 
extraordinary circumstances and after the approval of the EC, the basis on which to impose 
losses on shareholders can be set on RWA. This provision, apart from inserting further 
discretion on authorities’ behaviour, gave me the clue to look for discrepancies in resilience 
between the base case and the exceptional case. For this purpose, I created what I called the 
“benefit score”, which tries to resume in just one number the degree of advantage that a 
financial institution enjoys via the application of a bail-in at 20% of RWA. The score goes 
                                                 
51 Ozyasar (2016), web source. 
POOL A POOL B
Average value of total assets* 856 406
Average value of market cap* 21.590 20.213
Source: Bloomberg
*values are in billions of € as of Dec. 2016
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from 1 to 10, where 1 stands for the complete disadvantage after the imposition of losses 
based on risk weighted assets while 10 represents the opposite. A score of 10 is hard but not 
impossible to observe because it would mean that a bank resulted completely solvent on its 
Tier 1 in the case of a bail-in at 20% and totally insolvent with the 8% scenario. When the two 
simulations bring the same Tier 1 cut down the relative benefit score is in between 5 and 6, 
meaning that the bank is quite neutral in the application of the two losses-imposition bases. 
 
Table 7. Building the Benefit score
Score
-100% -80% 1 Banks with this score prefer a loss imposition on the 8% of TL
-80% -60% 2
-60% -40% 3
-40% -20% 4
-20% 0% 5
0% 20% 6
20% 40% 7
40% 60% 8
60% 80% 9
80% 100% 10 Banks with this score prefer a loss imposition on the 20% of RWA
Difference in Tier 1 cut down
between scenarios
Banks with this score are neutral wrt loss-imposition basis
 
 
Basically, as shown in the example below, to build the benefit score I computed the 
difference between the percentage of losses on Tier 1 under the two scenarios (8% of total 
liabilities minus 20% of risk weighted assets) for each year and each financial institution.  
In the case of Deutsche Bank, the benefit score is among the highest across all the period 
considered, being consistently between 9 and 10. An application of the bail-in to the German 
investment bank would have been more bearable for its shareholders and creditors if the 
authorities had opted for a loss imposition calculated on the 20% of RWA. 
Table 8. Deutsche Bank example
Deutsche bank AG Legend
2016 88,42% Difference in % of Tier 1 cut down
BS 10 BS Benefit Score
2015 78,05%
BS 9
2014 80,61%
BS 10
2013 70,30%
BS 9
2012 75,28%
BS 9  
Further analysis will follow in the next Chapter. 
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4. Assessing results 
In this section I am going to discuss the main evidences that could be found analyzing 
the data and the methodology seen in the previous Chapter.  
The sample used is based on banks included in the Euro STOXX, a capitalization-weighted 
index which includes financial institutions that are participating in the European and 
Economic Monetary Union (EMU) involved in the banking sector.  
 
 
Table 9. Top 12 banks of the Euro STOXX index by market cap
TOP 12 Euro Stoxx Banks
MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION AS OF 
DEC. 2016
(On average, values in 
Millions of €)
Banco Santander 89.493                            
BNP Paribas 55.060                            
ING Group 40.145                            
Banco Bilbao Vyzcaya Argentaria 35.226                            
Intesa Sanpaolo 32.115                            
Societé Générale 26.006                            
Crédit Agricole 24.602                            
KBC Group 20.163                            
Deutsche Bank 20.046                            
Allied Irish Banks 17.322                            
UniCredit 16.674                            
ABN Amro Group 16.174                            
Source: Bloomberg  
 
The bail-in simulation computed on balance sheet values from 2012 to 2016 showed a 
general improvement towards the resilience to resolution. This is quite understandable since 
we are still under phase-in of the Basel III, which will become fully effective in January 2019. 
This package of measures, progressively implemented, is intended to lead to a significant 
increase in the banking industry’s capital requirements, thus strengthening solvency. The 
prices of the CDS, and consequently the CDS spread between junior and senior layers of debt, 
are quite volatile across the sample and all over the five years considered. The range on 
Moody’s ratings instead is less pronounced since the top-ranked banks are assigned an A1 
while the worst ones got B1. Recall that the complete scale of rating goes from C up to triple 
A. 
The sample showed a wide heterogeneity in the fields of resilience to resolution, 
expressed as the percentage of loss on tier 1 in the case of a bail-in procedure, of risk, 
measured through 5 years CDS spread on senior and junior unsecured debt tranches, and of 
In the following 
table there is a list 
of the twelve most 
capitalized banks 
of the Euro 
STOXX index in 
2016 
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rating, based on the numeric equivalent score given by Moody’s rating agency. For these 
reasons, I split the sample in two subgroups, namely Pool A and Pool B, on a country-based 
criterion (see figure 15). The aim was to find coherence among the three variables. 
Pool A gathers banks from continental European countries: Germany, France, Belgium 
and Austria. Pool B groups peripherical banks from Italy, Spain and Ireland, usually 
perceived as weak economies inside the European Union. 
 
Figure 15. Pool comparison over the years
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average
% Loss on Tier 1 Base case 90,73% 71,43% 63,84% 67,48% 63,51% 71%
Benefit score 7,18 7,00 7,00 7,09 7,27 7,11
Moody's numeric equivalent 6,45 6,43 6,82 7,00 6,64 6,67
CDS Senior 5y 146,814 93,343 87,548 79,663 102,905 102,055
∆CDS 5y 143,881 54,805 103,162 88,585 125,998 103,286
% Loss on Tier 1 Base case 32,94% 25,08% 18,86% 12,44% 25,66% 23%
Benefit score 4,00 4,08 4,17 4,50 4,50 4,25
Moody's numeric equivalent 10,60 11,10 10,45 9,90 9,36 10,28
CDS Senior 5y 338,065 153,699 117,049 142,178 148,758 179,950
∆CDS 5y 178,135 84,939 155,547 151,444 177,467 149,506
POOL A
POOL B
 
 
Banks inserted in Pool A showed a higher average percentage of Tier 1 losses than 
Pool B, 71% against 23%, while its credit merit, expressed converting the traditional rating 
score in letters with its numerical equivalent, is low (6.67 on average) considering that it 
could reach 19 that represents a C. This means that banks inside Pool A got a rating between 
A2 and A3. The same indicator applied to Pool B produced a score of 10.28, basically a Baa3, 
four notches more than the other pool. The Pool A CDS spread has been constantly lower 
than Pool B CDS spread with an average value of 103€ against 149€. It seems that a 
misalignment among risk, resilience to bail-in and credit quality is in place. 
This lack of consistency is supported by the results of the linear correlations between 
the Tier 1 cut down at the 8% scenario against the CDS spread and the rating, measured with 
the numeric equivalent.  
 
Table 10. Pearson correlations 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
CORR (% Tier 1 cut down; CDS spread) -0,297 -0,327 -0,428 -0,474 -0,162
CORR (% Tier 1 cut down; Numeric equivalent) -0,598 -0,488 -0,591 -0,666 -0,653  
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The computations are made relying on the CORREL Excel function, which returns the 
correlation coefficient of two arrays. The estimated correlation is linear, so the presence of 
other types of relationships cannot be excluded a priori. 
The values are negative across all the years considered, indicating that the variables 
share opposite trends. From an ex-ante perspective, instead, I would expect positive values. 
 
Table 11. Pearson correlations with second scenario
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
CORR (% Tier 1 cut down; CDS spread) 0,705 0,318 0,501 0,482 0,305
CORR (% Tier 1 cut down; Numeric equivalent) 0,356 0,261 0,090 0,337 0,219  
Here I estimated the linear correlations in the same way as before, but under the 20% 
RWA assumption. Values this time are positive, meaning that the indicators of risk, namely 
the CDS spread and the rating, seem to follow the fundamentals linked with a bail-in on the 
second scenario. 
 
In order to explain this bias among CDS spread, rating and the simulation results the 
benefit score (Chapter 3.6) could turn useful. This indicator points out, in a scale from 1 to 10, 
the level of benefit a bank receives from the application of a bail-in procedure under the 20% 
RWA loss absorption instead the 8% of total liabilities (including own funds). Pool A got a 
score higher than 7 while Pool B got 4.25. The difference is sizable but may explain why 
banks in Pool A, which performed poorly in the first scenario-bail-in resilience test, 
encountered the market favour, being well rated by Moody’s and showing low risk on CDS 
spread.  
A possible reason for the difference in the two scenarios may lie in the core activities 
of the institutions composing the index. German and French banks are more focused on 
trading financial assets rather than lending money to firms and families, which is instead the 
main activity for banks of Pool B, such as Unicredit or Santander. Former banks hold more 
assets and, as a consequence of their core business, more derivatives contracts. It is not 
unlikely that given their nature of G-SIBs, they assess their capital requirements for credit risk 
with an internal rating based approach instead of a standardized method. In this sense, banks 
are allowed to adopt a mark-to-market model, thus computing the weights for the assets 
according to their own models, which could be hard to gauge for external investors. Being 
derivatives harder to price with respect to other financial instruments and given that most of 
the transactions are made over-the-counter, such banks may be prone to make their balance 
sheets opaquer. Moreover, the BRRD states that a derivative may be bailed-in (to the extent 
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that it is not secured by a collateral) only once the derivative contract has been terminated and 
closed out. This give investment banks a certain level of flexibility. 
Whether a derivative contract is ultimately bailed-in or not, the BRRD provides the 
resolution authority with the power to suspend the termination rights of parties to contracts 
with the institution under resolution until midnight on the business day following official 
notice of the resolution action. This power will apply if all obligations regarding payments, 
deliveries and collateral exchange are up-to-date. This power is intended to ensure that a 
resolution authority’s attempts to achieve an orderly resolution are not contrasted by a market 
panic, sparked by derivatives counterparties attempting to protect their positions with the 
institution52.  
The economies of Italy, Spain and Ireland, on the other hand, are characterized by the 
widespread presence of small and medium enterprises that find difficult to receive credit from 
the market and are forced to address banks in order to collect funds and undertake important 
investments. It may be not a coincidence that the recent resolution troubles, after the BRRD 
came into force, have concerned Italian and Spanish banks (with the cited cases of Banco 
Popular, Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca). Given the entrepreneurial structure of these 
economies, it is likely that the market asks for a greater attention to the soundness of their 
banks, whose core activity is focused on giving credit to local SMEs. Broadly speaking, 
Italian and Spanish banks are less prone to deeply enter into the investment bank business. 
Hence, one may see a lack of diversification and, consequently, a major difficulty in 
recovering losses in case of financial turmoil with the respect to the continental banks 
competitors (i.e. Deutsche Bank). 
The recent introduction, in Italy, of PIRs, literally individual saving plans, may be an 
important step towards the access of cheaper funds for SMEs and the change in core business 
for Italian banks. Introduced with the Budget Law n. 232 of November 2016, they are aimed 
at funding Italian companies through a tailored investment plan that can enjoy attractive fiscal 
benefits, since PIRs are exempted from the payment of both the capital gains and the 
inheritance tax if kept in the portfolio at least for five years. Any investment linked with a PIR 
must be duly qualified, that means it must be compliant with some allocation standards. At 
least 70% of each PIR capital must be compulsory invested in financial instruments (equities 
or bonds) issued by Italian and foreign companies (EU and EEA) permanently established in 
Italy under the domestic fiscal regime. Of this 70%, at least 30% (which corresponds to 21% 
of total investable assets) must be in Italian small and mid-caps quoted outside the main 
index, FTSE MIB, such as the Star, the MidCap or the AIM segments. The remaining PIR’s 
                                                 
52 Financial Sector Advisory Center of the World Bank (2017). 
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capital can be freely allocated regardless the mentioned 70% allocation rule with just an 
exception: investments related to all foreign companies established in “no cooperative” (black 
list) countries cannot – in any case – be admitted53. Last, but not least, it is not possible to 
allocate more than 10% of any PIR available capital in financial products and bank accounts 
issued by companies belonging to the same company group. In other words: the concentration 
risk in one single investment asset is limited to 10%. 
Since their debut PIRs had a huge success, collecting more than 5 billion euros in their 
first six months against the initial expectations estimated by the Ministry of Finance set at 1.8 
billion54. From a Deloitte field-research it emerged that experts are confident that several 
billions of new flows to the industry will be generated through PIRs in the next five years55. 
 
Figure 16. Performance comparison between AIM segment and FTSE MIB for the year 2017
 
Figure 16 highlights the positive trend of the AIM index, which is the Italian exchange 
segment designed to gather the small and medium enterprises with high growth potential. The 
AIM segment performed better than FTSE MIB consistently during the last year. This 
increasing pattern means that even SMEs can find alternative source of funding and it may be 
due to a fall of liquidity directly linked with the introduction of PIRs. 
Their success is expressed also by another indicator, the number of IPOs, which 
experienced a substantial growth in Italy in 2017, passing from a monthly average of one to 
more than two56. 
                                                 
53 Lecchi (May 2017), web source. 
54 Repubblica (September 2017), web source. 
55 Deloitte white paper (May 2017). 
56 Zenti (December 2017), web source. 
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Figure 17 aims at highlighting what explained before taking into consideration the first 
eight banks of the index. We would expect that the two series, the benefit score and the 
numeric equivalent, share the same trend because to a low benefit score, which expresses 
good resilience to 8% bail-in, should correspond a low numeric equivalent, which reflects top 
credit quality, other things being equal. 
However, the graph tells us the opposite story. For continental banks, which 
performed poorly in the bail-in test, Moody’s had assigned better ratings. Vice versa Pool B 
banks, despite the good bail-in resilience, have been assigned lower ratings. This reverse-
trends chart constitutes a further proof of the bias between rating and 8% bail-in simulation 
results. 
 
Figure 17.
7
10 10
9
4 4
3
55
7
5
6
9
8 8 8
CONTINENTAL BANKS VS PERIPHERICAL BANKS 
Benefit score
Numeric equivalent
 
 
Let’s switch from the subgroups to a more granular level of analysis by looking at the 
results linked with the highest capitalized banks of the sample (see Figure 18). Here I can 
observe something puzzling: the banks with the highest losses on Tier 1, most of the times 
reaching 100%, entail the highest ratings and the less expensive CDS. BNP Paribas, one of 
the most capitalized of the Euro STOXX Banks index, has the best rating (A1), together with 
Credit Agricole and ABN Amro, and one of the smallest CDS spread over the years 
considered. It had not the best performance in the bail-in scenario, though. Banco Santander, 
the second banks for market capitalization, did perform better as bail-in resilience. As a 
matter of fact, its Tier 1 losses barely go over 20%, but Moody’s has only assigned a low 
Baa2, which corresponds to four notches more than A1. The reason may lie on the perceived 
risk of default signaled by the CDS spread which skyrocketed to 131,149, +300 % with the 
respect of year 2013, when it was fairly under 50. The other important Spanish institution 
included in the sample, BBVA, has the same indicators for risk and resilience but has been 
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assigned a slightly better rating, Baa1. For instance, Credit Agricole shows a percentage of 
loss on Tier 1 in the base case of 100% along all the years considered, while its CDS spread is 
94.481, quite below the sample average and got a single A by Moody’s. On the contrary, 
Unicredit, even if it shows a good bail-in resilience having a Tier 1 loss average below 30% 
(29.77%), is far from being trustworthy given that Moody has assigned a Baa1 rating, three 
notches more than the French bank. Moreover, the market asked for a large premium to cover 
a default risk of the Italian bank given that its CDS spread in 2016 was 179,391 (135,625 on 
average). The other important Italian group, namely Intesa San Paolo, although it has the 
same rating, has been given a better risk premium, its CDS spread lies below 100 on average, 
and shows better bail-in resilience. Deutsche Bank shows a more coherent situation: given 
that its Tier 1 losses has been high along all the analyzed period, the 2016 CDS spread 
indicates a high perceived default risk (247,693). However, Moody’s confirmed the A3 rating, 
a notch less than Unicredit. Société Générale has never shown Tier 1 losses under 75%, but 
the downward trend is clearly evident: since 2012 it is falling at a rate of 5% per year. This 
pattern may explain the good rating, A2, and the small CDS spread of the year 2016 (34,087). 
KBC, had strong responses to the bail-in resilience test and had the lowest CDS spread in the 
last two years, namely 2015 and 2016. Despite these information, the first Belgian bank got 
just a Baa1 from Moody’s.  
For the other minor banks of the Euro STOXX index the main thing to put under the 
spotlight is that the two Austrian banks, Raiffeisen and Erste Group, have benefit score in 
some cases lower than banks in Pool B (respectively 3.40 and 2.75) and similar ratings (Baa1 
and Baa2) but CDS spreads are quite divergent: Erste Group showed values above average 
while Raiffeisen has been the less risky of all the sample. Broadly speaking, it can be 
observed a global improvement on the rating side from year 2011, where the financial crisis 
reached the peak on the European economy. 
 
Figure 18. Summary of the results for the main banks of the index
% Loss on Tier 1 Base case Benefit score MOODY'S Numeric equivalent CDS Senior 5y ∆CDS 5y
BNP Paribas 63,93% 7 A1 5 84,768 109,587
Deutsche Bank 100,00% 10 A3 7 166,415 247,693
Credit Agricole 100,00% 10 A1 5 73,677 107,158
Societé Generale 76,93% 9 A2 6 170,293 34,087
Banco Santander 0,00% 4 Baa2 9 120,631 131,149
UniCredit 63,19% 4 Baa1 8 175,771 179,391
BBVA 0,00% 3 Baa1 8 124,089 136,570
Intesa Sanpaolo 12,02% 5 Baa1 8 140,010 139,251
Commerzbank 24,25% 5 A2 6 118,490 185,976
KBC Group 21,14% 7 Baa1 8 53,000 72,515  
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To conclude, my suggestion is that these discrepancies between the signals given by 
the couple CDS spreads-rating and the results produced by the ex-post analysis on the 
resilience to an 8% bail-in resolution, measured via the percentage of loss on Tier 1, are due 
to the scarce market confidence in the strict application of the BRRD. The objectives of 
resolution under the Directive are manifold, comprehensive, and mainly of a generic 
qualitative nature: to ensure the continuity of critical functions on the basis of the going 
concern value, not gone concern; to avoid significant adverse effects on the financial system; 
to avoid, or at least minimize, reliance on taxpayers’ money. These objectives set the bar high 
and make it challenging to assess, ex-ante and under considerable time pressure, if they can be 
met to the same extent through normal insolvency proceedings. The threshold to meet the 
conditions for resolution set in the public interest test is relatively low and open to 
interpretation. Resolution authorities may use the discretion provided by the abstract and 
generic definition of public interest under the BRRD towards the resolution actions. 
Depending on the practical interpretation and application of the “public interest” 
definition, it seems credible that resolution could be deemed to be in the public interest as a 
general rule in line with the BRRD. Under a wide interpretation of the public interest test, 
only the smallest banks (if at all) may be determined not to fulfil the conditions and be wound 
down under normal insolvency proceedings. Serious care must therefore be taken in order to 
justify resolution actions and the use of resolution financing arrangements. 
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5. Conclusions 
It is early to say whether the European response to the lack of a coherent resolution 
framework has been sufficient. For sure, the BRRD created a unique legislation for managing 
banking crises at a systemic level (recall that resolution tools applied to G-SIBs). The main 
issue is the transition from the old regime to the new one. For several years to come, the new 
resolution tools will have to be applied to balance sheets that are not quite ready for it, since 
Basel III requirements are still ongoing. This is bound to create bitter legal and political fights 
as the presented cases show. However, the evidence suggests that bail-in can work in and it is 
already producing significant changes in some dimensions. Thanks to the help of hard-headed 
policymakers inside the ECB and the European Commission, it can become credible and 
effective. Hence, a cautious optimism about the future of the Directive 2014/59/EU shall be 
maintained.  
Another issue in resolution is the distinction between individual bank failure and 
systemic crises. Avgouelas and Goodhart (2014) discuss the shortcomings of the bail-in 
regime, and argue that bail-out would still be necessary in extreme cases. They review the 
many advantages of bail-ins, from incentives to reduced losses, but they also emphasize 
important shortcomings, in particular, regarding the bail-in of a ‘going-concern’ bank, the 
burden on different groups of creditors, liquidity concerns once the bail-in has been triggered, 
and creditor flight. They conclude that a bail-out would still be required in case of a systemic 
threat, a simultaneous failure of multiple banks, or a failure of a large, complex cross-border 
bank. 
 The Italian rescue cases deviated significantly from the scope of the BRRD. The 
Single Resolution Board justified the exception, i.e. not let Venetian banks fail, with the 
avoidance of a systemic panic among Italian savers. If this is perceived as politically 
unacceptable, the appropriate response would be a combination of harmonized principles for 
the resolution of non-systemically relevant bank institutions and more restrictive state-aid 
regulation, rather than the extension of the resolution toolbox to all cases of bank insolvency, 
irrespective of the systemic relevance of the institution in question. 
Moreover, the evidences of my analysis have shown an important break in the circle 
between fundamentals, namely the bail-in resilience tests, and risk indicators, namely CDS 
spreads and ratings. The initial assumptions about the relationship among the three variables 
investigated are not satisfied. Given the negative correlation between bail-in resilience and the 
risk indicators I would say that the market still cannot believe the European authorities to 
have a credible strength. Continental banks continue to get more creditworthiness with the 
respect to the peripherical competitors. 
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Overall, it will always be difficult to fully implement a bail-in until discretional 
provisions and political spillovers play the role of disturbance factors, contributing to the bias 
between soundness and risk. 
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6. Annexes 
In this section I collected all the data regarding the CDS prices on senior and junior 
unsecured debt, picked from Bloomberg and concerning 23 banks of the Euro STOXX index, 
and the computation of the CDS spread. All values are in €. The wording N.A. stands for 
“Not available”. 
 
Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 86,261 31/12/2015 70,064 31/12/2014 63,895 31/12/2013 83,881 31/12/2012 140,644
30/11/2016 80,669 30/11/2015 66,973 28/11/2014 65,794 29/11/2013 86,658 30/11/2012 168,514
31/10/2016 73,326 30/10/2015 75,056 31/10/2014 61,881 31/10/2013 106,874 31/10/2012 155,744
30/09/2016 70,973 30/09/2105 73,031 30/09/2014 55,697 30/09/2013 117,443 28/09/2012 173,538
31/08/2016 73,013 31/08/2015 70,912 29/08/2014 65,637 30/08/2013 120,035 31/08/2012 218,121
29/07/2016 82,351 31/07/2015 72,024 31/07/2014 66,004 31/07/2013 139,962 31/07/2012 253,106
30/06/2016 92,807 30/06/2015 75,250 30/06/2014 62,464 28/06/2013 148,000 29/06/2012 267,906
31/05/2016 82,334 29/05/2015 67,169 30/05/2014 66,860 31/05/2013 128,917 31/05/2012 277,728
29/04/2016 79,412 30/04/2015 62,337 30/04/2014 67,689 30/04/2013 155,875 30/04/2012 243,210
31/03/2016 81,156 31/03/2015 56,459 31/03/2014 79,297 29/03/2013 146,826 30/03/2012 195,243
29/02/2016 110,079 27/02/2015 60,935 28/02/2014 82,051 28/02/2013 126,595 29/02/2012 204,836
29/01/2016 73,931 30/01/2015 63,461 31/01/2014 84,007 31/01/2013 124,449 31/01/2012 240,126
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 192,629 31/12/2015 137,065 31/12/2014 128,323 31/12/2013 126,841 31/12/2012 229,962
30/11/2016 179,932 30/11/2015 137,038 28/11/2014 133,921 29/11/2013 133,363 30/11/2012 279,882
31/10/2016 168,268 30/10/2015 146,892 31/10/2014 122,587 31/10/2013 166,564 31/10/2012 279,044
30/09/2016 151,321 30/09/2105 146,466 30/09/2014 80,986 30/09/2013 184,329 28/09/2012 321,102
31/08/2016 155,549 31/08/2015 144,540 29/08/2014 90,525 30/08/2013 195,655 31/08/2012 401,845
29/07/2016 174,818 31/07/2015 147,117 31/07/2014 97,617 31/07/2013 232,141 31/07/2012 445,132
30/06/2016 189,564 30/06/2015 152,055 30/06/2014 93,517 28/06/2013 230,919 29/06/2012 477,970
31/05/2016 168,817 29/05/2015 136,711 30/05/2014 107,014 31/05/2013 199,834 31/05/2012 506,535
29/04/2016 167,962 30/04/2015 126,161 30/04/2014 105,937 30/04/2013 253,305 30/04/2012 404,578
31/03/2016 171,318 31/03/2015 118,595 31/03/2014 122,385 29/03/2013 250,268 30/03/2012 339,503
29/02/2016 231,706 27/02/2015 122,340 28/02/2014 121,484 28/02/2013 225,419 29/02/2012 369,707
29/01/2016 156,119 30/01/2015 133,773 31/01/2014 125,440 31/01/2013 208,056 31/01/2012 483,840
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 106,369 31/12/2015 67,001 31/12/2014 64,428 31/12/2013 42,961 31/12/2012 89,318
30/11/2016 99,263 30/11/2015 70,065 28/11/2014 68,128 29/11/2013 46,705 30/11/2012 111,368
31/10/2016 94,942 30/10/2015 71,836 31/10/2014 60,706 31/10/2013 59,690 31/10/2012 123,300
30/09/2016 80,348 30/09/2105 73,435 30/09/2014 25,289 30/09/2013 66,886 28/09/2012 147,564
31/08/2016 82,536 31/08/2015 73,628 29/08/2014 24,888 30/08/2013 75,620 31/08/2012 183,724
29/07/2016 92,466 31/07/2015 75,093 31/07/2014 31,613 31/07/2013 92,179 31/07/2012 192,027
30/06/2016 96,757 30/06/2015 76,805 30/06/2014 31,053 28/06/2013 82,919 29/06/2012 210,064
31/05/2016 86,483 29/05/2015 69,542 30/05/2014 40,154 31/05/2013 70,917 31/05/2012 228,807
29/04/2016 88,551 30/04/2015 63,824 30/04/2014 38,248 30/04/2013 97,430 30/04/2012 161,367
31/03/2016 90,162 31/03/2015 62,136 31/03/2014 43,088 29/03/2013 103,442 30/03/2012 144,260
29/02/2016 121,627 27/02/2015 61,405 28/02/2014 39,433 28/02/2013 98,824 29/02/2012 164,871
29/01/2016 82,188 30/01/2015 70,312 31/01/2014 41,433 31/01/2013 83,607 31/01/2012 243,714
BNP Paribas
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Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 192,642 31/12/2015 95,240 31/12/2014 75,024 31/12/2013 83,774 31/12/2012 97,977
30/11/2016 225,416 30/11/2015 90,912 28/11/2014 79,006 29/11/2013 86,910 30/11/2012 123,534
31/10/2016 217,607 30/10/2015 89,054 31/10/2014 76,691 31/10/2013 99,923 31/10/2012 140,159
30/09/2016 214,419 30/09/2105 94,647 30/09/2014 61,430 30/09/2013 103,881 28/09/2012 153,985
31/08/2016 208,999 31/08/2015 91,106 29/08/2014 71,296 30/08/2013 107,619 31/08/2012 186,015
29/07/2016 215,261 31/07/2015 89,781 31/07/2014 75,938 31/07/2013 112,339 31/07/2012 201,062
30/06/2016 192,554 30/06/2015 88,659 30/06/2014 63,432 28/06/2013 112,801 29/06/2012 189,850
31/05/2016 174,081 29/05/2015 74,583 30/05/2014 69,947 31/05/2013 96,547 31/05/2012 187,508
29/04/2016 176,527 30/04/2015 72,608 30/04/2014 73,489 30/04/2013 115,191 30/04/2012 175,552
31/03/2016 179,158 31/03/2015 64,367 31/03/2014 83,664 29/03/2013 112,416 30/03/2012 146,824
29/02/2016 226,170 27/02/2015 64,951 28/02/2014 89,431 28/02/2013 103,666 29/02/2012 152,662
29/01/2016 114,753 30/01/2015 72,812 31/01/2014 88,982 31/01/2013 90,365 31/01/2012 172,436
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 428,926 31/12/2015 188,104 31/12/2014 172,818 31/12/2013 129,558 31/12/2012 178,599
30/11/2016 451,883 30/11/2015 180,826 28/11/2014 179,133 29/11/2013 133,882 30/11/2012 232,296
31/10/2016 433,787 30/10/2015 185,171 31/10/2014 176,340 31/10/2013 160,985 31/10/2012 254,754
30/09/2016 424,272 30/09/2105 191,492 30/09/2014 102,811 30/09/2013 167,267 28/09/2012 256,770
31/08/2016 417,330 31/08/2015 190,899 29/08/2014 99,550 30/08/2013 177,031 31/08/2012 298,294
29/07/2016 435,760 31/07/2015 183,850 31/07/2014 109,242 31/07/2013 188,018 31/07/2012 329,979
30/06/2016 398,515 30/06/2015 182,186 30/06/2014 92,809 28/06/2013 187,002 29/06/2012 312,932
31/05/2016 365,028 29/05/2015 159,230 30/05/2014 106,428 31/05/2013 160,193 31/05/2012 314,614
29/04/2016 381,768 30/04/2015 151,387 30/04/2014 115,838 30/04/2013 211,325 30/04/2012 281,225
31/03/2016 395,079 31/03/2015 142,268 31/03/2014 134,198 29/03/2013 213,425 30/03/2012 249,721
29/02/2016 454,073 27/02/2015 149,877 28/02/2014 137,115 28/02/2013 203,093 29/02/2012 248,590
29/01/2016 224,620 30/01/2015 171,936 31/01/2014 134,607 31/01/2013 159,093 31/01/2012 310,200
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 236,284 31/12/2015 92,864 31/12/2014 97,794 31/12/2013 45,785 31/12/2012 80,622
30/11/2016 226,467 30/11/2015 89,914 28/11/2014 100,128 29/11/2013 46,972 30/11/2012 108,762
31/10/2016 216,181 30/10/2015 96,117 31/10/2014 99,649 31/10/2013 61,063 31/10/2012 114,595
30/09/2016 209,852 30/09/2105 96,845 30/09/2014 41,381 30/09/2013 63,387 28/09/2012 102,786
31/08/2016 208,331 31/08/2015 99,793 29/08/2014 28,253 30/08/2013 69,413 31/08/2012 112,279
29/07/2016 220,499 31/07/2015 94,070 31/07/2014 33,304 31/07/2013 75,680 31/07/2012 128,917
30/06/2016 205,961 30/06/2015 93,527 30/06/2014 29,378 28/06/2013 74,201 29/06/2012 123,081
31/05/2016 190,946 29/05/2015 84,646 30/05/2014 36,481 31/05/2013 63,646 31/05/2012 127,106
29/04/2016 205,241 30/04/2015 78,780 30/04/2014 42,350 30/04/2013 96,134 30/04/2012 105,673
31/03/2016 215,922 31/03/2015 77,902 31/03/2014 50,535 29/03/2013 101,008 30/03/2012 102,896
29/02/2016 227,904 27/02/2015 84,925 28/02/2014 47,684 28/02/2013 99,427 29/02/2012 95,928
29/01/2016 109,867 30/01/2015 99,123 31/01/2014 45,625 31/01/2013 68,728 31/01/2012 137,764
Deutsche Bank
 
 
Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 76,192 31/12/2015 69,589 31/12/2014 67,272 31/12/2013 104,225 31/12/2012 158,427
30/11/2016 72,975 30/11/2015 71,251 28/11/2014 68,036 29/11/2013 111,758 30/11/2012 183,463
31/10/2016 68,618 30/10/2015 75,364 31/10/2014 65,569 31/10/2013 139,661 31/10/2012 186,184
30/09/2016 68,952 30/09/2105 77,880 30/09/2014 57,602 30/09/2013 154,315 28/09/2012 219,813
31/08/2016 71,391 31/08/2015 76,872 29/08/2014 72,225 30/08/2013 159,338 31/08/2012 271,465
29/07/2016 81,281 31/07/2015 78,673 31/07/2014 71,994 31/07/2013 182,942 31/07/2012 300,232
30/06/2016 90,021 30/06/2015 78,548 30/06/2014 63,466 28/06/2013 182,178 29/06/2012 339,924
31/05/2016 80,988 29/05/2015 69,640 30/05/2014 72,861 31/05/2013 159,077 31/05/2012 356,517
29/04/2016 80,188 30/04/2015 66,655 30/04/2014 79,697 30/04/2013 191,519 30/04/2012 298,505
31/03/2016 80,949 31/03/2015 59,117 31/03/2014 91,459 29/03/2013 176,258 30/03/2012 245,230
29/02/2016 110,326 27/02/2015 63,545 28/02/2014 93,317 28/02/2013 168,543 29/02/2012 239,131
29/01/2016 73,934 30/01/2015 69,298 31/01/2014 102,904 31/01/2013 157,951 31/01/2012 257,557
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 85,553 31/12/2015 150,646 31/12/2014 149,721 31/12/2013 155,192 31/12/2012 307,364
30/11/2016 92,438 30/11/2015 152,944 28/11/2014 N.A. 29/11/2013 167,337 30/11/2012 370,698
31/10/2016 163,312 30/10/2015 161,394 31/10/2014 N.A. 31/10/2013 225,653 31/10/2012 375,759
30/09/2016 148,844 30/09/2105 164,816 30/09/2014 77,167 30/09/2013 255,422 28/09/2012 413,630
31/08/2016 N.A. 31/08/2015 159,682 29/08/2014 106,839 30/08/2013 259,005 31/08/2012 539,922
29/07/2016 N.A. 31/07/2015 160,764 31/07/2014 107,756 31/07/2013 301,172 31/07/2012 600,127
30/06/2016 164,307 30/06/2015 157,730 30/06/2014 95,677 28/06/2013 296,814 29/06/2012 644,235
31/05/2016 168,080 29/05/2015 145,286 30/05/2014 116,925 31/05/2013 269,585 31/05/2012 628,774
29/04/2016 168,814 30/04/2015 137,056 30/04/2014 122,376 30/04/2013 335,170 30/04/2012 509,933
31/03/2016 172,978 31/03/2015 128,021 31/03/2014 143,560 29/03/2013 329,784 30/03/2012 451,562
29/02/2016 239,400 27/02/2015 140,485 28/02/2014 142,018 28/02/2013 300,381 29/02/2012 472,542
29/01/2016 167,694 30/01/2015 155,045 31/01/2014 148,399 31/01/2013 272,936 31/01/2012 560,744
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 9,361 31/12/2015 81,057 31/12/2014 82,449 31/12/2013 50,967 31/12/2012 148,937
30/11/2016 19,463 30/11/2015 81,693 28/11/2014 N.A. 29/11/2013 55,579 30/11/2012 187,235
31/10/2016 94,694 30/10/2015 86,029 31/10/2014 N.A. 31/10/2013 85,992 31/10/2012 189,575
30/09/2016 79,892 30/09/2105 86,936 30/09/2014 19,565 30/09/2013 101,107 28/09/2012 193,817
31/08/2016 N.A. 31/08/2015 82,809 29/08/2014 34,613 30/08/2013 99,668 31/08/2012 268,457
29/07/2016 N.A. 31/07/2015 82,091 31/07/2014 35,762 31/07/2013 118,230 31/07/2012 299,895
30/06/2016 74,286 30/06/2015 79,183 30/06/2014 32,211 28/06/2013 114,636 29/06/2012 304,310
31/05/2016 87,092 29/05/2015 75,646 30/05/2014 44,064 31/05/2013 110,508 31/05/2012 272,258
29/04/2016 88,626 30/04/2015 70,401 30/04/2014 42,679 30/04/2013 143,652 30/04/2012 211,428
31/03/2016 92,029 31/03/2015 68,904 31/03/2014 52,101 29/03/2013 153,527 30/03/2012 206,332
29/02/2016 129,074 27/02/2015 76,940 28/02/2014 48,702 28/02/2013 131,838 29/02/2012 233,411
29/01/2016 93,760 30/01/2015 85,747 31/01/2014 45,496 31/01/2013 114,985 31/01/2012 303,187
Credit Agricole
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Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 86,493 31/12/2015 70,209 31/12/2014 85,964 31/12/2013 101,757 31/12/2012 173,168
30/11/2016 79,026 30/11/2015 72,765 28/11/2014 76,023 29/11/2013 107,414 30/11/2012 204,081
31/10/2016 70,283 30/10/2015 82,559 31/10/2014 75,021 31/10/2013 132,738 31/10/2012 195,490
30/09/2016 70,373 30/09/2105 85,994 30/09/2014 66,126 30/09/2013 150,807 28/09/2012 222,530
31/08/2016 72,233 31/08/2015 84,723 29/08/2014 82,734 30/08/2013 158,464 31/08/2012 271,222
29/07/2016 80,333 31/07/2015 82,608 31/07/2014 80,843 31/07/2013 181,745 31/07/2012 298,413
30/06/2016 90,539 30/06/2015 86,649 30/06/2014 70,835 28/06/2013 183,295 29/06/2012 331,579
31/05/2016 80,650 29/05/2015 78,502 30/05/2014 84,085 31/05/2013 161,821 31/05/2012 354,547
29/04/2016 80,181 30/04/2015 77,803 30/04/2014 91,156 30/04/2013 195,397 30/04/2012 314,603
31/03/2016 81,942 31/03/2015 71,979 31/03/2014 96,659 29/03/2013 177,034 30/03/2012 260,725
29/02/2016 111,794 27/02/2015 79,287 28/02/2014 93,787 28/02/2013 174,790 29/02/2012 265,372
29/01/2016 75,133 30/01/2015 90,008 31/01/2014 101,903 31/01/2013 165,684 31/01/2012 323,159
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 204,653 31/12/2015 164,182 31/12/2014 185,641 31/12/2013 152,180 31/12/2012 314,604
30/11/2016 190,878 30/11/2015 165,589 28/11/2014 182,952 29/11/2013 162,506 30/11/2012 376,374
31/10/2016 171,467 30/10/2015 189,294 31/10/2014 166,472 31/10/2013 217,467 31/10/2012 379,091
30/09/2016 159,517 30/09/2105 189,173 30/09/2014 100,263 30/09/2013 247,247 28/09/2012 395,752
31/08/2016 165,151 31/08/2015 181,801 29/08/2014 110,759 30/08/2013 257,599 31/08/2012 468,970
29/07/2016 180,585 31/07/2015 176,869 31/07/2014 114,926 31/07/2013 299,771 31/07/2012 517,275
30/06/2016 200,419 30/06/2015 189,145 30/06/2014 100,955 28/06/2013 297,984 29/06/2012 574,856
31/05/2016 182,675 29/05/2015 172,145 30/05/2014 131,518 31/05/2013 272,173 31/05/2012 609,647
29/04/2016 186,882 30/04/2015 164,815 30/04/2014 139,266 30/04/2013 338,567 30/04/2012 514,997
31/03/2016 193,350 31/03/2015 162,172 31/03/2014 155,778 29/03/2013 331,327 30/03/2012 441,761
29/02/2016 261,508 27/02/2015 174,524 28/02/2014 143,310 28/02/2013 306,912 29/02/2012 466,272
29/01/2016 182,608 30/01/2015 201,652 31/01/2014 150,875 31/01/2013 278,475 31/01/2012 573,532
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 118,160 31/12/2015 93,974 31/12/2014 99,677 31/12/2013 50,423 31/12/2012 141,436
30/11/2016 111,852 30/11/2015 92,825 28/11/2014 106,930 29/11/2013 55,091 30/11/2012 172,293
31/10/2016 101,184 30/10/2015 106,735 31/10/2014 91,451 31/10/2013 84,729 31/10/2012 183,602
30/09/2016 89,144 30/09/2105 103,179 30/09/2014 34,137 30/09/2013 96,440 28/09/2012 173,223
31/08/2016 92,918 31/08/2015 97,077 29/08/2014 28,026 30/08/2013 99,135 31/08/2012 197,748
29/07/2016 100,252 31/07/2015 94,261 31/07/2014 34,083 31/07/2013 118,026 31/07/2012 218,862
30/06/2016 109,881 30/06/2015 102,496 30/06/2014 30,120 28/06/2013 114,690 29/06/2012 243,277
31/05/2016 102,025 29/05/2015 93,644 30/05/2014 47,433 31/05/2013 110,352 31/05/2012 255,101
29/04/2016 106,701 30/04/2015 87,012 30/04/2014 48,109 30/04/2013 143,170 30/04/2012 200,394
31/03/2016 111,408 31/03/2015 90,193 31/03/2014 59,119 29/03/2013 154,294 30/03/2012 181,036
29/02/2016 149,714 27/02/2015 95,237 28/02/2014 49,523 28/02/2013 132,122 29/02/2012 200,900
29/01/2016 107,475 30/01/2015 111,644 31/01/2014 48,972 31/01/2013 112,791 31/01/2012 250,373
Societé Generale
 
 
Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 128,307 31/12/2015 125,927 31/12/2014 75,339 31/12/2013 129,147 31/12/2012 274,989
30/11/2016 138,364 30/11/2015 122,902 28/11/2014 76,599 29/11/2013 150,359 30/11/2012 315,065
31/10/2016 124,646 30/10/2015 128,524 31/10/2014 75,629 31/10/2013 188,569 31/10/2012 304,343
30/09/2016 125,699 30/09/2105 125,797 30/09/2014 62,318 30/09/2013 235,445 28/09/2012 317,680
31/08/2016 128,443 31/08/2015 111,597 29/08/2014 82,002 30/08/2013 249,806 31/08/2012 390,431
29/07/2016 150,353 31/07/2015 100,043 31/07/2014 81,598 31/07/2013 298,723 31/07/2012 432,987
30/06/2016 159,814 30/06/2015 98,753 30/06/2014 76,413 28/06/2013 273,284 29/06/2012 423,928
31/05/2016 137,947 29/05/2015 92,431 30/05/2014 93,721 31/05/2013 225,463 31/05/2012 411,922
29/04/2016 125,367 30/04/2015 89,591 30/04/2014 107,840 30/04/2013 276,387 30/04/2012 404,206
31/03/2016 123,591 31/03/2015 77,006 31/03/2014 126,965 29/03/2013 284,415 30/03/2012 306,633
29/02/2016 176,963 27/02/2015 81,519 28/02/2014 133,395 28/02/2013 276,943 29/02/2012 267,461
29/01/2016 150,724 30/01/2015 80,262 31/01/2014 132,961 31/01/2013 245,837 31/01/2012 305,480
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 265,246 31/12/2015 241,251 31/12/2014 164,787 31/12/2013 172,666 31/12/2012 382,689
30/11/2016 286,224 30/11/2015 231,818 28/11/2014 171,638 29/11/2013 208,323 30/11/2012 444,743
31/10/2016 255,582 30/10/2015 244,465 31/10/2014 173,946 31/10/2013 273,174 31/10/2012 455,341
30/09/2016 243,711 30/09/2105 243,869 30/09/2014 102,134 30/09/2013 335,830 28/09/2012 473,541
31/08/2016 250,961 31/08/2015 222,284 29/08/2014 104,044 30/08/2013 354,618 31/08/2012 609,048
29/07/2016 290,722 31/07/2015 194,961 31/07/2014 112,865 31/07/2013 399,159 31/07/2012 688,932
30/06/2016 312,460 30/06/2015 193,709 30/06/2014 106,931 28/06/2013 368,747 29/06/2012 667,453
31/05/2016 280,334 29/05/2015 180,203 30/05/2014 130,532 31/05/2013 308,270 31/05/2012 664,663
29/04/2016 264,717 30/04/2015 173,963 30/04/2014 146,956 30/04/2013 401,897 30/04/2012 633,424
31/03/2016 265,923 31/03/2015 159,062 31/03/2014 173,132 29/03/2013 416,157 30/03/2012 480,711
29/02/2016 371,042 27/02/2015 161,914 28/02/2014 178,744 28/02/2013 411,682 29/02/2012 437,442
29/01/2016 295,770 30/01/2015 168,595 31/01/2014 173,464 31/01/2013 344,599 31/01/2012 511,861
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 136,939 31/12/2015 115,324 31/12/2014 89,448 31/12/2013 43,519 31/12/2012 107,700
30/11/2016 147,860 30/11/2015 108,917 28/11/2014 95,039 29/11/2013 57,964 30/11/2012 129,679
31/10/2016 130,936 30/10/2015 115,941 31/10/2014 98,318 31/10/2013 84,605 31/10/2012 150,998
30/09/2016 118,012 30/09/2105 118,072 30/09/2014 39,816 30/09/2013 100,386 28/09/2012 155,861
31/08/2016 122,518 31/08/2015 110,687 29/08/2014 22,042 30/08/2013 104,812 31/08/2012 218,617
29/07/2016 140,369 31/07/2015 94,918 31/07/2014 31,267 31/07/2013 100,436 31/07/2012 255,945
30/06/2016 152,647 30/06/2015 94,956 30/06/2014 30,518 28/06/2013 95,463 29/06/2012 243,526
31/05/2016 142,387 29/05/2015 87,772 30/05/2014 36,811 31/05/2013 82,806 31/05/2012 252,741
29/04/2016 139,350 30/04/2015 84,373 30/04/2014 39,116 30/04/2013 125,510 30/04/2012 229,218
31/03/2016 142,332 31/03/2015 82,056 31/03/2014 46,167 29/03/2013 131,743 30/03/2012 174,078
29/02/2016 194,079 27/02/2015 80,396 28/02/2014 45,349 28/02/2013 134,739 29/02/2012 169,981
29/01/2016 145,047 30/01/2015 88,333 31/01/2014 40,502 31/01/2013 98,762 31/01/2012 206,382
Santander
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Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 188,726 31/12/2015 124,652 31/12/2014 114,285 31/12/2013 158,166 31/12/2012 298,182
30/11/2016 212,735 30/11/2015 117,458 28/11/2014 98,913 29/11/2013 197,637 30/11/2012 342,106
31/10/2016 176,332 30/10/2015 127,253 31/10/2014 99,952 31/10/2013 255,591 31/10/2012 340,031
30/09/2016 179,889 30/09/2105 139,027 30/09/2014 84,887 30/09/2013 307,637 28/09/2012 348,063
31/08/2016 175,678 31/08/2015 134,672 29/08/2014 114,694 30/08/2013 306,758 31/08/2012 476,273
29/07/2016 187,421 31/07/2015 133,872 31/07/2014 107,721 31/07/2013 348,076 31/07/2012 556,254
30/06/2016 194,844 30/06/2015 129,953 30/06/2014 89,479 28/06/2013 341,193 29/06/2012 538,007
31/05/2016 173,643 29/05/2015 118,063 30/05/2014 117,413 31/05/2013 274,544 31/05/2012 516,861
29/04/2016 170,806 30/04/2015 110,827 30/04/2014 129,058 30/04/2013 344,734 30/04/2012 417,304
31/03/2016 168,557 31/03/2015 96,324 31/03/2014 154,378 29/03/2013 351,995 30/03/2012 335,702
29/02/2016 228,124 27/02/2015 112,062 28/02/2014 156,658 28/02/2013 329,335 29/02/2012 336,612
29/01/2016 152,316 30/01/2015 127,169 31/01/2014 157,538 31/01/2013 279,104 31/01/2012 453,665
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 380,410 31/12/2015 259,401 31/12/2014 240,689 31/12/2013 209,935 31/12/2012 496,736
30/11/2016 440,066 30/11/2015 245,243 28/11/2014 229,091 29/11/2013 270,826 30/11/2012 578,233
31/10/2016 395,146 30/10/2015 267,689 31/10/2014 238,818 31/10/2013 367,877 31/10/2012 572,510
30/09/2016 385,899 30/09/2105 290,115 30/09/2014 142,738 30/09/2013 441,036 28/09/2012 576,427
31/08/2016 375,251 31/08/2015 287,022 29/08/2014 149,142 30/08/2013 453,377 31/08/2012 776,022
29/07/2016 400,313 31/07/2015 272,945 31/07/2014 145,345 31/07/2013 500,937 31/07/2012 853,953
30/06/2016 417,171 30/06/2015 269,492 30/06/2014 119,990 28/06/2013 497,057 29/06/2012 829,701
31/05/2016 380,435 29/05/2015 241,935 30/05/2014 156,985 31/05/2013 449,006 31/05/2012 802,001
29/04/2016 366,024 30/04/2015 229,339 30/04/2014 170,583 30/04/2013 595,137 30/04/2012 673,215
31/03/2016 361,784 31/03/2015 214,810 31/03/2014 199,310 29/03/2013 590,176 30/03/2012 559,651
29/02/2016 459,077 27/02/2015 250,289 28/02/2014 201,694 28/02/2013 546,800 29/02/2012 548,257
29/01/2016 315,281 30/01/2015 272,007 31/01/2014 204,995 31/01/2013 448,034 31/01/2012 801,957
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 191,685 31/12/2015 134,750 31/12/2014 126,404 31/12/2013 51,769 31/12/2012 198,554
30/11/2016 227,331 30/11/2015 127,784 28/11/2014 130,178 29/11/2013 73,189 30/11/2012 236,126
31/10/2016 218,814 30/10/2015 140,436 31/10/2014 138,866 31/10/2013 112,285 31/10/2012 232,479
30/09/2016 206,010 30/09/2105 151,089 30/09/2014 57,851 30/09/2013 133,399 28/09/2012 228,364
31/08/2016 199,573 31/08/2015 152,350 29/08/2014 34,448 30/08/2013 146,619 31/08/2012 299,749
29/07/2016 212,892 31/07/2015 139,073 31/07/2014 37,624 31/07/2013 152,861 31/07/2012 297,699
30/06/2016 222,327 30/06/2015 139,540 30/06/2014 30,512 28/06/2013 155,864 29/06/2012 291,693
31/05/2016 206,792 29/05/2015 123,872 30/05/2014 39,573 31/05/2013 174,462 31/05/2012 285,140
29/04/2016 195,218 30/04/2015 118,512 30/04/2014 41,525 30/04/2013 250,403 30/04/2012 255,911
31/03/2016 193,227 31/03/2015 118,486 31/03/2014 44,932 29/03/2013 238,181 30/03/2012 223,949
29/02/2016 230,952 27/02/2015 138,227 28/02/2014 45,036 28/02/2013 217,465 29/02/2012 211,645
29/01/2016 162,965 30/01/2015 144,839 31/01/2014 47,457 31/01/2013 168,930 31/01/2012 348,292
Unicredit
 
 
Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 64,379 31/12/2015 52,138 31/12/2014 55,858 31/12/2013 78,541 31/12/2012 109,072
30/11/2016 68,432 30/11/2015 51,395 28/11/2014 48,795 29/11/2013 80,809 30/11/2012 135,808
31/10/2016 66,213 30/10/2015 54,707 31/10/2014 52,938 31/10/2013 99,083 31/10/2012 158,405
30/09/2016 64,988 30/09/2105 78,252 30/09/2014 54,955 30/09/2013 120,422 28/09/2012 194,958
31/08/2016 60,710 31/08/2015 68,382 29/08/2014 52,110 30/08/2013 119,597 31/08/2012 208,797
29/07/2016 62,430 31/07/2015 68,933 31/07/2014 61,075 31/07/2013 116,792 31/07/2012 210,898
30/06/2016 89,617 30/06/2015 85,030 30/06/2014 60,012 28/06/2013 140,985 29/06/2012 222,546
31/05/2016 68,029 29/05/2015 69,111 30/05/2014 57,418 31/05/2013 135,961 31/05/2012 245,811
29/04/2016 65,367 30/04/2015 62,487 30/04/2014 64,000 30/04/2013 136,299 30/04/2012 232,079
31/03/2016 68,652 31/03/2015 55,492 31/03/2014 69,887 29/03/2013 179,009 30/03/2012 207,784
29/02/2016 82,145 27/02/2015 50,353 28/02/2014 81,037 28/02/2013 155,466 29/02/2012 160,238
29/01/2016 62,737 30/01/2015 54,162 31/01/2014 93,509 31/01/2013 105,002 31/01/2012 154,282
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 150,830 31/12/2015 119,812 31/12/2014 131,324 31/12/2013 136,694 31/12/2012 194,857
30/11/2016 154,595 30/11/2015 120,645 28/11/2014 133,918 29/11/2013 136,888 30/11/2012 244,114
31/10/2016 158,257 30/10/2015 137,562 31/10/2014 128,487 31/10/2013 166,706 31/10/2012 273,771
30/09/2016 143,268 30/09/2105 147,519 30/09/2014 82,321 30/09/2013 183,466 28/09/2012 274,750
31/08/2016 146,426 31/08/2015 143,871 29/08/2014 83,341 30/08/2013 187,336 31/08/2012 308,202
29/07/2016 157,797 31/07/2015 150,019 31/07/2014 88,134 31/07/2013 207,695 31/07/2012 349,893
30/06/2016 170,340 30/06/2015 152,302 30/06/2014 84,875 28/06/2013 212,531 29/06/2012 358,225
31/05/2016 149,528 29/05/2015 141,510 30/05/2014 97,851 31/05/2013 198,119 31/05/2012 377,726
29/04/2016 145,004 30/04/2015 127,422 30/04/2014 106,462 30/04/2013 270,579 30/04/2012 340,847
31/03/2016 142,961 31/03/2015 114,029 31/03/2014 125,024 29/03/2013 264,707 30/03/2012 272,499
29/02/2016 185,796 27/02/2015 126,459 28/02/2014 137,593 28/02/2013 221,996 29/02/2012 264,206
29/01/2016 133,727 30/01/2015 138,807 31/01/2014 138,904 31/01/2013 177,951 31/01/2012 355,215
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 86,451 31/12/2015 67,674 31/12/2014 75,466 31/12/2013 58,153 31/12/2012 85,785
30/11/2016 86,163 30/11/2015 69,250 28/11/2014 85,123 29/11/2013 56,079 30/11/2012 108,306
31/10/2016 92,044 30/10/2015 82,855 31/10/2014 75,549 31/10/2013 67,623 31/10/2012 115,366
30/09/2016 78,280 30/09/2105 69,267 30/09/2014 27,366 30/09/2013 63,044 28/09/2012 79,792
31/08/2016 85,716 31/08/2015 75,489 29/08/2014 31,231 30/08/2013 67,739 31/08/2012 99,405
29/07/2016 95,367 31/07/2015 81,086 31/07/2014 27,059 31/07/2013 90,903 31/07/2012 138,995
30/06/2016 80,723 30/06/2015 67,272 30/06/2014 24,863 28/06/2013 71,546 29/06/2012 135,679
31/05/2016 81,499 29/05/2015 72,399 30/05/2014 40,433 31/05/2013 62,158 31/05/2012 131,915
29/04/2016 79,637 30/04/2015 64,935 30/04/2014 42,462 30/04/2013 134,280 30/04/2012 108,768
31/03/2016 74,309 31/03/2015 58,537 31/03/2014 55,137 29/03/2013 85,698 30/03/2012 64,715
29/02/2016 103,651 27/02/2015 76,106 28/02/2014 56,556 28/02/2013 66,530 29/02/2012 103,968
29/01/2016 70,990 30/01/2015 84,645 31/01/2014 45,395 31/01/2013 72,949 31/01/2012 200,933
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Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 130,151 31/12/2015 120,780 31/12/2014 75,020 31/12/2013 131,814 31/12/2012 287,419
30/11/2016 139,959 30/11/2015 121,082 28/11/2014 77,218 29/11/2013 157,168 30/11/2012 329,766
31/10/2016 123,459 30/10/2015 123,752 31/10/2014 76,294 31/10/2013 197,794 31/10/2012 324,765
30/09/2016 118,978 30/09/2105 124,074 30/09/2014 64,485 30/09/2013 247,866 28/09/2012 333,080
31/08/2016 118,577 31/08/2015 111,431 29/08/2014 81,559 30/08/2013 262,971 31/08/2012 416,392
29/07/2016 140,094 31/07/2015 101,875 31/07/2014 85,030 31/07/2013 308,370 31/07/2012 452,780
30/06/2016 150,780 30/06/2015 102,396 30/06/2014 79,352 28/06/2013 285,457 29/06/2012 459,165
31/05/2016 130,085 29/05/2015 93,475 30/05/2014 97,441 31/05/2013 238,537 31/05/2012 449,956
29/04/2016 122,752 30/04/2015 89,916 30/04/2014 111,434 30/04/2013 295,669 30/04/2012 420,326
31/03/2016 120,480 31/03/2015 77,163 31/03/2014 132,480 29/03/2013 302,906 30/03/2012 317,055
29/02/2016 175,820 27/02/2015 82,194 28/02/2014 136,193 28/02/2013 296,021 29/02/2012 274,577
29/01/2016 144,885 30/01/2015 81,514 31/01/2014 134,596 31/01/2013 262,664 31/01/2012 312,215
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 269,163 31/12/2015 229,703 31/12/2014 163,947 31/12/2013 173,820 31/12/2012 407,844
30/11/2016 287,774 30/11/2015 226,181 28/11/2014 172,022 29/11/2013 214,299 30/11/2012 481,143
31/10/2016 252,872 30/10/2015 228,948 31/10/2014 179,574 31/10/2013 281,789 31/10/2012 503,523
30/09/2016 240,894 30/09/2105 238,996 30/09/2014 105,462 30/09/2013 349,035 28/09/2012 541,177
31/08/2016 242,492 31/08/2015 219,460 29/08/2014 106,021 30/08/2013 369,313 31/08/2012 697,913
29/07/2016 277,233 31/07/2015 196,946 31/07/2014 118,877 31/07/2013 410,111 31/07/2012 769,850
30/06/2016 300,312 30/06/2015 197,428 30/06/2014 109,600 28/06/2013 390,936 29/06/2012 774,305
31/05/2016 266,669 29/05/2015 180,783 30/05/2014 135,389 31/05/2013 344,232 31/05/2012 758,827
29/04/2016 261,481 30/04/2015 171,981 30/04/2014 150,672 30/04/2013 432,248 30/04/2012 718,068
31/03/2016 265,097 31/03/2015 156,948 31/03/2014 178,044 29/03/2013 455,456 30/03/2012 558,665
29/02/2016 368,761 27/02/2015 163,977 28/02/2014 180,043 28/02/2013 437,614 29/02/2012 522,806
29/01/2016 280,229 30/01/2015 170,288 31/01/2014 177,085 31/01/2013 370,274 31/01/2012 593,448
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 139,012 31/12/2015 108,923 31/12/2014 88,927 31/12/2013 42,007 31/12/2012 120,425
30/11/2016 147,815 30/11/2015 105,099 28/11/2014 94,804 29/11/2013 57,130 30/11/2012 151,377
31/10/2016 129,413 30/10/2015 105,196 31/10/2014 103,280 31/10/2013 83,995 31/10/2012 178,758
30/09/2016 121,915 30/09/2105 114,923 30/09/2014 40,977 30/09/2013 101,169 28/09/2012 208,097
31/08/2016 123,915 31/08/2015 108,030 29/08/2014 24,462 30/08/2013 106,342 31/08/2012 281,521
29/07/2016 137,139 31/07/2015 95,071 31/07/2014 33,847 31/07/2013 101,742 31/07/2012 317,071
30/06/2016 149,532 30/06/2015 95,032 30/06/2014 30,248 28/06/2013 105,479 29/06/2012 315,140
31/05/2016 136,584 29/05/2015 87,309 30/05/2014 37,948 31/05/2013 105,694 31/05/2012 308,871
29/04/2016 138,729 30/04/2015 82,065 30/04/2014 39,239 30/04/2013 136,579 30/04/2012 297,742
31/03/2016 144,617 31/03/2015 79,786 31/03/2014 45,565 29/03/2013 152,550 30/03/2012 241,610
29/02/2016 192,942 27/02/2015 81,783 28/02/2014 43,850 28/02/2013 141,593 29/02/2012 248,229
29/01/2016 135,345 30/01/2015 88,774 31/01/2014 42,489 31/01/2013 107,610 31/01/2012 281,233
BBVA
 
 
Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 146,673 31/12/2015 89,738 31/12/2014 86,178 31/12/2013 152,997 31/12/2012 278,254
30/11/2016 160,022 30/11/2015 86,306 28/11/2014 79,421 29/11/2013 186,020 30/11/2012 326,926
31/10/2016 137,411 30/10/2015 94,168 31/10/2014 82,238 31/10/2013 235,436 31/10/2012 316,157
30/09/2016 136,218 30/09/2105 106,603 30/09/2014 69,364 30/09/2013 277,052 28/09/2012 325,384
31/08/2016 126,551 31/08/2015 102,966 29/08/2014 86,592 30/08/2013 280,558 31/08/2012 441,240
29/07/2016 140,314 31/07/2015 99,349 31/07/2014 85,796 31/07/2013 325,121 31/07/2012 490,995
30/06/2016 149,235 30/06/2015 98,502 30/06/2014 77,264 28/06/2013 327,050 29/06/2012 485,818
31/05/2016 126,367 29/05/2015 92,090 30/05/2014 97,102 31/05/2013 252,771 31/05/2012 483,284
29/04/2016 122,430 30/04/2015 88,856 30/04/2014 106,639 30/04/2013 323,241 30/04/2012 400,599
31/03/2016 117,869 31/03/2015 75,174 31/03/2014 129,465 29/03/2013 329,830 30/03/2012 315,422
29/02/2016 163,178 27/02/2015 82,815 28/02/2014 136,784 28/02/2013 308,979 29/02/2012 311,694
29/01/2016 107,705 30/01/2015 89,586 31/01/2014 150,610 31/01/2013 252,931 31/01/2012 431,977
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 298,726 31/12/2015 181,988 31/12/2014 182,840 31/12/2013 197,910 31/12/2012 403,176
30/11/2016 333,740 30/11/2015 174,620 28/11/2014 182,284 29/11/2013 250,244 30/11/2012 482,336
31/10/2016 297,747 30/10/2015 192,194 31/10/2014 182,787 31/10/2013 326,170 31/10/2012 480,441
30/09/2016 279,243 30/09/2105 205,367 30/09/2014 110,295 30/09/2013 389,718 28/09/2012 499,574
31/08/2016 255,103 31/08/2015 204,543 29/08/2014 119,794 30/08/2013 406,621 31/08/2012 682,766
29/07/2016 293,707 31/07/2015 195,160 31/07/2014 124,342 31/07/2013 465,696 31/07/2012 751,610
30/06/2016 301,203 30/06/2015 196,075 30/06/2014 112,822 28/06/2013 456,367 29/06/2012 748,583
31/05/2016 261,231 29/05/2015 179,154 30/05/2014 136,029 31/05/2013 377,585 31/05/2012 760,846
29/04/2016 259,944 30/04/2015 168,545 30/04/2014 146,998 30/04/2013 503,728 30/04/2012 628,756
31/03/2016 261,787 31/03/2015 149,501 31/03/2014 176,058 29/03/2013 493,015 30/03/2012 510,866
29/02/2016 334,125 27/02/2015 161,394 28/02/2014 183,103 28/02/2013 459,483 29/02/2012 522,205
29/01/2016 223,423 30/01/2015 181,953 31/01/2014 192,734 31/01/2013 367,326 31/01/2012 723,394
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 152,052 31/12/2015 92,251 31/12/2014 96,663 31/12/2013 44,912 31/12/2012 124,922
30/11/2016 173,718 30/11/2015 88,314 28/11/2014 102,863 29/11/2013 64,224 30/11/2012 155,410
31/10/2016 160,336 30/10/2015 98,027 31/10/2014 100,549 31/10/2013 90,734 31/10/2012 164,284
30/09/2016 143,024 30/09/2105 98,764 30/09/2014 40,931 30/09/2013 112,666 28/09/2012 174,190
31/08/2016 128,552 31/08/2015 101,576 29/08/2014 33,202 30/08/2013 126,063 31/08/2012 241,526
29/07/2016 153,393 31/07/2015 95,811 31/07/2014 38,547 31/07/2013 140,575 31/07/2012 260,615
30/06/2016 151,968 30/06/2015 97,573 30/06/2014 35,558 28/06/2013 129,317 29/06/2012 262,765
31/05/2016 134,864 29/05/2015 87,064 30/05/2014 38,926 31/05/2013 124,814 31/05/2012 277,562
29/04/2016 137,514 30/04/2015 79,689 30/04/2014 40,359 30/04/2013 180,487 30/04/2012 228,157
31/03/2016 143,918 31/03/2015 74,327 31/03/2014 46,594 29/03/2013 163,185 30/03/2012 195,444
29/02/2016 170,947 27/02/2015 78,579 28/02/2014 46,319 28/02/2013 150,504 29/02/2012 210,511
29/01/2016 115,718 30/01/2015 92,367 31/01/2014 42,124 31/01/2013 114,395 31/01/2012 291,417
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Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 80,030 31/12/2015 68,250 31/12/2014 58,010 31/12/2013 100,920 31/12/2012 175,000
30/11/2016 71,370 30/11/2015 72,800 28/11/2014 61,500 29/11/2013 95,000 30/11/2012 185,000
31/10/2016 70,960 30/10/2015 73,580 31/10/2014 64,340 31/10/2013 145,000 31/10/2012 193,090
30/09/2016 74,200 30/09/2105 81,560 30/09/2014 62,500 30/09/2013 165,600 28/09/2012 210,000
31/08/2016 70,500 31/08/2015 70,340 29/08/2014 51,500 30/08/2013 170,000 31/08/2012 253,495
29/07/2016 77,000 31/07/2015 66,420 31/07/2014 64,400 31/07/2013 165,000 31/07/2012 258,440
30/06/2016 93,500 30/06/2015 74,315 30/06/2014 66,075 28/06/2013 170,000 29/06/2012 277,230
31/05/2016 79,500 29/05/2015 64,455 30/05/2014 62,000 31/05/2013 169,250 31/05/2012 315,000
29/04/2016 77,500 30/04/2015 60,010 30/04/2014 68,500 30/04/2013 170,000 30/04/2012 237,335
31/03/2016 83,250 31/03/2015 59,385 31/03/2014 73,000 29/03/2013 209,465 30/03/2012 217,890
29/02/2016 110,290 27/02/2015 54,010 28/02/2014 83,000 28/02/2013 176,390 29/02/2012 216,945
29/01/2016 83,500 30/01/2015 57,010 31/01/2014 105,000 31/01/2013 171,000 31/01/2012 207,000
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 180,215 31/12/2015 138,800 31/12/2014 137,010 31/12/2013 150,035 31/12/2012 325,000
30/11/2016 160,295 30/11/2015 146,910 28/11/2014 130,360 29/11/2013 145,860 30/11/2012 370,000
31/10/2016 165,050 30/10/2015 141,290 31/10/2014 143,895 31/10/2013 240,000 31/10/2012 385,040
30/09/2016 161,470 30/09/2105 160,335 30/09/2014 125,520 30/09/2013 264,380 28/09/2012 439,965
31/08/2016 154,000 31/08/2015 147,060 29/08/2014 75,010 30/08/2013 280,000 31/08/2012 451,360
29/07/2016 159,000 31/07/2015 141,610 31/07/2014 100,805 31/07/2013 282,000 31/07/2012 515,080
30/06/2016 202,500 30/06/2015 150,755 30/06/2014 101,620 28/06/2013 295,000 29/06/2012 524,990
31/05/2016 166,000 29/05/2015 138,300 30/05/2014 107,000 31/05/2013 265,000 31/05/2012 570,000
29/04/2016 159,000 30/04/2015 121,010 30/04/2014 108,000 30/04/2013 257,500 30/04/2012 444,960
31/03/2016 179,630 31/03/2015 121,710 31/03/2014 130,000 29/03/2013 355,025 30/03/2012 395,000
29/02/2016 221,505 27/02/2015 112,010 28/02/2014 133,000 28/02/2013 312,710 29/02/2012 386,145
29/01/2016 180,500 30/01/2015 125,520 31/01/2014 155,000 31/01/2013 309,995 31/01/2012 383,340
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 100,185 31/12/2015 70,550 31/12/2014 79,000 31/12/2013 49,115 31/12/2012 150,000
30/11/2016 88,925 30/11/2015 74,110 28/11/2014 68,860 29/11/2013 50,860 30/11/2012 185,000
31/10/2016 94,090 30/10/2015 67,710 31/10/2014 79,555 31/10/2013 95,000 31/10/2012 191,950
30/09/2016 87,270 30/09/2105 78,775 30/09/2014 63,020 30/09/2013 98,780 28/09/2012 229,965
31/08/2016 83,500 31/08/2015 76,720 29/08/2014 23,510 30/08/2013 110,000 31/08/2012 197,865
29/07/2016 82,000 31/07/2015 75,190 31/07/2014 36,405 31/07/2013 117,000 31/07/2012 256,640
30/06/2016 109,000 30/06/2015 76,440 30/06/2014 35,545 28/06/2013 125,000 29/06/2012 247,760
31/05/2016 86,500 29/05/2015 73,845 30/05/2014 45,000 31/05/2013 95,750 31/05/2012 255,000
29/04/2016 81,500 30/04/2015 61,000 30/04/2014 39,500 30/04/2013 87,500 30/04/2012 207,625
31/03/2016 96,380 31/03/2015 62,325 31/03/2014 57,000 29/03/2013 145,560 30/03/2012 177,110
29/02/2016 111,215 27/02/2015 58,000 28/02/2014 50,000 28/02/2013 136,320 29/02/2012 169,200
29/01/2016 97,000 30/01/2015 68,510 31/01/2014 50,000 31/01/2013 138,995 31/01/2012 176,340
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Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 123,871 31/12/2015 88,721 31/12/2014 79,392 31/12/2013 112,662 31/12/2012 157,681
30/11/2016 129,046 30/11/2015 85,602 28/11/2014 84,122 29/11/2013 126,123 30/11/2012 189,008
31/10/2016 125,551 30/10/2015 93,583 31/10/2014 86,421 31/10/2013 142,556 31/10/2012 207,785
30/09/2016 118,246 30/09/2105 100,954 30/09/2014 76,765 30/09/2013 153,133 28/09/2012 220,814
31/08/2016 118,603 31/08/2015 95,990 29/08/2014 84,102 30/08/2013 162,105 31/08/2012 261,073
29/07/2016 121,737 31/07/2015 92,694 31/07/2014 88,415 31/07/2013 168,222 31/07/2012 294,894
30/06/2016 121,975 30/06/2015 95,420 30/06/2014 73,348 28/06/2013 173,452 29/06/2012 284,816
31/05/2016 113,211 29/05/2015 83,013 30/05/2014 88,029 31/05/2013 152,329 31/05/2012 281,469
29/04/2016 108,214 30/04/2015 82,569 30/04/2014 98,532 30/04/2013 174,568 30/04/2012 244,170
31/03/2016 108,116 31/03/2015 73,329 31/03/2014 108,899 29/03/2013 162,281 30/03/2012 211,243
29/02/2016 150,683 27/02/2015 72,424 28/02/2014 111,881 28/02/2013 152,665 29/02/2012 208,904
29/01/2016 101,583 30/01/2015 78,541 31/01/2014 115,176 31/01/2013 138,996 31/01/2012 244,507
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 314,328 31/12/2015 188,564 31/12/2014 230,903 31/12/2013 215,712 31/12/2012 408,315
30/11/2016 322,198 30/11/2015 188,134 28/11/2014 234,604 29/11/2013 244,774 30/11/2012 486,492
31/10/2016 299,136 30/10/2015 212,341 31/10/2014 245,688 31/10/2013 325,247 31/10/2012 546,785
30/09/2016 277,308 30/09/2105 218,032 30/09/2014 157,606 30/09/2013 366,324 28/09/2012 543,337
31/08/2016 284,698 31/08/2015 208,579 29/08/2014 155,535 30/08/2013 390,110 31/08/2012 585,097
29/07/2016 299,515 31/07/2015 198,964 31/07/2014 165,999 31/07/2013 394,569 31/07/2012 644,137
30/06/2016 280,597 30/06/2015 201,015 30/06/2014 133,174 28/06/2013 361,932 29/06/2012 674,577
31/05/2016 259,360 29/05/2015 183,611 30/05/2014 145,386 31/05/2013 339,363 31/05/2012 693,984
29/04/2016 253,254 30/04/2015 190,301 30/04/2014 154,958 30/04/2013 426,840 30/04/2012 596,262
31/03/2016 259,098 31/03/2015 181,202 31/03/2014 183,484 29/03/2013 425,404 30/03/2012 562,156
29/02/2016 353,712 27/02/2015 189,207 28/02/2014 198,462 28/02/2013 439,496 29/02/2012 577,420
29/01/2016 225,351 30/01/2015 228,045 31/01/2014 212,561 31/01/2013 372,891 31/01/2012 778,438
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 190,458 31/12/2015 99,843 31/12/2014 151,512 31/12/2013 103,051 31/12/2012 250,633
30/11/2016 193,152 30/11/2015 102,532 28/11/2014 150,482 29/11/2013 118,651 30/11/2012 297,484
31/10/2016 173,586 30/10/2015 118,758 31/10/2014 159,267 31/10/2013 182,691 31/10/2012 339,000
30/09/2016 159,063 30/09/2105 117,078 30/09/2014 80,842 30/09/2013 213,191 28/09/2012 322,522
31/08/2016 166,095 31/08/2015 112,589 29/08/2014 71,433 30/08/2013 228,005 31/08/2012 324,025
29/07/2016 177,778 31/07/2015 106,270 31/07/2014 77,584 31/07/2013 226,347 31/07/2012 349,243
30/06/2016 158,622 30/06/2015 105,595 30/06/2014 59,825 28/06/2013 188,480 29/06/2012 389,761
31/05/2016 146,149 29/05/2015 100,598 30/05/2014 57,357 31/05/2013 187,034 31/05/2012 412,515
29/04/2016 145,040 30/04/2015 107,733 30/04/2014 56,426 30/04/2013 252,272 30/04/2012 352,092
31/03/2016 150,982 31/03/2015 107,873 31/03/2014 74,585 29/03/2013 263,123 30/03/2012 350,913
29/02/2016 203,028 27/02/2015 116,783 28/02/2014 86,581 28/02/2013 286,831 29/02/2012 368,516
29/01/2016 123,767 30/01/2015 149,504 31/01/2014 97,385 31/01/2013 233,895 31/01/2012 533,931
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Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 65,185 31/12/2015 66,010 31/12/2014 61,825 31/12/2013 90,125 31/12/2012 N.A.
30/11/2016 70,415 30/11/2015 64,740 28/11/2014 57,580 29/11/2013 93,260 30/11/2012 N.A.
31/10/2016 68,600 30/10/2015 65,375 31/10/2014 62,165 31/10/2013 95,895 31/10/2012 N.A.
30/09/2016 72,125 30/09/2105 77,365 30/09/2014 64,470 30/09/2013 108,000 28/09/2012 N.A.
31/08/2016 67,220 31/08/2015 67,125 29/08/2014 58,185 30/08/2013 121,410 31/08/2012 N.A.
29/07/2016 73,465 31/07/2015 60,325 31/07/2014 63,895 31/07/2013 119,380 31/07/2012 N.A.
30/06/2016 83,640 30/06/2015 68,280 30/06/2014 62,160 28/06/2013 135,850 29/06/2012 N.A.
31/05/2016 72,870 29/05/2015 62,305 30/05/2014 64,570 31/05/2013 105,000 31/05/2012 N.A.
29/04/2016 78,385 30/04/2015 60,900 30/04/2014 72,500 30/04/2013 N.A. 30/04/2012 N.A.
31/03/2016 84,875 31/03/2015 59,690 31/03/2014 79,085 29/03/2013 N.A. 30/03/2012 N.A.
29/02/2016 95,515 27/02/2015 57,030 28/02/2014 81,320 28/02/2013 N.A. 29/02/2012 N.A.
29/01/2016 79,010 30/01/2015 62,535 31/01/2014 85,960 31/01/2013 N.A. 31/01/2012 N.A.
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 246,300 31/12/2015 134,425 31/12/2014 120,165 31/12/2013 187,160 31/12/2012 206,490
30/11/2016 267,565 30/11/2015 139,570 28/11/2014 136,975 29/11/2013 187,770 30/11/2012 236,185
31/10/2016 270,595 30/10/2015 167,200 31/10/2014 143,935 31/10/2013 251,790 31/10/2012 251,655
30/09/2016 284,700 30/09/2105 197,730 30/09/2014 149,295 30/09/2013 259,100 28/09/2012 280,000
31/08/2016 216,770 31/08/2015 171,520 29/08/2014 134,635 30/08/2013 147,405 31/08/2012 309,995
29/07/2016 245,100 31/07/2015 154,100 31/07/2014 148,275 31/07/2013 275,000 31/07/2012 325,000
30/06/2016 277,630 30/06/2015 163,940 30/06/2014 144,745 28/06/2013 274,995 29/06/2012 332,900
31/05/2016 143,025 29/05/2015 149,540 30/05/2014 150,515 31/05/2013 275,005 31/05/2012 360,050
29/04/2016 153,980 30/04/2015 130,680 30/04/2014 148,735 30/04/2013 223,885 30/04/2012 320,000
31/03/2016 166,680 31/03/2015 128,070 31/03/2014 184,545 29/03/2013 271,670 30/03/2012 318,360
29/02/2016 187,925 27/02/2015 119,030 28/02/2014 185,335 28/02/2013 215,000 29/02/2012 320,000
29/01/2016 155,435 30/01/2015 130,435 31/01/2014 195,825 31/01/2013 205,000 31/01/2012 372,220
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 181,115 31/12/2015 68,415 31/12/2014 58,340 31/12/2013 97,035 31/12/2012 N.A.
30/11/2016 197,150 30/11/2015 74,830 28/11/2014 79,395 29/11/2013 94,510 30/11/2012 N.A.
31/10/2016 201,995 30/10/2015 101,825 31/10/2014 81,770 31/10/2013 155,895 31/10/2012 N.A.
30/09/2016 212,575 30/09/2105 120,365 30/09/2014 84,825 30/09/2013 151,100 28/09/2012 N.A.
31/08/2016 149,550 31/08/2015 104,395 29/08/2014 76,450 30/08/2013 25,995 31/08/2012 N.A.
29/07/2016 171,635 31/07/2015 93,775 31/07/2014 84,380 31/07/2013 155,620 31/07/2012 N.A.
30/06/2016 193,990 30/06/2015 95,660 30/06/2014 82,585 28/06/2013 139,145 29/06/2012 N.A.
31/05/2016 70,155 29/05/2015 87,235 30/05/2014 85,945 31/05/2013 170,005 31/05/2012 N.A.
29/04/2016 75,595 30/04/2015 69,780 30/04/2014 76,235 30/04/2013 N.A. 30/04/2012 N.A.
31/03/2016 81,805 31/03/2015 68,380 31/03/2014 105,460 29/03/2013 N.A. 30/03/2012 N.A.
29/02/2016 92,410 27/02/2015 62,000 28/02/2014 104,015 28/02/2013 N.A. 29/02/2012 N.A.
29/01/2016 76,425 30/01/2015 67,900 31/01/2014 109,865 31/01/2013 N.A. 31/01/2012 N.A.
ABN Amro
 
Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 133,615 31/12/2015 131,630 31/12/2014 100,430
30/11/2016 145,000 30/11/2015 120,500 28/11/2014 91,010
31/10/2016 136,760 30/10/2015 124,500 31/10/2014 94,100
30/09/2016 141,000 30/09/2105 160,000 30/09/2014 89,480
31/08/2016 131,620 31/08/2015 139,510 29/08/2014 85,015
29/07/2016 155,000 31/07/2015 115,000 31/07/2014 100,010
30/06/2016 193,000 30/06/2015 125,000 30/06/2014 87,010
31/05/2016 149,180 29/05/2015 117,000 30/05/2014 95,000
29/04/2016 146,000 30/04/2015 100,670 30/04/2014 114,500
31/03/2016 160,625 31/03/2015 106,000 31/03/2014 135,000
29/02/2016 175,755 27/02/2015 115,010 28/02/2014 150,000
29/01/2016 170,635 30/01/2015 108,040 31/01/2014 150,000
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 329,160 31/12/2015 N.A. 31/12/2014 N.A.
30/11/2016 352,000 30/11/2015 N.A. 28/11/2014 N.A.
31/10/2016 325,860 30/10/2015 N.A. 31/10/2014 N.A.
30/09/2016 324,965 30/09/2105 N.A. 30/09/2014 N.A.
31/08/2016 299,335 31/08/2015 N.A. 29/08/2014 N.A.
29/07/2016 N.A. 31/07/2015 N.A. 31/07/2014 N.A.
30/06/2016 N.A. 30/06/2015 N.A. 30/06/2014 N.A.
31/05/2016 N.A. 29/05/2015 N.A. 30/05/2014 N.A.
29/04/2016 N.A. 30/04/2015 N.A. 30/04/2014 N.A.
31/03/2016 N.A. 31/03/2015 N.A. 31/03/2014 N.A.
29/02/2016 N.A. 27/02/2015 N.A. 28/02/2014 N.A.
29/01/2016 N.A. 30/01/2015 N.A. 31/01/2014 N.A.
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 195,545 31/12/2015 N.A. 31/12/2014 N.A.
30/11/2016 207,000 30/11/2015 N.A. 28/11/2014 N.A.
31/10/2016 189,100 30/10/2015 N.A. 31/10/2014 N.A.
30/09/2016 183,965 30/09/2105 N.A. 30/09/2014 N.A.
31/08/2016 167,715 31/08/2015 N.A. 29/08/2014 N.A.
29/07/2016 N.A. 31/07/2015 N.A. 31/07/2014 N.A.
30/06/2016 N.A. 30/06/2015 N.A. 30/06/2014 N.A.
31/05/2016 N.A. 29/05/2015 N.A. 30/05/2014 N.A.
29/04/2016 N.A. 30/04/2015 N.A. 30/04/2014 N.A.
31/03/2016 N.A. 31/03/2015 N.A. 31/03/2014 N.A.
29/02/2016 N.A. 27/02/2015 N.A. 28/02/2014 N.A.
29/01/2016 N.A. 30/01/2015 N.A. 31/01/2014 N.A.
Caixa Bank
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Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 53,000 31/12/2015 48,360 31/12/2014 65,040 31/12/2013 113,850 31/12/2012 175,000
30/11/2016 60,000 30/11/2015 44,500 28/11/2014 62,050 29/11/2013 121,270 30/11/2012 214,515
31/10/2016 57,355 30/10/2015 51,745 31/10/2014 72,410 31/10/2013 135,000 31/10/2012 235,810
30/09/2016 62,470 30/09/2105 74,165 30/09/2014 67,010 30/09/2013 149,325 28/09/2012 285,520
31/08/2016 62,000 31/08/2015 69,270 29/08/2014 70,010 30/08/2013 165,000 31/08/2012 307,000
29/07/2016 62,000 31/07/2015 65,000 31/07/2014 90,010 31/07/2013 170,000 31/07/2012 330,000
30/06/2016 67,920 30/06/2015 73,000 30/06/2014 82,010 28/06/2013 174,180 29/06/2012 331,710
31/05/2016 56,110 29/05/2015 62,680 30/05/2014 88,780 31/05/2013 160,000 31/05/2012 380,780
29/04/2016 55,990 30/04/2015 60,270 30/04/2014 90,900 30/04/2013 148,640 30/04/2012 337,000
31/03/2016 53,000 31/03/2015 46,500 31/03/2014 110,000 29/03/2013 174,590 30/03/2012 327,255
29/02/2016 55,700 27/02/2015 48,510 28/02/2014 115,000 28/02/2013 166,040 29/02/2012 312,850
29/01/2016 59,800 30/01/2015 54,500 31/01/2014 115,000 31/01/2013 167,500 31/01/2012 361,000
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 125,515 31/12/2015 95,745 31/12/2014 160,070 31/12/2013 176,250 31/12/2012 317,300
30/11/2016 144,865 30/11/2015 90,000 28/11/2014 151,950 29/11/2013 179,550 30/11/2012 379,675
31/10/2016 125,000 30/10/2015 92,000 31/10/2014 173,465 31/10/2013 185,000 31/10/2012 399,905
30/09/2016 112,820 30/09/2105 135,000 30/09/2014 210,030 30/09/2013 224,000 28/09/2012 475,035
31/08/2016 104,000 31/08/2015 139,560 29/08/2014 130,030 30/08/2013 225,000 31/08/2012 574,635
29/07/2016 109,960 31/07/2015 151,870 31/07/2014 150,030 31/07/2013 230,000 31/07/2012 574,680
30/06/2016 99,465 30/06/2015 165,000 30/06/2014 140,030 28/06/2013 227,100 29/06/2012 600,525
31/05/2016 102,390 29/05/2015 142,000 30/05/2014 135,000 31/05/2013 227,225 31/05/2012 629,945
29/04/2016 106,315 30/04/2015 135,010 30/04/2014 152,500 30/04/2013 242,185 30/04/2012 629,975
31/03/2016 104,010 31/03/2015 114,010 31/03/2014 160,000 29/03/2013 262,075 30/03/2012 580,815
29/02/2016 96,000 27/02/2015 120,960 28/02/2014 170,000 28/02/2013 277,210 29/02/2012 600,000
29/01/2016 99,375 30/01/2015 145,030 31/01/2014 165,000 31/01/2013 286,935 31/01/2012 799,985
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 72,515 31/12/2015 47,385 31/12/2014 95,030 31/12/2013 62,400 31/12/2012 142,300
30/11/2016 84,865 30/11/2015 45,500 28/11/2014 89,900 29/11/2013 58,280 30/11/2012 165,160
31/10/2016 67,645 30/10/2015 40,255 31/10/2014 101,055 31/10/2013 50,000 31/10/2012 164,095
30/09/2016 50,350 30/09/2105 60,835 30/09/2014 143,020 30/09/2013 74,675 28/09/2012 189,515
31/08/2016 42,000 31/08/2015 70,290 29/08/2014 60,020 30/08/2013 60,000 31/08/2012 267,635
29/07/2016 47,960 31/07/2015 86,870 31/07/2014 60,020 31/07/2013 60,000 31/07/2012 244,680
30/06/2016 31,545 30/06/2015 92,000 30/06/2014 58,020 28/06/2013 52,920 29/06/2012 268,815
31/05/2016 46,280 29/05/2015 79,320 30/05/2014 46,220 31/05/2013 67,225 31/05/2012 249,165
29/04/2016 50,325 30/04/2015 74,740 30/04/2014 61,600 30/04/2013 93,545 30/04/2012 292,975
31/03/2016 51,010 31/03/2015 67,510 31/03/2014 50,000 29/03/2013 87,485 30/03/2012 253,560
29/02/2016 40,300 27/02/2015 72,450 28/02/2014 55,000 28/02/2013 111,170 29/02/2012 287,150
29/01/2016 39,575 30/01/2015 90,530 31/01/2014 50,000 31/01/2013 119,435 31/01/2012 438,985
KBC
 
 
Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 139,775 31/12/2015 172,875 31/12/2014 131,520 31/12/2013 185,000 31/12/2012 372,730
30/11/2016 165,000 30/11/2015 155,000 28/11/2014 116,010 29/11/2013 200,520 30/11/2012 430,000
31/10/2016 155,810 30/10/2015 150,875 31/10/2014 123,820 31/10/2013 255,000 31/10/2012 503,975
30/09/2016 162,415 30/09/2105 185,000 30/09/2014 140,040 30/09/2013 315,000 28/09/2012 577,775
31/08/2016 139,365 31/08/2015 169,140 29/08/2014 115,040 30/08/2013 425,960 31/08/2012 727,040
29/07/2016 147,000 31/07/2015 147,000 31/07/2014 152,520 31/07/2013 465,000 31/07/2012 755,000
30/06/2016 178,000 30/06/2015 157,000 30/06/2014 140,010 28/06/2013 465,000 29/06/2012 830,000
31/05/2016 151,420 29/05/2015 147,810 30/05/2014 131,040 31/05/2013 387,740 31/05/2012 722,110
29/04/2016 168,000 30/04/2015 132,665 30/04/2014 141,800 30/04/2013 420,000 30/04/2012 672,120
31/03/2016 199,170 31/03/2015 134,010 31/03/2014 166,670 29/03/2013 468,965 30/03/2012 560,000
29/02/2016 213,080 27/02/2015 130,610 28/02/2014 176,595 28/02/2013 399,810 29/02/2012 371,260
29/01/2016 194,550 30/01/2015 143,010 31/01/2014 192,500 31/01/2013 415,000 31/01/2012 500,070
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 277,580 31/12/2015 303,875 31/12/2014 255,070 31/12/2013 284,960 31/12/2012 645,210
30/11/2016 336,000 30/11/2015 270,500 28/11/2014 246,030 29/11/2013 300,000 30/11/2012 767,850
31/10/2016 321,200 30/10/2015 285,245 31/10/2014 305,785 31/10/2013 397,080 31/10/2012 914,605
30/09/2016 313,265 30/09/2105 336,655 30/09/2014 357,075 30/09/2013 455,000 28/09/2012 1127,800
31/08/2016 295,080 31/08/2015 304,115 29/08/2014 165,030 30/08/2013 650,000 31/08/2012 1374,445
29/07/2016 320,000 31/07/2015 295,610 31/07/2014 215,070 31/07/2013 695,000 31/07/2012 1536,625
30/06/2016 355,000 30/06/2015 290,000 30/06/2014 185,030 28/06/2013 699,130 29/06/2012 1446,480
31/05/2016 299,500 29/05/2015 248,880 30/05/2014 170,620 31/05/2013 574,480 31/05/2012 1025,500
29/04/2016 312,500 30/04/2015 234,000 30/04/2014 189,000 30/04/2013 675,000 30/04/2012 892,435
31/03/2016 348,565 31/03/2015 240,030 31/03/2014 235,000 29/03/2013 715,565 30/03/2012 816,650
29/02/2016 408,625 27/02/2015 256,840 28/02/2014 263,160 28/02/2013 631,805 29/02/2012 634,995
29/01/2016 361,320 30/01/2015 335,125 31/01/2014 295,000 31/01/2013 645,000 31/01/2012 914,985
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 137,805 31/12/2015 131,000 31/12/2014 123,550 31/12/2013 99,960 31/12/2012 272,480
30/11/2016 171,000 30/11/2015 115,500 28/11/2014 130,020 29/11/2013 99,480 30/11/2012 337,850
31/10/2016 165,390 30/10/2015 134,370 31/10/2014 181,965 31/10/2013 142,080 31/10/2012 410,630
30/09/2016 150,850 30/09/2105 151,655 30/09/2014 217,035 30/09/2013 140,000 28/09/2012 550,025
31/08/2016 155,715 31/08/2015 134,975 29/08/2014 49,990 30/08/2013 224,040 31/08/2012 647,405
29/07/2016 173,000 31/07/2015 148,610 31/07/2014 62,550 31/07/2013 230,000 31/07/2012 781,625
30/06/2016 177,000 30/06/2015 133,000 30/06/2014 45,020 28/06/2013 234,130 29/06/2012 616,480
31/05/2016 148,080 29/05/2015 101,070 30/05/2014 39,580 31/05/2013 186,740 31/05/2012 303,390
29/04/2016 144,500 30/04/2015 101,335 30/04/2014 47,200 30/04/2013 255,000 30/04/2012 220,315
31/03/2016 149,395 31/03/2015 106,020 31/03/2014 68,330 29/03/2013 246,600 30/03/2012 256,650
29/02/2016 195,545 27/02/2015 126,230 28/02/2014 86,565 28/02/2013 231,995 29/02/2012 263,735
29/01/2016 166,770 30/01/2015 192,115 31/01/2014 102,500 31/01/2013 230,000 31/01/2012 414,915
Banco Sabadell
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Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 128,000 31/12/2015 123,530 31/12/2014 160,040 31/12/2013 117,055 31/12/2012 150,000
30/11/2016 121,500 30/11/2015 120,000 28/11/2014 115,625 29/11/2013 100,000 30/11/2012 175,000
31/10/2016 122,200 30/10/2015 130,740 31/10/2014 114,090 31/10/2013 137,500 31/10/2012 180,000
30/09/2016 127,750 30/09/2105 164,145 30/09/2014 130,040 30/09/2013 155,000 28/09/2012 217,400
31/08/2016 124,500 31/08/2015 156,545 29/08/2014 132,520 30/08/2013 160,000 31/08/2012 230,000
29/07/2016 142,500 31/07/2015 154,495 31/07/2014 155,040 31/07/2013 150,000 31/07/2012 240,500
30/06/2016 164,500 30/06/2015 166,000 30/06/2014 110,520 28/06/2013 156,780 29/06/2012 244,995
31/05/2016 125,535 29/05/2015 154,105 30/05/2014 113,000 31/05/2013 145,000 31/05/2012 285,000
29/04/2016 128,870 30/04/2015 134,440 30/04/2014 115,265 30/04/2013 145,000 30/04/2012 269,190
31/03/2016 150,000 31/03/2015 148,010 31/03/2014 122,500 29/03/2013 177,095 30/03/2012 249,315
29/02/2016 163,820 27/02/2015 130,645 28/02/2014 130,000 28/02/2013 155,000 29/02/2012 235,260
29/01/2016 141,045 30/01/2015 190,040 31/01/2014 127,000 31/01/2013 150,160 31/01/2012 310,640
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 283,000 31/12/2015 247,055 31/12/2014 380,130 31/12/2013 200,330 31/12/2012 310,000
30/11/2016 285,000 30/11/2015 244,000 28/11/2014 344,985 29/11/2013 187,565 30/11/2012 344,995
31/10/2016 280,425 30/10/2015 243,905 31/10/2014 282,995 31/10/2013 240,000 31/10/2012 350,005
30/09/2016 296,590 30/09/2105 350,150 30/09/2014 350,205 30/09/2013 256,910 28/09/2012 394,975
31/08/2016 288,000 31/08/2015 390,675 29/08/2014 275,095 30/08/2013 265,000 31/08/2012 400,000
29/07/2016 320,000 31/07/2015 391,225 31/07/2014 255,070 31/07/2013 258,135 31/07/2012 452,835
30/06/2016 355,000 30/06/2015 440,000 30/06/2014 195,030 28/06/2013 257,500 29/06/2012 422,565
31/05/2016 257,770 29/05/2015 400,480 30/05/2014 175,000 31/05/2013 235,000 31/05/2012 480,465
29/04/2016 255,000 30/04/2015 335,395 30/04/2014 181,955 30/04/2013 290,000 30/04/2012 400,000
31/03/2016 280,000 31/03/2015 390,130 31/03/2014 205,000 29/03/2013 305,025 30/03/2012 391,035
29/02/2016 332,390 27/02/2015 352,400 28/02/2014 205,000 28/02/2013 290,920 29/02/2012 502,465
29/01/2016 308,325 30/01/2015 500,200 31/01/2014 195,000 31/01/2013 298,330 31/01/2012 550,000
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 155,000 31/12/2015 123,525 31/12/2014 220,090 31/12/2013 83,275 31/12/2012 160,000
30/11/2016 163,500 30/11/2015 124,000 28/11/2014 229,360 29/11/2013 87,565 30/11/2012 169,995
31/10/2016 158,225 30/10/2015 113,165 31/10/2014 168,905 31/10/2013 102,500 31/10/2012 170,005
30/09/2016 168,840 30/09/2105 186,005 30/09/2014 220,165 30/09/2013 101,910 28/09/2012 177,575
31/08/2016 163,500 31/08/2015 234,130 29/08/2014 142,575 30/08/2013 105,000 31/08/2012 170,000
29/07/2016 177,500 31/07/2015 236,730 31/07/2014 100,030 31/07/2013 108,135 31/07/2012 212,335
30/06/2016 190,500 30/06/2015 274,000 30/06/2014 84,510 28/06/2013 100,720 29/06/2012 177,570
31/05/2016 132,235 29/05/2015 246,375 30/05/2014 62,000 31/05/2013 90,000 31/05/2012 195,465
29/04/2016 126,130 30/04/2015 200,955 30/04/2014 66,690 30/04/2013 145,000 30/04/2012 130,810
31/03/2016 130,000 31/03/2015 242,120 31/03/2014 82,500 29/03/2013 127,930 30/03/2012 141,720
29/02/2016 168,570 27/02/2015 221,755 28/02/2014 75,000 28/02/2013 135,920 29/02/2012 267,205
29/01/2016 167,280 30/01/2015 310,160 31/01/2014 68,000 31/01/2013 148,170 31/01/2012 239,360
Erste Group
 
Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 139,780 31/12/2015 151,985 31/12/2014 91,590 31/12/2013 225,000 31/12/2012 827,250
30/11/2016 163,000 30/11/2015 145,500 28/11/2014 75,320 29/11/2013 220,000 30/11/2012 991,760
31/10/2016 150,140 30/10/2015 148,750 31/10/2014 105,490 31/10/2013 315,000 31/10/2012 1031,605
30/09/2016 162,980 30/09/2105 181,130 30/09/2014 115,010 30/09/2013 395,000 28/09/2012 1088,030
31/08/2016 148,205 31/08/2015 153,600 29/08/2014 115,040 30/08/2013 520,000 31/08/2012 1202,930
29/07/2016 158,000 31/07/2015 136,880 31/07/2014 149,320 31/07/2013 630,000 31/07/2012 1441,275
30/06/2016 198,000 30/06/2015 155,000 30/06/2014 127,010 28/06/2013 630,000 29/06/2012 1011,850
31/05/2016 172,960 29/05/2015 145,290 30/05/2014 128,000 31/05/2013 853,355 31/05/2012 800,000
29/04/2016 173,000 30/04/2015 128,910 30/04/2014 151,800 30/04/2013 890,710 30/04/2012 695,000
31/03/2016 198,160 31/03/2015 103,010 31/03/2014 173,340 29/03/2013 791,265 30/03/2012 575,000
29/02/2016 209,055 27/02/2015 101,850 28/02/2014 198,560 28/02/2013 740,805 29/02/2012 409,995
29/01/2016 195,105 30/01/2015 115,010 31/01/2014 210,000 31/01/2013 740,010 31/01/2012 485,000
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 319,990 31/12/2015 288,210 31/12/2014 269,080 31/12/2013 320,015 31/12/2012 1103,510
30/11/2016 430,000 30/11/2015 265,000 28/11/2014 266,070 29/11/2013 310,000 30/11/2012 1075,610
31/10/2016 337,815 30/10/2015 260,500 31/10/2014 279,630 31/10/2013 379,440 31/10/2012 1470,900
30/09/2016 374,045 30/09/2105 379,000 30/09/2014 325,125 30/09/2013 501,130 28/09/2012 1552,315
31/08/2016 325,470 31/08/2015 344,150 29/08/2014 170,070 30/08/2013 610,080 31/08/2012 1776,820
29/07/2016 365,000 31/07/2015 312,890 31/07/2014 224,870 31/07/2013 665,275 31/07/2012 2033,220
30/06/2016 445,000 30/06/2015 325,000 30/06/2014 178,010 28/06/2013 679,865 29/06/2012 1467,830
31/05/2016 431,385 29/05/2015 304,145 30/05/2014 175,000 31/05/2013 886,315 31/05/2012 1024,780
29/04/2016 450,000 30/04/2015 277,810 30/04/2014 200,000 30/04/2013 883,200 30/04/2012 799,220
31/03/2016 355,000 31/03/2015 280,550 31/03/2014 215,000 29/03/2013 908,045 30/03/2012 628,550
29/02/2016 467,160 27/02/2015 284,015 28/02/2014 260,000 28/02/2013 902,055 29/02/2012 509,090
29/01/2016 386,185 30/01/2015 285,035 31/01/2014 270,000 31/01/2013 881,750 31/01/2012 558,680
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 180,210 31/12/2015 136,225 31/12/2014 177,490 31/12/2013 95,015 31/12/2012 276,260
30/11/2016 267,000 30/11/2015 119,500 28/11/2014 190,750 29/11/2013 90,000 30/11/2012 83,850
31/10/2016 187,675 30/10/2015 111,750 31/10/2014 174,140 31/10/2013 64,440 31/10/2012 439,295
30/09/2016 211,065 30/09/2105 197,870 30/09/2014 210,115 30/09/2013 106,130 28/09/2012 464,285
31/08/2016 177,265 31/08/2015 190,550 29/08/2014 55,030 30/08/2013 90,080 31/08/2012 573,890
29/07/2016 207,000 31/07/2015 176,010 31/07/2014 75,550 31/07/2013 35,275 31/07/2012 591,945
30/06/2016 247,000 30/06/2015 170,000 30/06/2014 51,000 28/06/2013 49,865 29/06/2012 455,980
31/05/2016 258,425 29/05/2015 158,855 30/05/2014 47,000 31/05/2013 32,960 31/05/2012 224,780
29/04/2016 277,000 30/04/2015 148,900 30/04/2014 48,200 30/04/2013 -7,510 30/04/2012 104,220
31/03/2016 156,840 31/03/2015 177,540 31/03/2014 41,660 29/03/2013 116,780 30/03/2012 53,550
29/02/2016 258,105 27/02/2015 182,165 28/02/2014 61,440 28/02/2013 161,250 29/02/2012 99,095
29/01/2016 191,080 30/01/2015 170,025 31/01/2014 60,000 31/01/2013 141,740 31/01/2012 73,680
Bankia
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Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 161,065 31/12/2015 116,440 31/12/2014 170,040 31/12/2013 219,560 31/12/2012 371,295
30/11/2016 175,075 30/11/2015 155,000 28/11/2014 166,040 29/11/2013 214,860 30/11/2012 413,435
31/10/2016 160,000 30/10/2015 139,965 31/10/2014 159,320 31/10/2013 240,000 31/10/2012 500,210
30/09/2016 160,045 30/09/2105 156,000 30/09/2014 165,195 30/09/2013 308,745 28/09/2012 624,370
31/08/2016 155,000 31/08/2015 144,480 29/08/2014 170,040 30/08/2013 335,000 31/08/2012 711,915
29/07/2016 155,000 31/07/2015 154,460 31/07/2014 195,040 31/07/2013 355,000 31/07/2012 757,015
30/06/2016 165,000 30/06/2015 164,000 30/06/2014 185,040 28/06/2013 397,570 29/06/2012 708,475
31/05/2016 150,000 29/05/2015 151,020 30/05/2014 170,000 31/05/2013 333,140 31/05/2012 847,040
29/04/2016 174,000 30/04/2015 136,915 30/04/2014 152,740 30/04/2013 335,000 30/04/2012 754,640
31/03/2016 175,000 31/03/2015 130,010 31/03/2014 155,000 29/03/2013 401,730 30/03/2012 773,670
29/02/2016 175,805 27/02/2015 160,040 28/02/2014 170,000 28/02/2013 391,390 29/02/2012 722,185
29/01/2016 148,245 30/01/2015 105,010 31/01/2014 190,000 31/01/2013 397,535 31/01/2012 842,540
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 312,030 31/12/2015 232,880 31/12/2014 330,070 31/12/2013 415,000 31/12/2012 N.A.
30/11/2016 338,875 30/11/2015 280,000 28/11/2014 331,070 29/11/2013 450,000 30/11/2012 N.A.
31/10/2016 309,970 30/10/2015 273,995 31/10/2014 298,715 31/10/2013 475,000 31/10/2012 N.A.
30/09/2016 310,415 30/09/2105 299,000 30/09/2014 350,370 30/09/2013 527,885 28/09/2012 N.A.
31/08/2016 310,000 31/08/2015 269,000 29/08/2014 225,070 30/08/2013 575,000 31/08/2012 N.A.
29/07/2016 301,310 31/07/2015 311,020 31/07/2014 250,125 31/07/2013 595,000 31/07/2012 N.A.
30/06/2016 292,825 30/06/2015 337,500 30/06/2014 265,125 28/06/2013 N.A. 29/06/2012 N.A.
31/05/2016 290,000 29/05/2015 301,630 30/05/2014 240,000 31/05/2013 N.A. 31/05/2012 N.A.
29/04/2016 325,000 30/04/2015 275,030 30/04/2014 234,910 30/04/2013 N.A. 30/04/2012 N.A.
31/03/2016 325,000 31/03/2015 245,070 31/03/2014 260,000 29/03/2013 N.A. 30/03/2012 N.A.
29/02/2016 328,015 27/02/2015 283,690 28/02/2014 285,000 28/02/2013 N.A. 29/02/2012 N.A.
29/01/2016 304,200 30/01/2015 365,595 31/01/2014 335,000 31/01/2013 N.A. 31/01/2012 N.A.
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 150,965 31/12/2015 116,440 31/12/2014 160,030 31/12/2013 195,440 31/12/2012 N.A.
30/11/2016 163,800 30/11/2015 125,000 28/11/2014 165,030 29/11/2013 235,140 30/11/2012 N.A.
31/10/2016 149,970 30/10/2015 134,030 31/10/2014 139,395 31/10/2013 235,000 31/10/2012 N.A.
30/09/2016 150,370 30/09/2105 143,000 30/09/2014 185,175 30/09/2013 219,140 28/09/2012 N.A.
31/08/2016 155,000 31/08/2015 124,520 29/08/2014 55,030 30/08/2013 240,000 31/08/2012 N.A.
29/07/2016 146,310 31/07/2015 156,560 31/07/2014 55,085 31/07/2013 240,000 31/07/2012 N.A.
30/06/2016 127,825 30/06/2015 173,500 30/06/2014 80,085 28/06/2013 N.A. 29/06/2012 N.A.
31/05/2016 140,000 29/05/2015 150,610 30/05/2014 70,000 31/05/2013 N.A. 31/05/2012 N.A.
29/04/2016 151,000 30/04/2015 138,115 30/04/2014 82,170 30/04/2013 N.A. 30/04/2012 N.A.
31/03/2016 150,000 31/03/2015 115,060 31/03/2014 105,000 29/03/2013 N.A. 30/03/2012 N.A.
29/02/2016 152,210 27/02/2015 123,650 28/02/2014 115,000 28/02/2013 N.A. 29/02/2012 N.A.
29/01/2016 155,955 30/01/2015 260,585 31/01/2014 145,000 31/01/2013 N.A. 31/01/2012 N.A.
Bank of Ireland
 
Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 203,825 31/12/2015 177,205 31/12/2014 105,010 31/12/2013 145,000 31/12/2012 278,235
30/11/2016 225,000 30/11/2015 170,000 28/11/2014 94,010 29/11/2013 150,000 30/11/2012 284,280
31/10/2016 200,430 30/10/2015 175,500 31/10/2014 110,265 31/10/2013 200,000 31/10/2012 295,000
30/09/2016 208,255 30/09/2105 187,450 30/09/2014 120,040 30/09/2013 260,000 28/09/2012 365,690
31/08/2016 184,440 31/08/2015 148,495 29/08/2014 95,040 30/08/2013 280,000 31/08/2012 407,380
29/07/2016 196,000 31/07/2015 140,000 31/07/2014 120,270 31/07/2013 280,000 31/07/2012 475,000
30/06/2016 226,060 30/06/2015 145,000 30/06/2014 102,010 28/06/2013 275,000 29/06/2012 460,000
31/05/2016 185,430 29/05/2015 124,530 30/05/2014 100,000 31/05/2013 237,465 31/05/2012 566,000
29/04/2016 174,000 30/04/2015 121,010 30/04/2014 107,000 30/04/2013 240,000 30/04/2012 410,000
31/03/2016 240,000 31/03/2015 125,400 31/03/2014 138,000 29/03/2013 349,080 30/03/2012 342,465
29/02/2016 256,000 27/02/2015 115,955 28/02/2014 143,000 28/02/2013 299,590 29/02/2012 298,020
29/01/2016 232,000 30/01/2015 115,010 31/01/2014 145,000 31/01/2013 295,000 31/01/2012 438,610
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 442,935 31/12/2015 334,175 31/12/2014 255,070 31/12/2013 220,000 31/12/2012 420,000
30/11/2016 470,000 30/11/2015 300,000 28/11/2014 236,070 29/11/2013 225,000 30/11/2012 460,000
31/10/2016 425,830 30/10/2015 293,200 31/10/2014 300,855 31/10/2013 300,000 31/10/2012 495,000
30/09/2016 451,770 30/09/2105 325,000 30/09/2014 305,125 30/09/2013 390,000 28/09/2012 624,990
31/08/2016 416,340 31/08/2015 256,430 29/08/2014 170,070 30/08/2013 420,000 31/08/2012 700,000
29/07/2016 416,080 31/07/2015 265,580 31/07/2014 185,520 31/07/2013 430,000 31/07/2012 775,000
30/06/2016 440,870 30/06/2015 260,000 30/06/2014 153,030 28/06/2013 405,000 29/06/2012 765,000
31/05/2016 412,025 29/05/2015 208,480 30/05/2014 142,000 31/05/2013 375,000 31/05/2012 895,000
29/04/2016 389,500 30/04/2015 246,070 30/04/2014 147,305 30/04/2013 430,000 30/04/2012 643,530
31/03/2016 463,055 31/03/2015 195,030 31/03/2014 188,000 29/03/2013 540,000 30/03/2012 565,000
29/02/2016 511,130 27/02/2015 212,500 28/02/2014 195,000 28/02/2013 454,745 29/02/2012 550,000
29/01/2016 455,815 30/01/2015 245,030 31/01/2014 220,000 31/01/2013 420,000 31/01/2012 691,955
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 239,110 31/12/2015 156,970 31/12/2014 150,060 31/12/2013 75,000 31/12/2012 141,765
30/11/2016 245,000 30/11/2015 130,000 28/11/2014 142,060 29/11/2013 75,000 30/11/2012 175,720
31/10/2016 225,400 30/10/2015 117,700 31/10/2014 190,590 31/10/2013 100,000 31/10/2012 200,000
30/09/2016 243,515 30/09/2105 137,550 30/09/2014 185,085 30/09/2013 130,000 28/09/2012 259,300
31/08/2016 231,900 31/08/2015 107,935 29/08/2014 75,030 30/08/2013 140,000 31/08/2012 292,620
29/07/2016 220,080 31/07/2015 125,580 31/07/2014 65,250 31/07/2013 150,000 31/07/2012 300,000
30/06/2016 214,810 30/06/2015 115,000 30/06/2014 51,020 28/06/2013 130,000 29/06/2012 305,000
31/05/2016 226,595 29/05/2015 83,950 30/05/2014 42,000 31/05/2013 137,535 31/05/2012 329,000
29/04/2016 215,500 30/04/2015 125,060 30/04/2014 40,305 30/04/2013 190,000 30/04/2012 233,530
31/03/2016 223,055 31/03/2015 69,630 31/03/2014 50,000 29/03/2013 190,920 30/03/2012 222,535
29/02/2016 255,130 27/02/2015 96,545 28/02/2014 52,000 28/02/2013 155,155 29/02/2012 251,980
29/01/2016 223,815 30/01/2015 130,020 31/01/2014 75,000 31/01/2013 125,000 31/01/2012 253,345
UBI
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Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 143,000 31/12/2015 212,635 31/12/2014 242,040 31/12/2013 126,785 31/12/2012 160,000
30/11/2016 136,000 30/11/2015 190,000 28/11/2014 165,810 29/11/2013 117,180 30/11/2012 185,000
31/10/2016 143,750 30/10/2015 216,495 31/10/2014 152,005 31/10/2013 137,500 31/10/2012 180,430
30/09/2016 158,490 30/09/2105 251,640 30/09/2014 180,175 30/09/2013 155,000 28/09/2012 202,970
31/08/2016 178,000 31/08/2015 234,240 29/08/2014 137,520 30/08/2013 160,000 31/08/2012 241,565
29/07/2016 200,000 31/07/2015 243,655 31/07/2014 170,040 31/07/2013 150,000 31/07/2012 255,000
30/06/2016 237,000 30/06/2015 284,000 30/06/2014 128,010 28/06/2013 155,000 29/06/2012 257,645
31/05/2016 192,375 29/05/2015 268,305 30/05/2014 125,000 31/05/2013 144,745 31/05/2012 305,000
29/04/2016 229,060 30/04/2015 235,200 30/04/2014 140,445 30/04/2013 145,000 30/04/2012 280,000
31/03/2016 300,000 31/03/2015 278,790 31/03/2014 150,000 29/03/2013 172,000 30/03/2012 258,975
29/02/2016 330,000 27/02/2015 282,040 28/02/2014 139,570 28/02/2013 165,000 29/02/2012 251,090
29/01/2016 310,000 30/01/2015 336,085 31/01/2014 127,000 31/01/2013 158,530 31/01/2012 325,000
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 422,000 31/12/2015 653,345 31/12/2014 685,195 31/12/2013 220,040 31/12/2012 310,000
30/11/2016 424,000 30/11/2015 594,005 28/11/2014 538,560 29/11/2013 210,860 30/11/2012 340,790
31/10/2016 481,840 30/10/2015 694,655 31/10/2014 469,700 31/10/2013 240,000 31/10/2012 334,895
30/09/2016 522,635 30/09/2105 776,310 30/09/2014 525,800 30/09/2013 262,340 28/09/2012 368,975
31/08/2016 544,000 31/08/2015 744,005 29/08/2014 284,635 30/08/2013 265,000 31/08/2012 388,495
29/07/2016 564,000 31/07/2015 699,360 31/07/2014 275,070 31/07/2013 261,860 31/07/2012 499,970
30/06/2016 674,000 30/06/2015 780,955 30/06/2014 205,030 28/06/2013 257,880 29/06/2012 499,970
31/05/2016 625,155 29/05/2015 786,790 30/05/2014 200,000 31/05/2013 235,000 31/05/2012 450,030
29/04/2016 697,405 30/04/2015 751,415 30/04/2014 223,335 30/04/2013 290,000 30/04/2012 450,030
31/03/2016 818,770 31/03/2015 824,855 31/03/2014 240,000 29/03/2013 304,970 30/03/2012 450,000
29/02/2016 836,245 27/02/2015 926,540 28/02/2014 215,000 28/02/2013 287,290 29/02/2012 549,975
29/01/2016 822,070 30/01/2015 1585,130 31/01/2014 195,000 31/01/2013 298,330 31/01/2012 590,000
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 279,000 31/12/2015 440,710 31/12/2014 443,155 31/12/2013 93,255 31/12/2012 150,000
30/11/2016 288,000 30/11/2015 404,005 28/11/2014 372,750 29/11/2013 93,680 30/11/2012 155,790
31/10/2016 338,090 30/10/2015 478,160 31/10/2014 317,695 31/10/2013 102,500 31/10/2012 154,465
30/09/2016 364,145 30/09/2105 524,670 30/09/2014 345,625 30/09/2013 107,340 28/09/2012 166,005
31/08/2016 366,000 31/08/2015 509,765 29/08/2014 147,115 30/08/2013 105,000 31/08/2012 146,930
29/07/2016 364,000 31/07/2015 455,705 31/07/2014 105,030 31/07/2013 111,860 31/07/2012 244,970
30/06/2016 437,000 30/06/2015 496,955 30/06/2014 77,020 28/06/2013 102,880 29/06/2012 242,325
31/05/2016 432,780 29/05/2015 518,485 30/05/2014 75,000 31/05/2013 90,255 31/05/2012 145,030
29/04/2016 468,345 30/04/2015 516,215 30/04/2014 82,890 30/04/2013 145,000 30/04/2012 170,030
31/03/2016 518,770 31/03/2015 546,065 31/03/2014 90,000 29/03/2013 132,970 30/03/2012 191,025
29/02/2016 506,245 27/02/2015 644,500 28/02/2014 75,430 28/02/2013 122,290 29/02/2012 298,885
29/01/2016 512,070 30/01/2015 1249,045 31/01/2014 68,000 31/01/2013 139,800 31/01/2012 265,000
Raiffeisen
 
Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 127,715 31/12/2015 123,575 31/12/2014 167,105
30/11/2016 123,805 30/11/2015 123,055 28/11/2014 150,960
31/10/2016 125,815 30/10/2015 129,070 31/10/2014 166,950
30/09/2016 124,435 30/09/2105 144,505 30/09/2014 168,320
31/08/2016 134,185 31/08/2015 142,775 29/08/2014 171,510
29/07/2016 139,800 31/07/2015 151,935 31/07/2014 136,495
30/06/2016 152,535 30/06/2015 139,115 30/06/2014 195,040
31/05/2016 119,420 29/05/2015 141,870 30/05/2014 175,000
29/04/2016 132,550 30/04/2015 127,040 30/04/2014 150,000
31/03/2016 140,505 31/03/2015 126,040 31/03/2014 N.A.
29/02/2016 158,935 27/02/2015 120,040 28/02/2014 N.A.
29/01/2016 156,870 30/01/2015 132,795 31/01/2014 N.A.
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 251,365 31/12/2015 273,145 31/12/2014 273,350
30/11/2016 243,615 30/11/2015 272,950 28/11/2014 273,435
31/10/2016 247,865 30/10/2015 273,095 31/10/2014 270,230
30/09/2016 243,455 30/09/2105 273,060 30/09/2014 270,175
31/08/2016 263,845 31/08/2015 273,215 29/08/2014 270,305
29/07/2016 280,535 31/07/2015 273,275 31/07/2014 270,305
30/06/2016 301,695 30/06/2015 273,065 30/06/2014 275,195
31/05/2016 235,640 29/05/2015 273,205 30/05/2014 245,000
29/04/2016 272,665 30/04/2015 273,525 30/04/2014 N.A.
31/03/2016 272,545 31/03/2015 273,420 31/03/2014 N.A.
29/02/2016 272,615 27/02/2015 273,440 28/02/2014 N.A.
29/01/2016 272,905 30/01/2015 273,445 31/01/2014 N.A.
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 123,650 31/12/2015 149,570 31/12/2014 106,245
30/11/2016 119,810 30/11/2015 149,895 28/11/2014 122,475
31/10/2016 122,050 30/10/2015 144,025 31/10/2014 103,280
30/09/2016 119,020 30/09/2105 128,555 30/09/2014 101,855
31/08/2016 129,660 31/08/2015 130,440 29/08/2014 98,795
29/07/2016 140,735 31/07/2015 121,340 31/07/2014 133,810
30/06/2016 149,160 30/06/2015 133,950 30/06/2014 80,155
31/05/2016 116,220 29/05/2015 131,335 30/05/2014 70,000
29/04/2016 140,115 30/04/2015 146,485 30/04/2014 N.A.
31/03/2016 132,040 31/03/2015 147,380 31/03/2014 N.A.
29/02/2016 113,680 27/02/2015 153,400 28/02/2014 N.A.
29/01/2016 116,035 30/01/2015 140,650 31/01/2014 N.A.
Allied Irish Banks 
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Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 189,909 31/12/2015 127,316 31/12/2014 101,124 31/12/2013 157,894 31/12/2012 260,410
30/11/2016 206,794 30/11/2015 122,578 28/11/2014 93,428 29/11/2013 166,951 30/11/2012 291,249
31/10/2016 184,691 30/10/2015 132,813 31/10/2014 98,637 31/10/2013 190,334 31/10/2012 297,165
30/09/2016 190,161 30/09/2105 145,403 30/09/2014 84,973 30/09/2013 207,219 28/09/2012 328,954
31/08/2016 184,711 31/08/2015 144,502 29/08/2014 96,236 30/08/2013 209,485 31/08/2012 416,896
29/07/2016 196,250 31/07/2015 138,896 31/07/2014 93,940 31/07/2013 225,584 31/07/2012 453,095
30/06/2016 195,961 30/06/2015 133,905 30/06/2014 87,074 28/06/2013 224,385 29/06/2012 436,694
31/05/2016 177,675 29/05/2015 128,435 30/05/2014 98,185 31/05/2013 203,646 31/05/2012 421,656
29/04/2016 172,815 30/04/2015 124,071 30/04/2014 112,541 30/04/2013 253,919 30/04/2012 356,369
31/03/2016 170,898 31/03/2015 108,030 31/03/2014 126,304 29/03/2013 254,256 30/03/2012 299,404
29/02/2016 220,913 27/02/2015 104,514 28/02/2014 132,406 28/02/2013 247,347 29/02/2012 332,608
29/01/2016 153,303 30/01/2015 104,425 31/01/2014 133,911 31/01/2013 230,899 31/01/2012 467,771
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 417,117 31/12/2015 245,542 31/12/2014 N.A. 31/12/2013 N.A. 31/12/2012 415,520
30/11/2016 439,030 30/11/2015 231,307 28/11/2014 N.A. 29/11/2013 N.A. 30/11/2012 465,895
31/10/2016 389,176 30/10/2015 244,046 31/10/2014 N.A. 31/10/2013 N.A. 31/10/2012 487,100
30/09/2016 N.A. 30/09/2105 256,320 30/09/2014 N.A. 30/09/2013 N.A. 28/09/2012 553,458
31/08/2016 N.A. 31/08/2015 257,452 29/08/2014 N.A. 30/08/2013 N.A. 31/08/2012 644,249
29/07/2016 N.A. 31/07/2015 245,137 31/07/2014 N.A. 31/07/2013 N.A. 31/07/2012 720,067
30/06/2016 352,877 30/06/2015 254,812 30/06/2014 N.A. 28/06/2013 N.A. 29/06/2012 851,109
31/05/2016 359,545 29/05/2015 244,964 30/05/2014 N.A. 31/05/2013 327,731 31/05/2012 778,419
29/04/2016 348,572 30/04/2015 230,427 30/04/2014 N.A. 30/04/2013 398,166 30/04/2012 604,574
31/03/2016 356,013 31/03/2015 263,082 31/03/2014 N.A. 29/03/2013 400,955 30/03/2012 510,410
29/02/2016 449,124 27/02/2015 N.A. 28/02/2014 N.A. 28/02/2013 384,016 29/02/2012 647,459
29/01/2016 298,106 30/01/2015 N.A. 31/01/2014 N.A. 31/01/2013 354,295 31/01/2012 796,248
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 227,208 31/12/2015 118,226 31/12/2014 N.A. 31/12/2013 N.A. 31/12/2012 155,110
30/11/2016 232,236 30/11/2015 108,729 28/11/2014 N.A. 29/11/2013 N.A. 30/11/2012 174,646
31/10/2016 204,486 30/10/2015 111,232 31/10/2014 N.A. 31/10/2013 N.A. 31/10/2012 189,936
30/09/2016 N.A. 30/09/2105 110,918 30/09/2014 N.A. 30/09/2013 N.A. 28/09/2012 224,505
31/08/2016 N.A. 31/08/2015 112,949 29/08/2014 N.A. 30/08/2013 N.A. 31/08/2012 227,353
29/07/2016 N.A. 31/07/2015 106,241 31/07/2014 N.A. 31/07/2013 N.A. 31/07/2012 266,972
30/06/2016 156,916 30/06/2015 120,908 30/06/2014 N.A. 28/06/2013 N.A. 29/06/2012 414,415
31/05/2016 181,870 29/05/2015 116,529 30/05/2014 N.A. 31/05/2013 124,085 31/05/2012 356,763
29/04/2016 175,757 30/04/2015 106,356 30/04/2014 N.A. 30/04/2013 144,246 30/04/2012 248,205
31/03/2016 185,115 31/03/2015 155,052 31/03/2014 N.A. 29/03/2013 146,699 30/03/2012 211,006
29/02/2016 228,211 27/02/2015 N.A. 28/02/2014 N.A. 28/02/2013 136,669 29/02/2012 314,851
29/01/2016 144,803 30/01/2015 N.A. 31/01/2014 N.A. 31/01/2013 123,396 31/01/2012 328,478
Mediobanca
 
Monthly CDS price on senior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 125,330 31/12/2015 123,525 31/12/2014 89,010 31/12/2013 140,000 31/12/2012 316,185
30/11/2016 133,000 30/11/2015 115,500 28/11/2014 84,010 29/11/2013 148,535 30/11/2012 360,000
31/10/2016 127,470 30/10/2015 118,000 31/10/2014 97,610 31/10/2013 205,000 31/10/2012 382,950
30/09/2016 133,490 30/09/2105 146,135 30/09/2014 115,010 30/09/2013 270,000 28/09/2012 473,090
31/08/2016 123,430 31/08/2015 125,550 29/08/2014 85,010 30/08/2013 326,080 31/08/2012 621,095
29/07/2016 129,000 31/07/2015 116,315 31/07/2014 110,180 31/07/2013 330,000 31/07/2012 629,995
30/06/2016 155,000 30/06/2015 127,000 30/06/2014 105,010 28/06/2013 332,825 29/06/2012 680,840
31/05/2016 126,830 29/05/2015 113,070 30/05/2014 113,000 31/05/2013 285,000 31/05/2012 600,000
29/04/2016 133,000 30/04/2015 100,380 30/04/2014 131,000 30/04/2013 321,530 30/04/2012 537,355
31/03/2016 147,450 31/03/2015 95,760 31/03/2014 147,500 29/03/2013 359,275 30/03/2012 450,000
29/02/2016 171,270 27/02/2015 96,595 28/02/2014 155,000 28/02/2013 321,260 29/02/2012 332,640
29/01/2016 152,740 30/01/2015 103,010 31/01/2014 162,500 31/01/2013 310,000 31/01/2012 482,650
Monthly CDS price on junior unsecured debt
30/12/2016 263,790 31/12/2015 225,790 31/12/2014 185,030 31/12/2013 185,015 31/12/2012 600,165
30/11/2016 278,000 30/11/2015 205,000 28/11/2014 163,520 29/11/2013 190,000 30/11/2012 630,000
31/10/2016 268,910 30/10/2015 216,360 31/10/2014 194,270 31/10/2013 290,000 31/10/2012 670,000
30/09/2016 288,495 30/09/2105 265,000 30/09/2014 210,030 30/09/2013 395,000 28/09/2012 828,680
31/08/2016 252,790 31/08/2015 237,190 29/08/2014 140,070 30/08/2013 464,990 31/08/2012 1054,430
29/07/2016 280,000 31/07/2015 218,920 31/07/2014 172,420 31/07/2013 470,000 31/07/2012 1086,765
30/06/2016 325,000 30/06/2015 225,000 30/06/2014 148,010 28/06/2013 473,025 29/06/2012 1024,985
31/05/2016 285,000 29/05/2015 212,120 30/05/2014 170,000 31/05/2013 428,240 31/05/2012 870,990
29/04/2016 283,000 30/04/2015 195,655 30/04/2014 163,600 30/04/2013 486,100 30/04/2012 789,990
31/03/2016 270,000 31/03/2015 190,010 31/03/2014 182,670 29/03/2013 539,975 30/03/2012 705,000
29/02/2016 341,850 27/02/2015 186,525 28/02/2014 195,000 28/02/2013 518,205 29/02/2012 580,000
29/01/2016 300,890 30/01/2015 200,130 31/01/2014 210,000 31/01/2013 500,000 31/01/2012 802,060
Monthly CDS spread between junior and senior
30/12/2016 138,460 31/12/2015 102,265 31/12/2014 96,020 31/12/2013 45,015 31/12/2012 283,980
30/11/2016 145,000 30/11/2015 89,500 28/11/2014 79,510 29/11/2013 41,465 30/11/2012 270,000
31/10/2016 141,440 30/10/2015 98,360 31/10/2014 96,660 31/10/2013 85,000 31/10/2012 287,050
30/09/2016 155,005 30/09/2105 118,865 30/09/2014 95,020 30/09/2013 125,000 28/09/2012 355,590
31/08/2016 129,360 31/08/2015 111,640 29/08/2014 55,060 30/08/2013 138,910 31/08/2012 433,335
29/07/2016 151,000 31/07/2015 102,605 31/07/2014 62,240 31/07/2013 140,000 31/07/2012 456,770
30/06/2016 170,000 30/06/2015 98,000 30/06/2014 43,000 28/06/2013 140,200 29/06/2012 344,145
31/05/2016 158,170 29/05/2015 99,050 30/05/2014 57,000 31/05/2013 143,240 31/05/2012 270,990
29/04/2016 150,000 30/04/2015 95,275 30/04/2014 32,600 30/04/2013 164,570 30/04/2012 252,635
31/03/2016 122,550 31/03/2015 94,250 31/03/2014 35,170 29/03/2013 180,700 30/03/2012 255,000
29/02/2016 170,580 27/02/2015 89,930 28/02/2014 40,000 28/02/2013 196,945 29/02/2012 247,360
29/01/2016 148,150 30/01/2015 97,120 31/01/2014 47,500 31/01/2013 190,000 31/01/2012 319,410
Bankinter
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The following tables collect the average monthly price of the CDS senior, junior and CDS spread for 
all the banks included in the sample 
CDS on senior unsecured debt
Maturiy: 5 years
Average monthly price 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
BNP Paribas 211,560 123,793 68,440 67,806 82,193
Deutsche Bank 160,630 102,119 75,694 82,393 194,799
Credit Agricole 254,704 157,314 75,533 71,369 79,651
Societé Generale 267,907 157,579 83,761 80,257 81,582
Banco Santander 346,260 236,198 93,732 102,862 139,185
UniCredit 413,255 291,231 118,748 122,611 184,089
ING Group 186,723 122,331 62,633 62,537 68,642
Banco Bilbao Vyzcaya Argentaria 364,791 248,936 95,925 102,471 134,668
Intesa Sanpaolo 383,979 270,999 98,954 92,179 136,165
Natixis 228,869 158,969 68,319 66,845 80,967
Commerzbank 233,864 151,591 91,257 86,903 120,070
ABN Amro N.A. 108,615 67,810 64,307 75,942
Caixa Bank N.A. N.A. 107,630 121,905 153,183
KBC Group 299,870 153,783 85,685 58,208 58,779
Banco Sabadell 585,173 366,916 143,964 152,083 167,799
Erste Group 232,275 145,716 127,137 147,725 136,685
Bankia 879,975 579,262 136,707 138,910 172,365
Bank of Ireland Group 668,899 327,461 170,705 142,778 162,853
Unione di banche italiane 385,057 250,928 114,970 145,463 210,953
Raiffeisen 241,890 148,895 154,801 252,757 213,140
Allied Irish Banks N.A. N.A. 164,598 133,485 136,381
Mediobanca 363,522 214,327 104,896 126,241 187,007
Bankinter 488,900 279,125 116,237 115,070 138,168
Sample average per year 359,905 218,861 105,571 110,311 135,446  
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CDS on junior unsecured debt
Maturity: 5 years
Average monthly price 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
BNP Paribas 378,258 200,558 110,811 137,396 175,667
Deutsche Bank 272,331 174,239 130,074 173,102 400,920
Credit Agricole 489,607 264,038 121,044 151,156 174,179
Societé Generale 469,428 263,517 140,226 177,613 189,974
Banco Santander 537,487 332,927 144,931 201,341 281,891
UniCredit 672,388 447,516 183,281 258,357 389,738
ING Group 301,192 197,056 111,519 134,996 153,211
Banco Bilbao Vyzcaya Argentaria 610,631 352,427 148,061 198,470 276,081
Intesa Sanpaolo 599,546 391,155 154,174 182,541 283,332
Natixis 432,573 263,125 120,602 137,109 174,097
Commerzbank 591,417 358,555 184,863 198,999 285,713
ABN Amro 302,738 231,148 153,582 148,853 217,975
Caixa Bank N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 326,264
KBC Group 546,873 228,544 158,175 127,182 110,810
Banco Sabadell 1008,132 560,252 240,156 283,406 329,053
Erste Group 416,612 257,060 253,789 357,135 295,125
Bankia 1166,710 660,598 236,071 300,525 390,588
Bank of Ireland Group N.A. 506,314 283,788 289,534 312,303
Unione di banche italiane 632,123 384,145 208,170 261,791 441,279
Raiffeisen 436,094 261,131 338,110 818,114 619,343
Allied Irish Banks N.A. N.A. 268,499 273,237 263,229
Mediobanca 622,876 373,033 N.A. 247,309 378,840
Bankinter 803,589 411,713 177,885 214,808 286,477
Sample average per year 564,530 339,002 184,182 239,681 293,743  
CDS spread between Junior and Senior
Maturiy: 5 years
Average monthly price 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
BNP Paribas 166,699 76,765 42,372 69,590 93,474
Deutsche Bank 111,701 72,120 54,380 90,709 206,121
Credit Agricole 234,903 106,724 45,510 79,786 94,527
Societé Generale 201,520 105,938 56,465 97,356 108,393
Banco Santander 191,227 96,729 51,199 98,479 142,706
UniCredit 259,133 156,286 64,534 135,746 205,649
ING Group 114,469 74,725 48,887 72,460 84,569
Banco Bilbao Vyzcaya Argentaria 245,839 103,491 52,136 95,999 141,413
Intesa Sanpaolo 215,567 120,156 55,219 90,362 147,167
Natixis 203,705 104,157 52,283 70,265 93,130
Commerzbank 357,553 206,964 93,606 112,096 165,643
ABN Amro N.A. 122,533 85,772 84,547 142,033
Caixa Bank N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 173,082
KBC Group 247,003 74,761 72,490 68,974 52,031
Banco Sabadell 422,958 193,335 96,192 131,323 161,254
Erste Group 184,337 111,344 126,652 209,410 158,440
Bankia 286,736 81,335 99,365 161,616 218,222
Bank of Ireland Group N.A. 178,853 113,083 146,756 149,450
Unione di banche italiane 247,066 133,218 93,200 116,328 230,326
Raiffeisen 194,205 112,236 183,309 565,357 406,204
Allied Irish Banks N.A. N.A. 103,902 139,752 126,848
Mediobanca 259,353 158,706 N.A. 121,068 191,833
Bankinter 314,689 132,587 61,648 99,738 148,310
Sample average per year 234,666 120,141 78,676 129,896 158,297
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Comprehensive table of the results obtained each year for each bank of the sample
2016 BNP Paribas Deutsche Bank Credit Agricole Societé Generale Banco Santander UniCredit ING Group BBVA Intesa Sanpaolo Natixis Commerzbank ABN Amro
% Loss on Tier 1 Base case 63,93% 100,00% 100,00% 76,93% 0,00% 63,19% 25,65% 0,00% 12,02% 100,00% 24,25% 59,69%
% Loss on Tier 1 Exceptional case 27,89% 11,58% 0,00% 10,47% 20,24% 97,81% 24,27% 44,60% 18,92% 13,82% 31,44% 10,24%
Benefit score 7 10 10 9 4 4 6 3 5 10 5 8
MOODY'S A1 A3 A1 A2 Baa2 Baa1 Baa1 Baa1 Baa1 A2 A2 A1
Numeric equivalent 5 7 5 6 9 8 8 8 8 6 6 5
CDS Senior 5y 82,193 194,799 79,651 81,582 139,185 184,089 68,642 134,668 136,165 80,967 120,070 75,942
∆CDS 5y 93,474 206,121 94,527 108,393 142,706 205,649 84,569 141,413 147,167 93,130 165,643 142,033
2015
% Loss on Tier 1 Base case 66,95% 98,41% 100,00% 81,21% 0,77% 24,64% 60,48% 0,58% 4,18% 100,00% 36,92% 74,61%
% Loss on Tier 1 Exceptional case 34,65% 20,36% 0,00% 18,01% 25,01% 54,84% 33,95% 51,43% 21,09% 15,73% 34,29% 22,04%
Benefit score 7 9 10 9 4 4 7 3 5 10 6 8
MOODY'S A1 A3 A2 A2 Baa2 Baa1 Baa1 Withdrawn Baa1 A2 Baa1 A2
Numeric equivalent 5 7 6 6 9 8 8 8 6 8 6
CDS Senior 5y 67,806 82,393 71,369 80,257 102,862 122,611 62,537 102,471 92,179 66,845 86,903 64,307
∆CDS 5y 69,590 90,709 79,786 97,356 98,479 135,746 72,460 95,999 90,362 70,265 112,096 84,547
2014
% Loss on Tier 1 Base case 92,35% 90,17% 100,00% 92,08% 6,16% 23,02% 37,64% 0,00% 7,97% 100% 61,58% 93,10%
% Loss on Tier 1 Exceptional case 42,99% 9,56% 7,07% 27,95% 38,18% 63,76% 1,76% 44,24% 23,26% 20,90% 63,70% 44,12%
Benefit score 8 10 10 9 4 3 7 3 5 9 5 8
MOODY'S A1 A3 A2 A2 Baa1 Baa2 A3 Baa2 Baa2 A2 Baa1 A2
Numeric equivalent 5 7 6 6 8 9 7 9 9 6 8 6
CDS Senior 5y 68,440 75,694 75,533 83,761 93,732 118,748 62,633 95,925 98,954 68,319 91,257 67,810
∆CDS 5y 42,372 54,380 45,510 56,465 51,199 64,534 48,887 52,136 55,219 52,283 93,606 85,772
2013
% Loss on Tier 1 Base case 63,90% 100,00% 100,00% 96,49% 5,26% 28,11% 76,01% 0,00% 3,74% 100,00% 57,90% 90,48%
% Loss on Tier 1 Exceptional case 28,75% 29,70% 36,77% 36,39% 29,66% 81,18% 8,66% 50,17% 30,13% 17,26% 43,51% 49,31%
Benefit score 7 9 9 9 4 3 9 3 4 10 6 8
MOODY'S A2 A2 A2 A2 Baa2 A3 Baa3 Baa2 A2 Baa1 A2
Numeric equivalent 6 6 6 6 9 7 10 9 6 8 6
CDS Senior 5y 123,793 102,119 157,314 157,579 236,198 291,231 122,331 248,936 270,999 158,969 151,591 108,615
∆CDS 5y 76,765 72,120 106,724 105,938 96,729 156,286 74,725 103,491 120,156 104,157 206,964 122,533
2012
% Loss on Tier 1 Base case 68,23% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 22,16% 4,86% 84,18% 6,71% 0,00% 100,00% 82,70% 100,00%
% Loss on Tier 1 Exceptional case 21,86% 24,72% 35,59% 27,82% 48,42% 38,82% 1,55% 62,07% 26,45% 33,86% 56,44% 72,73%
Benefit score 8 9 9 9 4 4 10 3 4 9 7 7
MOODY'S A2 A2 A2 A2 Baa2 A3 Baa3 Baa2 A2 A3 A2
Numeric equivalent 6 6 6 6 9 7 10 9 6 7 6
CDS Senior 5y 211,560 160,630 254,704 267,907 346,260 413,255 186,723 364,791 383,979 228,869 233,864 N.A.
∆CDS 5y 166,699 111,701 234,903 201,520 191,227 259,133 114,469 245,839 215,567 203,705 357,553 N.A.
Downgrade Upgrade  
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2016 Caixa Bank KBC Group Banco Sabadell Erste Group Bankia Bank of Ireland UBI Raiffeisen Allied Irish Banks Mediobanca Bankinter
% Loss on Tier 1 Base case 13,46% 21,14% 27,79% 0,00% 11,63% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 25,88%
% Loss on Tier 1 Exceptional case 19,21% 0,12% 39,98% 30,33% 22,22% 0,00% 41,51% 33,34% 0,00% 20,73% 56,03%
Benefit score 5 7 5 4 5 6 3 4 6 4 4
MOODY'S Baa2 Baa1 Baa3 Baa1 Ba3 Baa2 Baa3 Baa2 Baa3 Baa2
Numeric equivalent 9 8 10 8 13 9 10 9 10 9
CDS Senior 5y 153,183 58,779 167,799 136,685 172,365 162,853 210,953 213,140 136,381 187,007 138,168
∆CDS 5y 173,082 52,031 161,254 158,440 218,222 149,450 230,326 406,204 126,848 191,833 148,310
2015
% Loss on Tier 1 Base case 1,73% 21,25% 28,42% 0,00% 25,21% 8,04% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 18,43%
% Loss on Tier 1 Exceptional case 18,71% 13,67% 48,84% 43,25% 31,58% 0,00% 23,64% 54,14% 0,00% 26,17% 51,45%
Benefit score 5 6 4 3 5 6 4 3 6 4 4
MOODY'S Baa2 Withdrawn Ba1 Baa2 B1 Ba1 Baa2 Baa2 Ba1 Baa2
Numeric equivalent 9 11 9 14 11 9 9 11 9
CDS Senior 5y 121,905 58,208 152,083 147,725 138,910 142,778 145,463 252,757 133,485 126,241 115,070
∆CDS 5y N.A. 68,974 131,323 209,410 161,616 146,756 116,328 565,357 139,752 121,068 99,738
2014
% Loss on Tier 1 Base case 0,00% 12,24% 10,97% 11,15% 50,04% 14,62% 0,00% 11,93% 0,00% 0,00% 19,25%
% Loss on Tier 1 Exceptional case 15,00% 11,92% 42,14% 65,24% 50,27% 24,54% 26,18% 74,78% 2,58% 40,92% 44,23%
Benefit score 5 6 4 3 5 5 4 2 5 3 4
MOODY'S Baa3 A3 Ba2 Baa2 B1 Ba1 Baa3 Baa1 Ba3 Baa3
Numeric equivalent 10 7 12 9 14 11 10 8 13 10
CDS Senior 5y 107,630 85,685 143,964 127,137 136,707 170,705 114,970 154,801 164,598 104,896 116,237
∆CDS 5y N.A. 72,490 96,192 126,652 99,365 113,083 93,200 183,309 103,902 N.A. 61,648
2013
% Loss on Tier 1 Base case 7,56% 29,20% 23,50% 0,36% 76,36% 30,45% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 25,69%
% Loss on Tier 1 Exceptional case 36,33% 31,84% 50,01% 41,48% 80,90% 45,55% 12,73% 62,62% 22,24% 56,60% 45,64%
Benefit score 4 5 4 3 5 5 5 2 4 3 5
MOODY'S Baa3 Baa1 Ba1 A3 B1 Ba3 Baa3 A2 B1 Ba1
Numeric equivalent 10 8 11 7 14 13 10 6 14 11
CDS Senior 5y N.A. 153,783 366,916 145,716 579,262 327,461 250,928 148,895 N.A. 214,327 279,125
∆CDS 5y N.A. 74,761 193,335 111,344 81,335 178,853 133,218 112,236 N.A. 158,706 132,587
2012
% Loss on Tier 1 Base case 18,90% 23,56% 37,25% 0,00% 100,00% 31,16% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 42,50%
% Loss on Tier 1 Exceptional case 53,98% 31,78% 73,96% 38,67% 100,00% 32,83% 57,37% 61,34% 27,00% 55,40% 67,71%
Benefit score 4 5 4 4 6 5 3 2 4 3 4
MOODY'S Baa3 Baa1 Ba1 A3 Ba2 Ba2 Baa2 A2 Ba3 Ba1
Numeric equivalent 10 8 11 7 12 12 9 6 13 11
CDS Senior 5y N.A. 299,870 585,173 232,275 879,975 668,899 385,057 241,890 N.A. 363,522 488,900
∆CDS 5y N.A. 247,003 422,958 184,337 286,736 N.A. 247,066 194,205 N.A. 259,353 314,689
70 
 
7. List of figures 
Figure 1. Banking sector: Net fiscal costs of state aid in 2008-14 (% of GDP) ...…………….4 
Figure 2. Stylised example of loss absorption and bank recapitalization after a bail-in ...…....7 
Figure 3. The three pillars on which rests the Single Rulebook …………………………….12 
Figure 4. Write down of capital instruments ………………………………………………...14 
Figure 5. TLAC compared to MREL ………………………………………………………..19 
Figure 6. Timeline of bail-in events before the entrance into force of the BRRD …………..22 
Figure 7. Market’s reaction to the resolution decision ………………………………………22 
Figure 8. Different capital structures can lead to different indicators ……………………….28 
Figure 9. Commonly established CDS credit events ………………………………………..34 
Figure 10. Evolution over time of CDS on senior and junior unsecured debt with different maturities ……35 
Figure 11. CDS on unsecured debt of 2016 ...……………………………………………….36 
Figure 12. Evolution over time between the CDS spread and the Euro STOXX index price ……...37 
Figure 13. Moody’s BCA scale .……………………………………………………………..39 
Figure 14. Overview of the weight to address the Financial Profile ………………………...40 
Figure 15. Pool comparison over the years ………………………………………………….45 
Figure 16. Performance comparison between AIM segment and FTSE MIB for the year 2017 …...48 
Figure 17. Continental banks vs peripherical banks ………………………………………...49 
Figure 18. Summary of the results for the main banks of the index ………………………...50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
71 
 
8. List of tables 
Table 1. Overview of deposits eligible for MREL and bail-in ...…………………………….17 
Table 2. 2016 EU-wide Stress Test: main results for Banco Popular ……………………….23 
Table 3. List of the 26 banks composing the Euro STOXX index and their status in 2016 ….30 
Table 4. Waterfall approach to calculate the extent of losses on 8% TL ……………………31 
Table 5. Waterfall approach to calculate the extent of losses on 20% RWA ..………………32 
Table 6. Moody’s ratings on senior unsecured debt ………………………………………....41 
Table 7. Building the Benefit score ………………………………………………………….43 
Table 8. Deutsche Bank example ……………………………………………………………43 
Table 9. Top 12 banks of the Euro STOXX index by market cap …………………………..44 
Table 10. Pearson correlations ………………………………………………………………45 
Table 11. Pearson correlations with second scenario ……………………………………….46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
9. References 
Acharya V., Drechsler I. & Schnable P (2011). A Pyrrhic Victory Bank Bail-outs and 
Sovereign Credit Risk., NBER Working Paper. 
Avgouleas, E., & Goodhart, C. A. (2014). A critical evaluation of bail-in as a bank 
recapitalisation mechanism. CEPR. 
Barlaam R. (2017). Atlante: non ci sono le condizioni per altri investimenti in banche venete, 
Il Sole 24 Ore. 
Available at: http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/finanza-e-mercati/2017-05-30/atlante-non-
ci-sono-condizioni-altri-investimenti-banche-venete-180758.shtml?uuid=AEd9PnVB 
 
Bulow, J. I., & Klemperer, P. (2013). Market-based bank capital regulation.  
Collins M. (2015). The Big Bank Bailout. Forbes. 
Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikecollins/2015/07/14/the-big-bank-bail-
out/#37ad8fbf2d83 
 
Council on foreign relations (2015). The Credit Rating Controversy. 
Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/credit-rating-controversy 
 
Deloitte white paper (May 2017). Asset management in Italy: a snapshot in an evolutive 
context, pp 10-11. 
Financial Sector Advisory Center (2017). Understanding Bank recovery and resolution in the 
EU: A Guidebook to the BRRD. World Bank Group 
Financial Times (2014). Fear over Banco Espirito Santo trigger stock sell-off 
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/4b0ce5ce-0815-11e4-9afc-00144feab7de 
Franceschi A. (2016). Focus su Deutsche Bank e banche austriache, Il Sole 24 Ore. 
Available at: http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/finanza-e-mercati/2016-07-24/focus-
deutsche-bank-e-banche-austriache--161355.shtml?uuid=AD2KZ5w 
 
Giugliano F. (2017). Here's What the Banco Popular Post-Mortem Shows, Bloomberg view. 
73 
 
Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-06-14/here-s-what-the-
banco-popular-post-mortem-shows 
 
Honohan, P. (2017). Management and resolution of banking crises: Lessons from recent 
european experience. Peterson Institute for International Economics.  
Hull J. C. (2015). Futures, Options and Other Derivatives. Pearson, ninth edition. Page 573. 
Hüser, A. (2017). The systemic implications of bail-in. European Central Bank.  
Il sole 24 Ore (February 2013). L'Olanda nazionalizza la banca Sns Reaal con un esborso di 
3,7 miliardi. Ha fatto crac sul mattone. 
Available at: http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/finanza-e-mercati/2013-02-01/olanda-
nazionalizza-banca-reaal-091506_PRV.shtml?uuid=AbcLBCQH 
 
Ivry B., Keoun B. & Kuntz P. (2011). Secret Fed Loans Gave Banks $13 Billion Undisclosed 
to Congress, Bloomberg Markets. 
Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-11-28/secret-fed-loans-
undisclosed-to-congress-gave-banks-13-billion-in-income 
Kremer W. (2013). Laiki Bank: The Cyprus bank staff hit worst of all, BBC World Service. 
Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-22042727 
 
LaBrosse, J. R., Olivares-Caminal, R., & Singh, D. (2011). Managing risk in the financial 
system. Cheltenham, Gloucestershire.  
Lecchi S. (2017). The PIR: a Very Interesting Opportunity for Any Italian Saver, Pragma 
International.  
Available at: http://pragma.international/article/the-pir-a-very-interesting-opportunity-
for-any-italian-saver 
 
Lintner P. & Lincoln J. (2017). Bank resolution and bail-in in the EU: selected case studies 
pre and post BRRD, World Bank Group, pp 18-60. 
74 
 
Micossi S., Bruzzone G. & Cassella M. (2016). Fine-tuning the use of bail-in to promote a 
stronger EU financial system, CEPS Special Report No. 136. 
Miyashiro A. K. (2017). Supervisory Bodies in the Italian Banking System, Seven Pillars 
Institute. 
Morgenson G. (2017). Lessons from the collapse of Banco Popular, NY Times. 
Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/business/lessons-from-the-collapse-
of-banco-popular.html 
 
Ozyasar H. (2016). Market capitalization vs. total assets, The Nest. 
Available at: https://budgeting.thenest.com/market-capitalization-vs-total-assets-
21419.html 
 
Philippon, T. (2017). Bail-ins and bank resolution in Europe. Geneva: ICMB, International 
Center for Monetary and Banking Studies.  
Press release of the European Central Bank (June 2017). ECB Deemed Veneto Banca and 
Banca Popolare di Vicenza failing or Likely to Fail. 
Press release of the European Commission (November 2012). State aid: Commission 
approves restructuring plans of Spanish banks BFA/Bankia, NCG Banco, Catalunya 
Banc and Banco de Valencia. 
Raymond J., Karia P. & Knepper L. (2017). Banco Popular: Resolution, Santander, AT1 loss. 
CreditSights. 
Reinhart C. M. & Rogoff K. S. (2014). Recovery from Financial Crises: Evidence from 100 
Episodes. 
Sackey-Addo L., Adamson S., Karia P., Knepper L., Raymond J., Picagne P. & Raymond T. 
(2017). Euro financial movers: Bail-in, Italian style. CreditSights. 
Sanderson R. (2016). Once-thriving Veneto Becomes Heart of Italy’s Bank Crisis, Financial 
Times. 
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/04869eca-b15e-11e6-9c37-5787335499a0 
75 
 
Schäfer A., Schnabel I. & Weder di Mauro B. (2016). Bail-in expectations for European 
banks, CEPR. 
Schoenmaker, D., & Veron, N. (2017). A "twin peaks" vision for Europe. Bruegel Policy 
Contribution Issue. 
Sirletti S. & Weber A. (2017). Italy Commits $19 Billion for Veneto Banks in Biggest Rescue, 
Bloomberg news. 
Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-25/italy-mobilizes-up-
to-19-billion-to-keep-veneto-banks-afloat 
 
The Economist (2017). Is Europe’s framework for resolving banks broken. 
Available at: https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21724394-liquidation-two-
italian-banks-raises-awkward-questions-criticism-overdone 
 
The Economist Intelligence Unit (2011). Amagerbanken's collapse is first test of resolution 
scheme.  
Available at:  
http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1527866337&Country=Denmark&topic=Ec
onomy&subtopic=C_7 
Todescan G. (2016). Timeline: un anno di crisi di Banca Popolare di Vicenza, Veneto 
Economia. 
Available at: http://www.venetoeconomia.it/2016/03/timeline-crisi-banca-popolare-di-
vicenza/ 
 
Uymaz B. (2017). Current debates in public finance, public administration and 
environmental studies, pp 20-28, IJOPEC publication. 
Van Malleghem J. & Colla B (2015). The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. 
Willey S., Pogrel R., Greig J., Heuer D. & Baierlein D. (2017). Recent Developments in Bank 
Resolution – Can Bridge Banks be Resolved?, White & Case. 
Available at: https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/recent-developments-bank-
resolution-can-bridge-banks-be-resolved 
 
76 
 
Zenti R. (2017). 2017, un anno nel segno dei PIR, AdviseOnly. 
Available at: https://www.adviseonly.com/blog/investire/piani-individuali-di-
risparmio/2017-un-anno-nel-segno-dei-pir/ 
 
